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Secon icial District Court - Nez Perce Co User: DEANNA 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002057 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Lewiston Independent School District # 1, eta!. vs. City Of Lewiston 
User Judge 
KATHY New Case Filed-Other Claims Carl B. Kerrick 
KATHY Plaintiff: Lewiston Independent School, Attorney Carl B. Kerrick 
Retained Theodore 0 Creason 
KATHY Plaintiff: Lewis Clark State College Attorney Carl B. Kerrick 
Retained Theodore 0 Creason 
KATHY Plaintiff: Nez Perce County Attorney Retained Carl B. Kerrick 
Theodore 0 Creason 
KATHY Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Carl B. Kerrick 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Creason, Theodore 0 (attorney 
for Lewiston Independent School,) Receipt 
number: 0342968 Dated: 9/28/2009 Amount: 
$88.00 (Check) For: Lewis Clark State College 
(plaintiff) 
KATHY Plaintiff: Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District Carl B. Kerrick 
Attorney Retained Theodore 0 Creason 
KATHY Plaintiff: Port Of Lewiston Attorney Retained Carl B. Kerrick 
Theodore 0 Creason 
KATHY Complaint Filed Carl B. Kerrick 
KATHY Summons Filed Carl B. Kerrick 
JENNY Order Regarding Disqualification of Judge Kerrick Carl B. Kerrick 
JANET Order Assigning Judge (Brudie) Carl B. Kerrick 
JANET Order Re Disqualification of Judge (Brudie) Carl B. Kerrick 
JANET Order Assigning Judge (Stegner) Carl B. Kerrick 
JENNY Acceptance Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
served Don Roberts, city attorney 9-30-09 
JANET Order Re Disqualification of Judge (Stegner) Carl B. Kerrick 
JANET Order Assigning Judge (Bradbury) Carl B. Kerrick 
JANET Change Assigned Judge John Bradbury 
JANET Affidavit Of Service John Bradbury 
JANET Defendant: City Of Lewiston Attorney Retained John Bradbury 
Don L Roberts 
JANET Notice Of Appearance John Bradbury 
JANET Order for Pretrial Sched Conf John Bradbury 
JANET Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference John Bradbury 
12/10/200902:45 PM) by tele from Grangeville 
JANET Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff of Thomas John Bradbury 
Dechert 
JANET Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff of City of John Bradbury 
Lewiston Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) 
JANET Plfs Initial Disclosures John Bradbury 
JANET Notice of Application for Entry of Default Pursuant John Bradbury 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS to IRCP 55(1)(1) /. 
Date: 11/23/2010 
Time: 09:31 AM 























Secon cial District Court - Nez Perce Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002057 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Lewiston Independent School District # 1, etaL vs. City Of Lewiston 
User 
JANET Answer 
JANET Defs initial disclosures 
JANET Litigation Plan (Proposed) 
JANET Amended Notice Of Hearing 
JANET Continued (Pretrial Conference 12/10/2009 
10:30 AM) by tele from Grangeville 
JANET Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
12/10/2009 10:30 AM: Hearing Held by tele 
from Grangeville 
JANET Order (re schedule) 
JANET Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/20/201009:00 
AM) 
SHELLIE Order Pendente Lite 
JANET Stipulation for Entry of Order Pendente Lite 
JANET Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff 
Daniel Marsh 
JANET Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff 
Chris Davies 
JANET Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff 
Shawn Stubbers 
JANET Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff 
Keith Bingman 
JANET Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff 
Thomas Dechert 
JANET Notice Of Service-defendant of Interrogatories, 
Request for Admission, and Request for 
Production of Documents on Nez Pece County 
JANET Notice Of Service-defendant of Interrogatories, 
Request for Admission, and Request for 
Production of Documents on Lewiston 
Independent School Dist #1 
JANET Notice Of Service-defendant of Interrogatories, 
Request for Admission, and Request for 
Production of Documents on Port of Lewiston 
JANET Notice Of Service-defendant of Interrogatories, 
Request for Admission, and Request for 
Production of Documents on Lewiston Orchards 
Irrigation Dist 
JANET Notice Of Service-defendant of Interrogatories, 
Request for Admission, and Request for 
Production of Documents on Lewis-Clark State 
College 
JANET Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff 
Chris Davies 
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Secon icial District Court - Nez Perce Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002057 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Lewiston I ndependent School District # 1, eta!. vs. City Of Lewiston 
User 
JANET Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition-plaintiff 
Shawn Stubbers 
PAM Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order 
PAM Affidavit of Theodore O. Creason Re: Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Protective Order 






PAM Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order John Bradbury 
JANET Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions John Bradbury 
03/19/2010 10:00 AM) Plfs Motion for Protective 
Order 
JANET Plfs Brief Filed in Response to Defs Objection to John Bradbury 
Motion for Protective Order 
JANET Affidavit of Chet Herbst Re: Plfs Brief in John Bradbury 
Response to Defn's Objectionto Motion for 
Protective Order 
JANET Affidavit of David Doeringsfeld Re" Plfs Brief in John Bradbury 
Response to Defn's Objection to Motion for 
Protective Order 
JANET Hearing result for Hearing on Motions held on John Bradbury 
03/19/201010:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Plfs 
Motion for Protective Order 
JANET Stipulation Resolving Discovery Issues and John Bradbury 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order in 
Part 
JANET Protective Order John Bradbury 
JANET Notice Of Service Pursuant to IRCP 33, 34 and John Bradbury 
36 
JANET Notice Of Service Pursuant to IRCP 33, 34 and John Bradbury 
36 
JANET Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs John Bradbury 
JANET Memorandum in Support of Plfs Motion for John Bradbury 
Summary Judgment 
JANET Affidavit of Chet Herbst in Support of Plfs Motion John Bradbury 
for Summary Judgment 
JANET Affidavit to Theodore O. Creason in Support of John Bradbury 
Plfs Motion for Summary Judgment 
JANET Notice Of Hearing re Plfs Motion for Summary John Bradbury 
Judgment 
JANET Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John Bradbury 
Judgment 06/11/2010 11 :00 AM) Plaintiffs 
JANET Motion for Summary Judgment (Def) John Bradbury 
JANET Memorandum in Support of Defs Motion for John Bradbury 
Summary Judgment 
JANET Defs reply to Plfs Memo in Support of Motion for John Bradbury 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS Summary Judgment 3. 
Date: 11/23/2010 
Time: 09:31 AM 
















8/24/2010 OR DR 
MISC 
Secon icial District Court - Nez Perce Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002057 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Lewiston Independent School District # 1, etal. vs. City Of Lewiston 
User 
JANET Notice Of Hearing on Defs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
JANET Plfs Response to Defs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
JANET Brief Filed in Support of Plfs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
PAM Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Plfs' & Defs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Hearing date: 6/11/2010 
Time: 11 :02 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: PAM 
Tape Number: Crtrm #1 
Plaintiffs: Theodore Creason 
Defendant: Don Roberts 
PAM Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
held on 06/11/201011:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Plaintiffs and Defs 
PAM Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
held on 06/11/201011:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages Plaintiffs 
and Defs Motions for Summary Judgment 
JANET Memorandum Decision and Order 
JANET Motion Granted (Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment) 
JANET Motion Denied (Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment) 
JANET Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/20/2010 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
JANET Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Lewiston, 
Defendant; Lewis Clark State College, Plaintiff; 
Lewiston Independent School District # 1, 
Plaintiff; Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District, 
Plaintiff; Nez Perce County, Plaintiff; Port Of 
Lewiston, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/16/2010 
JANET Case Status Changed: Closed 
JANET Plfs Memorandum Of Costs 
JANET Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment 
JANET Order for Entry of Final Judgment 
JANET Final Judgment 
9/30/2010 ~STER '2JfA~~IONS Appealed To The Supreme Court 




















lj John Bradbury . 
Date: 11/23/2010 
Time: 09:31 AM 




Secon icial District Court - Nez Perce Coun User: DEANNA 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002057 Current Judge: John Bradbury 




Supreme Court Receipt - Notice of Appeal filed at John Bradbury 
the SC, Clerk's Recordand Reporter's Transcript 
due at the SC by December 10,2010. 
Supreme Court Receipt - Clerk's Certificate filed John Bradbury 
at the SC 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS 5· 
FILED 
ltD sa' L8 f11l Z. 1.f5 
Theodore O. Creason, ISB # 1563 
CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL ) 
DISTRICT #1, an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; LEWIS-CLARK STATE ) 
COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal ) 
subdivision of the state ofIdaho; PORT OF ) 
LEWISTON, a publicly created Port District ) 
within Nez Perce County, Idaho; and ) 
LEWISTON ORCHARDS IRRlGATION ) 
DISTRICT, a duly organized Irrigation 
District within Nez Perce County, Idaho, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF LEWISTON, an Idaho Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 















O 0 r'H'1 1- ~ CV,9.,.iLU:)! 
COMPLAINT 
Fee Category: A 
Fee: $88.00 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
COME NOW the plaintiffs, NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal subdivision of the state of 
Idaho; PORT OF LEWISTON, a publicly created Port District within Nez Perce County, Idaho; 
LEWIS-CLARK STATE COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and corporate; LEWISTON 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT #1, an Idaho body politic and corporate; and 
LEWISTON ORCHARDS IRRIGATION DISTRICT, a duly organized Irrigation District within 
Nez Perce County, Idaho, by and through their attorney of record, Theodore O. Creason of 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC, and for claim against the defendant, allege as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
I. 
The defendant, the City of Lewiston (City), is a body corporate and politic municipal 
corporation and chartered city of the State ofIdaho. 
II. 
That jurisdiction and venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
in and for the County of Nez Perce pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
III. 
At all times relevant hereto, the plaintiffs have owned or occupied property within the 
corporate limits of the City of Lewiston. The properties owned or occupied by the plaintiffs 
include without limitation those properties upon which the City of Lewiston has by invoice 
identified as parcels subject to assessment under Ordinance No. 4512. 
IV. 
The plaintiffs as governmental entities are severally exempt from the imposition of 
municipal taxes under the provisions of Idaho Code section 63-602A (exempting property 
COMPLAINT - Page 2 
toc/governmental entitieslpleading!complaint 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
7~ 
belonging to the state, county, municipal corporation, or school district from taxation); Idaho 
Code section 63-602N (exempting irrigation water rights, irrigation infrastructure, and irrigation 
organizations from property taxes); Idaho Code section 63-602E (exempting property used for 
nonprofit school and educational purposes from taxation); Idaho Code section 63-6020 
(exempting property used for generating and delivering power for irrigation and drainage 
purposes from taxation); Idaho Code section 70-2206 (exempting property owned by port 
districts that is used for intermodal authority purposes from municipal taxes). 
V. 
On August 11, 2008, the City passed Ordinance No. 4512 (Ordinance), which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A, establishing a stormwater utility and imposing a stormwater utility fee on all 
persons "responsible for properties" within the Lewiston City limits. 
VI. 
On October 27, 2008, the City passed Resolution 2008-55, attached hereto as Exhibit B, 
which establishes the applicable stormwater utility fee to be imposed through October 1, 2010. 
VII. 
Pursuant to the Ordinance, the stormwater utility fee imposed on each parcel of property 
is based on the property's classification as residential or non-residential. 
VIII. 
The stormwater utility fee imposed on each non-residential property is further appraised 
based on the square footage of impervious surface located on the property. 
COMPLAINT - Page 3 
toc/governmental entities/pieadingicompiaint 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
IX. 
Since the adoption of the Ordinance, the Plaintiffs received storm water utility fee 
assessments for their respective properties of at least: 
Nez Perce County $87,370.00 
Port of Lewiston $30,828.00 
Lewis-Clark State College $ 6,943.02 
Lewiston Independent School District #1 $15,427.36 
Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District $ 768.00 
x. 
Plaintiffs Nez Perce County, Port of Lewiston and Lewis-Clark State College paid the 
stormwater utility fees assessed on their respective properties in amounts not less than as follows: 
Nez Perce County $ 1,464.00 
Port of Lewiston $11,109.14 
Lewis-Clark State College $ 6,943.02 
XI. 
Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action having suffered a distinct and palpable injury 
that has a fairly traceable causal connection to the City's imposition of the stormwater utility fee. 
XII. 
The plaintiffs' claims against the City present a real and substantial controversy regarding 
the validity of the stormwater utility fee, which is capable of being resolved by judicial decree 
including, but not limited to, the issuance of an injunction or declaratory judgment. 
COMPLAINT - Page 4 
toc/governmental entities/pleadillg/complaillt 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, 10 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 q .. 
XIII. 
Ordinance No. 4512 has been passed, is currently in force, and contains provisions for 
enforcement. Additionally, the City has sent invoices to each plaintiff for parcels of property 
owned or occupied by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' claims against the City are ripe for judicial 
reVIew. 
XIV. 
The plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative remedies because their claims 
challenging the validity of the Ordinance are exempt from the exhaustion requirement. 
COUNT ONE 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
The City Acted Outside of its Constitutional Authority 
xv. 
The City's power to tax or regulate is limited to grants of authority given it by the Idaho 
Legislature. 
XVI. 
The Idaho Legislature has not granted the City, or any Idaho municipal corporation, the 
authority to impose a storm water utility tax on plaintiffs, except as may be specifically provided 
and regulated under Title 50, Chapter 3, Title 50, Chapter 10, Title 50, Chapter 20, and Title 50, 
Chapter 31 of the Idaho Code. The City's Ordinance exceeds these Constitutional and legislative 
grants of authority and as such is ultra virus. 
COMPLAINT - Page 5 
lac/governmental entities/pieadingicompiainl 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
/0· 
XVII. 
The stonnwater utility fee established by Ordinance No. 4512 and Resolution 2008-55 is 
a disguised tax imposed in violation ofthe Idaho Constitution. 
XVIII. 
By enacting Ordinance No. 4512 and approving Resolution 2008-55, the City acted 
outside of its authority. 
XIX. 
Ordinance No. 4512 and Resolution 2008-55 are not authorized under Idaho law and are 
void and unenforceable. 
xx. 
The City has no authority to enforce an invalid ordinance. 
The Stormwater Utility Fee Violates Article 7, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution 
XXI. 
Article 7, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution requires all taxes be "unifonn upon the same 
class of subj ects within the territorial limits, of the authority levying the tax." 
XXII. 
The stonnwater utility fee violates Article 7, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution as it 
imposes a non-unifonn tax on non-residential properties within the city limits. 
Alternatively, if the Stormwater Utility Fee is not a Disguised Tax, the Fee is Invalid 
Because it is Arbitrary and Unreasonable. 
XXIII. 
Under Idaho law, municipalities have the authority to impose fees for services rendered. 
COMPLAINT - Page 6 
toc/governmental entitieslpleading/complaint 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 II 
• 
XXIV. 
The City does not provide a service in connection with the stormwater "utility fee," which 
as plaintiffs allege is instead a disguised tax. 
xxv. 
The City's failure to provide a servIce in connection with the imposition of the fee 
renders the fee arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Declaration Requested 
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring: 
(a) That the City acted outside of its authority in enacting Ordinance No. 4512 and 
approving Resolution No. 2008-55. 
(b) That Ordinance No. 4512 and Resolution No. 2008-55 are void and unenforceable 
as a matter of law. 
(c) That all stormwater utility fees imposed pursuant to the Ordinance and Resolution 
are void. 
(d) That all subsequent ordinances, agreements, or resolutions modifying Ordinance 
No. 4512 be declared invalid by virtue of the Ordinance's illegality. 
(e) That any funds collected pursuant to Ordinance No. 4512 and Resolution 2008-55 
be returned to the party assessed. 
(f) That the payment of the stormwater utility fee poses potential harm to the 
Plaintiffs, who lack a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy under Idaho Code sections 7-303 and 
7-403. 
COMPLAINT - Page 7 
toc/governmental entities/pieadingicomplaint 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 




Under Idaho law, injunctive relief precluding collection of a fee or tax pending the 
outcome of litigation may be granted to a plaintiff challenging the validity of the fee. 
XXVII. 
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiffs seek an injunction: 
(a) Precluding the City from collecting future stormwater utility fees imposed by 
Ordinance No. 4512 pending the outcome of the litigation. 
(b) Prohibiting the City from bringing enforcement actions for collection of past due 
stormwater utility fees pending the outcome of the litigation. 
(c) Requiring the City to reimburse the plaintiffs for any stormwater utilities they may 
have already paid under the ordinance should the ordinance be declared invalid. 
COUNT THREE 
Writ of Prohibition 
XXVIII. 
By enacting Ordinance No. 4512, the City acted in excess of its jurisdiction and outside 
the authority conferred by law. Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief through a writ of 
prohibition issued by the court pursuant to Idaho Code section 7-402: 
(a) Precluding the City from collecting the stormwater utility fee imposed by 
Ordinance No. 4512 and Resolution 2008-55. 
COMPLAINT - Page 8 
toc/governmental entities/pleading/complaint 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
13 . 
(b) Prohibiting the City from enforcing the storrnwater utility ordinance and 
resolution. 
XXIX. 
The plaintiffs have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. 
COUNT FOUR 
Writ of Mandate 
xxx. 
By collecting payments in amounts not less than the amounts set forth in Paragraph X 
above, the City of Lewiston has collected monies under the auspices of Ordinance No. 4512 and 
Resolution 2008-55, which said Ordinance and Resolution plaintiffs allege are void and 
constitute a disguised tax. As such, the City of Lewiston holds all sums collected from the 
plaintiffs in constructive trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs having paid the disguised tax as set 
forth in Paragraph X. 
The plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law. Based on the foregoing, 
the plaintiffs seek a Writ of Mandate: 
(a) Requiring the City Treasurer forthwith to segregate all such funds heretofore paid 
under the Ordinance and Resolution. 
(b) Pay them over to the proper statutory authority for refund to the parties from 
whom the disguised tax was collected. 
COMPLAINT - Page 9 
toc/governmental entitieslpleading!complaint 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray as follows: 
1. For a Preliminary Injunction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(a) and 65(e) prohibiting the 
City of Lewiston from collecting the stormwater utility fee pending the outcome ofthe litigation. 
2. For a Writ of Prohibition and a Permanent Injunction restraining the City from 
taking action to implement or enforce Ordinance No. 4512. 
3. For a Writ of Mandate pursuant to I.R.c.P. 74(a) for return of monies collected. 
4. For a judgment declaring Ordinance No. 4512, the fee it imposes, and any actions 
by the City taken in accordance with the Ordinance void and invalid. 
5. For an award of attorney fees and costs as provided by law, including, but not 
limited to those allowed by Idaho Code section 12-117 and the private attorney general doctrine. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2009. 
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EXHIBIT A 
COMPLAINT 
1 ORDINANCE NO. 4512 
2 
3 AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF LEWISTON ENACTING NEW SECTIONS 
4 OF THE LEWISTON CITY CODE TO BE CODIFIED AS LEWISTON CITY 
5 CODE SECTIONS 36-151 THROUGH 36-162; ESTABLISHING A STORM 
6 WATER UTILITY AND A STORM WATER UTILITY FEE; PROVIDING 
7 DEFINITIONS; AUTHORIZING A UTILITY RATE STRUCTURE; 
8 AUTHORIZING CREDITS AGAINST CHARGES; PROVIDING FOR 
9 ADMINSTRATION OF THE STORM WATER UTILITY; PROVIDING FOR 
10 THEAPPEAL AND RECALCULATION OF FEES; EST ABLISIDNG UTILITY 
11 BILLING AND DELINQUENCY PROCEDURES; ESTABLISIDNG A STORM 
12 WATER ENTERPRISE FUND; REPEALING ALL ORDINANCES AND PARTS 
13 OF ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT HEREWITH; PROVIDING A 
14 SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
15 
16 WHEREAS, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency is issuing a National 
17 Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit requiring a storm water 
18 management plan to reduce pollutant loading to receiving waters of the United States, 
19 which specifically identifies the Snake River and the Clearwater River branches of Lower 
20 Granite Reservoir, Tammany Creek, and Lindsay Creek, under the authority of the Clean 
21 Water Act; and 
22 
23 WHEREAS, the City Council recognizes that the NPDES permit requires the City 
24 to take certain responsibilities for water quality in all storm water facilities and 
25 conveyances, natural or man-made, owned and/or operated by the City; and 
26 
27 WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Lewiston (the "City") has determined 
28 that the City's growth and development will continue to increase the volume of storm 
29 water runoff collected in and routed through the City's man-made and natural storm water 
30 facilities ("storm water system"); and 
31 
32 WHEREAS, the City Council finds that storm water runoff causes property 
33 damage and erosion; carries concentrations of various pollutants into receiving waters; 
34 degrades the integrity of City streets and the transportation system; reduces citizen access 
35 to emergency services; and poses hazards to both lives and property; and 
36 
37 WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that storm water runoff must be 
38 managed in a manner that protects the public health, safety and welfare; and 
39 
40 WHEREAS, the City Council finds that implementation of City-approved storm 
41 water design criteria, regulations, maintenaI1ce, improvements, water quality 
42 management, public awareness and code enforcement are necessary to ensure adequate 




2 WHEREAS, the City Council fmds that establishing a Storm Water Utility 
3 provides the funding necessary to enable on-going maintenance, operation, regulation, 
4 water quality management and improvement of the system; and 
5 
6 WHEREAS, the City Council finds that all impervious surfaces within the City's 
7 boundaries contribute runoff to the City's storm water system; that all utility users having 
8 impervious surface areas make use of or benefit from the City's maintenance, operation 
9 and improvement of the storm water system; and that all such Storm Water Utility users 
10 should participate in funding of the City's program for maintenance, operation and 
11 improvement of the storm water system; and 
12 
13 wirEREAS, The City Council finds that it has authority, through its police power 
14 as well as through I.C. 50-1027 et seq., I.C. 50-304, I.C. 50-315, I.C. 50-332 and I.C. 50-
15 33 to establish a Storm Water Utility. 
16 
17 
18 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED, by the Mayor and City Council of the 
19 
20 City of Lewiston: 
21 
22 SECTION ONE: That new sections to be codified as Lewiston City Code 
23 





29 ARTICLE V. STORM WATER UTILITY ORDINANCE 
30 
31 Sec.36-151. Purpose. 
32 The City Council finds and declares the need for adequate and effective maintenance, 
33 operation, regulation and control of the existing storm water drainage system in all areas 
34 within the City to improve the health, safety and general welfare of the City. The City 
35 Council finds that those citizens receiving the benefits of the City's management of the 
36 storm water drainage system should pay for those benefits through a storm water fee. 
37 The City Council finds that the establishment of a Storm Water Utility is the preferred 
38 funding and management method for the City's storm water system. 
39 
40 Sec. 36-152. Definitions. 
41 Impervious Surface: Impervious surfaces are mainly constructed surfaces - rooftops, 
42 sidewalks, roads, driveways, parking lots - covered by impenetrable materials such as 
43 asphalt, concrete, and roofing materials. These materials seal surfaces, repel water and 
44 prevent precipitation and meltwater from inf}ltrating soils. Soils compacted by urban 
45 development are also highly impervious. . 
2 
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1 Persons Responsible: The owner, agent, occupant, lessee, tenant, contract purchaser, or 
2 other person having possession or control of property or the supervision of an 
3 improvement on the property. 
4 Utility: For the purposes of this chapter, all references to "Utility" refer to the Storm 
5 Water Utility. 
6 ERU or Equivalent Residential Unit: For the purposes of this chapter, all reference to 
7 "ERU" shall mean an impervious surface of four thousand (4,000) square feet. 
8 
9 Sec. 36·153. Storm Water Utility Created. 
10 There is hereby created and established a Storm Water Utility and service charge rate 
11 structure. The Utility will have regulatory authority for planning, design, construction, 
12 maintenance, administration and operation of all City storm water conveyances and 
13 facilities. 
14 
15 Sec. 36·154. Utility Administration. 
16 The Storm Water Utility will be administered by the City in a manner consistent with 
17 other City Utilities. The organization structure of the Utility will be approved by 
18 resolution of the City Council. 
19 
20 Sec. 36~155. Applicability. 
21 All persons responsible for properties within the corporate limits of the City of Lewiston 
22 are subject to the regulatory authority of the Storm Water Utility and shall pay a service 
23 charge determined by the rate structure created by this chapter. 
24 
25 Sec. 36-156. Rate Structure. 
26 The Storm Water Utility rate structure shall be b~ed on property parcels as identified in 
27 the Nez Perce County property records. Ail property parcels within the City will be 
28 classed into one of two classes, residential or non-re~idential, based on such classes in the 
29 Nez Perce County property records and ~ desigmlte,d in Idaho Administrative Rules, 
30 IDAP A 35.01.03.130, except that manufactured homes on single lots will be considered 
31 residential and manufactured home in manufactured home courts or parks will be 
32 considered commercial for the purposes of this section. 
33 
34 All residential class property parcels shall be assigned a value of one (1) ERU. 
35 
36 All non-residential class property parcels shall be assigned a value of one (1) or 
37 more ERUs. The ERU value for each non-residential property shall be 
38 determined as foIlows: 
39 1) The City shall determine the area of impervious surface for each parcel 
40 2) The City shall divide each parcel's impervious surface area by the surface area 
41 of one ERU, 4,000 square feet. 
42 3) The City shall assign an ERU value of 1 or the result of the division in step 2, 






1 Sec. 36-157. Fee Established. 
2 Each person responsible for properties within the City shall be subject to the provisions 
3 of this chapter and shall pay a Storm Water Utility Fee for each ERU assigned to property 
4 parcels for which they are responsible. The fee per ERU shall be reviewed annually and 
5 set by resolution of the City Council. 
6 
7 Sec. 36-158. Exemptions and Credits. 
8 The City Council may establish credits and exemptions to the rate structure established in 
9 Sec 36-156. Credits and exemptions may be established for classes of parcels identifiable 
10 in the Nez Perce County Tax Parcel base map. All credits and exemptions shall be 
11 reviewed annually by the City Council as part of s~tting the fee for each ERU. 
12 
13 Sec. 36-159. Appeal and Recalculation of Fee. 
14 (a) If a person responsible for properties within the City and subject to the fee 
15 established by this chapter believes that a particular assigned fee is unwarranted or based 
16 on an incorrect calculation of impervious surface or other aspect of the rate structure, 
17 such person responsible may appeal the fee. 
18 (b) The appellant must first request that the Utility recalculate or explain the fee by 
19 requesting in writing such recalculation or explanation. The request must identifY the 
20 basis for disagreement with the assessed fee and be accompanied by relevant supporting 
21 documentation. The Utility shall review the request and notifY the appellant of its 
22 decision, in writing, no later than 30 calendar days following receipt of the completed 
23 written request for explanation or recalculation. 
24 (c) If the appellant still believes that the fee is unwarranted, a written appeal may be 
25 submitted to the City of Lewiston Public Works Director, with supporting 
26 documentation. The Public Works Director shall notifY the appellant, within 60 calendar 
27 days following receipt of the completed written appeal, with a decision on the appeal. 
28 
29 Sec. 36-160. Billing. 
30 Billings for fees assessed under the provisions of this chapter shall be made on a schedule 
31 as determined by the City Council. All service fees shall be paid to the City of Lewiston. 
32 Billings shall be assessed to the record owner of the parcel against which the fee is being 
33 charged. . 
34 
35 Sec. 36-161. Unpaid Fees and Charges; Lien. 
36 The owner, to the extent permitted by law,an<:i OC~)lpant of any such premises subject to 
37 the fee created by this chapter shall bejointly ah.d severally liable for all fees and charges 
38 assessed by the City. Such fees and charges may be collected in any manner permitted or 
39 hereafter permitted by law. 
40 A delinquency charge often percent (10%) may be assessed on any balance remaining 
41 unpaid at the time of the next succeeding billing. The charges and fees must be received 
42 by the City prior to the due date shown on the invoice or billing statement. 
43 
44 Sec. 36-162. Storm Water Enterprise Fund. 
45 All fees and charges received and collected under authority of this chapter shall be 
46 deposited and credited to a special fund to be designated as the Storm Water Enterprise 
4 
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I Fund. The accounts of the fund shall show all receipts and expenditures for the 
2 maintenance, operation, upkeep and repair and capital outlay of the storm water system, 
3 including the payment of bonds issued to finance such capital outlay. When budgeted and 
4 appropriated, the funds and credits to the account of the Stonn Water Enterprise Fund 
5 shall be available for the payment of the requirements for the maintenance, operation, 
6 repairs and upkeep and improvements of the storm water system of the City, including 
7 the payment of bonds issued therefore. 
8 
9 SECTION TWO: That all ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict with this 
10 
11 ordinance are hereby repealed. 
12 
13 SECTION THREE: The provisions ofthis ordinance are severable and if any 
14 provision, clause, sentence, subsection, word or part thereof is held illegal, invalid, or 
15 unconstitutional or inapplicable to any person or circumstance, such illegality, invalidity 
16 or unconstitutionality or inapplicability shall not affect or impair any of the remaining 
17 provisions, clauses, sentences, subsections, words or parts of this ordinance or their 
18 application to other persons or circumstances. It is hereby declared to be the legislative 
19 intent that this ordinance would have been adopted if such illegal, invalid or 
20 unconstitutional provision, clause sentence, subsection,'word, or part had not been 
21 included therein, and if such person or circumstance to which the ordinance or part 
22 thereof is held inapplicable had been specifically exempt therefrom. 
23 
24 SECTION FOUR: This ordinance shall take effect and be in full force from and 





















City of Lewiston 
IDAHO'S ONLY SEAPORT 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
(208) 746·3671 
CITY COUNCIL MEETING 
AGENDA ITEM HISTORY [COMMENT ARY 
AOENnAN 
Ordinance 4Sl2- Stonn Water Utility nabling 
Ordinance 
AGENOA OATli _ _ _ 
CONSENT: AC1TVc: a 
1>aIc}-7- 0 
ounci) has been discussing the creation of a Storm Water Utility Enterprise Fund over the last several 
month ' during budget work essions. For the last several years, Public Works has been developing the 
dataset and proposed methods for establi hing a stonn water utility, based on the experience of other 
stonnwater utilities in Idaho and other states. The ity already has utilities in place for water 
wastewater, and sanitation services. 
TEM COMMENTAlI.Y (BACKOROUND. DISCUS ION, u,y rorm-s, RF.ooMM OAno " ere.) Pboc: Ick.-.iry ""yonU ioIpKUlh.ia~ ...,i., .. 
Id ......... 0 .. C~)' ........ ..,; .. rc:r--I ft:OOUra:s. 
A Storm Water tility will provide a discrete. foo-based funding source for storm water service 
provided by the City. The Stonn Water Utility will pay for all stOI111 water services in the ity, allowing 
streets to use all of their general fund a1Jocations for treet work as intended, rather than supporting the 
storm water program is currently the case. e torm Water tiljry will result in the City charging 
tonn water fees to each indjvidual property parceJ in the City based on needs to support the City' 
stonn water sy tem and the am unt of storm water runoff each property generates. The Storm Water 
Utility will allow the City Council to set fees on an annual basi to cover any or all oflh following 
system cost : operation and maintenance of the City's stonn water system, NPDE permit requiremen 
capital improvements, and stormwater utility adminislration. 
This is an enabling Ordinance, but does Dot yet set the fee, The fee shall be et subject to budget 
approval. 
en J'ltOPOSF.n 
Staff recommends i Council approve the Water Enabling Ordinance 0 . 45 12. 
MlStorm Wtr Util Fund\CC Agenda Form. Enabling Ordimmcc.doc 
TREE CnY USA 
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A RESOLUTION SETTING STORMWATER UTILITY FEES AND PROVIDING 
AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
WHEREAS Lewiston City Code Section 36-157 provides that a Stonn Water 
Utility Fee shall be set annuall~ by resolution of the City Council. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE 
CITY OF LEWISTON, IDAHO, THAT: 
SECTION I: The Stonn Water Utility Fees shall be as follows: 
(1) The base rate charge shall be six dollars ($6.00) per month per Equivalent 
Residential Unit (ERU), an ERU being established as four thousand (4,000) 
square feet of impervious and semi-pervious surface. 
(2) Property parcels less than two thousand (2,000) square feet area as identified 
in the Nez Perce County property parcel database, excluding condominiums, 
shall be exempt from fees. 
(3) Property parcels identified in the Nez Perce County property parcel database 
as undeveloped shall be exempt from fees . 
(4) Residential parcels whose owner qualifies for 'Circuit Breaker' status in the 
Nez Perce County database shall be exempt from fees. 
(5) All other residential parcels as identified in the Nez Perce County property 
parcel database, including residential condominiums, shall be assigned a value 
of one ERU, and shall be assigned a fee of one-hundred percent (100%) of the 
base rate. " 
(6) All developed non-residential property parcels as identified in the Nez Perce 
County property parcel database shall be assigned a fee of one-hundred 
percent (100%) of the base rate multiplied by the number of ERUs on the 
property. The amount of impervious surface and the number of ERUs per 
parcel will be detennined by the City Public Works Department, based on a 
computerized mapping analysis of each parcel. 
(7) Non-residential property parcels identified as 'non-residential condominiums' 
in the Nez Perce 'County property parcel database shall be assigned a value of 
one ERU and a fee 0 f one-hundred percent (100%) of the base rate. 
COMPLAINT 
SECTrON 2: The fees herein established shall be phased in over a period of three 
fiscal years. For the period commencing October 1,2008, through September 30, 2009, 
all fees shall be assessed at fifty percent (50%) of the rate established in Section 1 above. 
For the period commencing October 1,2009, through September 30,2010, all fees shall 
be assessed at seventy-five percent (75%) of the rate established in Section 1 above. 
Thereafter, commencing October 1,2010, all fees shall be assessed as established in 
Section 1 above. 
SECTION 3: This resolution shall take effect on October 1,2008, and be in full 
force from and after its passage, approval and publication. 
DATEDthis~dayof O~ ,2008. 




THEODORE O. CREASON* 
DAVID E. DOKKEN' 
TOD D. GEIDL' 
CHRISTOPHER J. MOORE * 
• ADMITTED IN IDAHO AND WASHINGTON 
Clerk, District Court 
CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC 
LAWYERS 
1219 IDAHO STREET 
P.O. DRAWER 835 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
www.cmd-law.com 
September 28, 2009 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DANIEL W. O'CONNELL 
(1928-1988) 
MARCUS J. WARE 
(1904-1996) 
(208) 743-1516 
FAX (208) 746-2231 
E-mail cmd@cmd-law.com 
Re: Lewiston Independent School District #1, et al. v. City of Lewiston 
Dear Clerk: 
I am enclosing a Complaint and Summons in the above matter. Please file the Complaint in your 
usual manner and issue the Summons. Our check for the $88.00 filing fee is enclosed. 
Also enclosed are copies which we ask be conformed and returned to the undersigned. 
Thank you for your courtesy. 
TOC:dd 
Enclosures 
Very truly yours, 
CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC 
cc: Lewiston Independent School District #1 
Lewis-Clark State College 
Nez Perce County 
Port of Lewiston 
Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE CO 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL ) 
DISTRICT #1, an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; LEWIS-CLARK STATE ) 
COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal ) 
subdivision of the state ofIdaho; PORT ) 
OF LEWISTON, a publicly created Port ) 
District within Nez Perce County, Idaho; ) 
and LEWISTON ORCHARDS ) 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, a duly organized) 












CASE NO. CV-09-02057 
ORDER REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE 
[XX] The undersigned Judge voluntarily disqualifies himself from presiding over this case. 
[ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under IRCP § 40. 
The motion is [] with cause [ ] without cause. 
The motion is [] granted [ ] denied. 
[ ] State [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under ICR § 25. 
The motion is [] with cause [ ] without cause. 
The motion is [] granted [] denied 
Date Judge 
ORDER REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION 
OF JUDGE 1 J7. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true copies of the fOJ!~~g Order Regarding Disqualification of 
Judge were hand delivered via messenger this _ .. :,x.J- day of September, 2009 to: 
Theodore O.Creason 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION 
OF JUDGE 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 





CITY OF LEWISTON, ) 
Defendant. ) 
------------) 
Case No. CV 09-02057 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge Brudie whose chambers are located ill Lewiston, Idaho, 
is assigned to preside over further proceedillgs ill the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this L day of October 2009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was mailed to: 
Theodore Creason 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
The HonJeff Brudie 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 30. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE<Si~bND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE C6tV{)(fItY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL, et al) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) CASE NO. CV 09-02057 
CITY OF LEWISTON, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE 
[ XJThe undersigned Judge voluntarily disqualifies himself/herself from presiding over this case. 
[ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under IRCP § 40. 
The motion is [] with cause [ ] without cause. 
The motion is [J granted [] denied. 
[ ] State [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under ICR § 25. 
The motion is [J with cause [ ] without cause. 
The motion is [J granted [] denied 
Date I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing Order -F:!:!ga:cding Disqualification of 
Judge were delivered this 2.. day of O~:';'!G((2B~;,"\ , to: 
Theodore Creason 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
.;;~ / [~\JO\\·.?r.; \~{~\ \ 
PATE" O. ~~~v-"" ql~!f 
By~]\ ;-' . \.,., /';? / 
, .. '1;~puty 
\<'/ 
/.// 
Order Regarding Disqualification 1 
3/. 
~Fl~LED 
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, PA1Tl O. WEEKS 
··.-fHE. OISI. COURi 
CLERKOf~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE 
) 





CITY OF LEWISTON, ) 
Defendant. ) 
-------------------------) 
Case No. CV 09-02057 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge Stegner whose chambers are located in Moscow, Idaho, 
is assigned to preside over further proceedbrrgs in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this L day of October 2009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ASSIGNlNG JUDGE was mailed to: 
Theodore Creason 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
The Hon John Stegner ~ 
Moscow, ID 83843 ~ ~ 
on this -+- day of October 2009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 
33. 
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CITY OF LEWISTON, ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
CASE NO. CV 09·02057 
ORDER REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE 
[ X]The undersigned Judge voluntarily disqualifies himseWherself from presiding over this case. 
[ ] Plaintiff ( ) Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under IRCP .S 40. 
The motion IS [] with cause ( ] without cause. 
The motion is [] granted [ ] denied. 
[ ) State [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under ICR § 25, 
The motion is [] with cause [ ] without cau.se. 
The motion is (] granted [] denied 
Date 
CERTIFICATE OF IvIAILlNG 
Th~odore Creason 
Lewiston, ID 83.501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 





CITY OF LEWISTON, ) 
Defendant. ) 
-------------------------- ) 
Case No. CV 09-02057 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge Bradbury whose chambers are located in Grangeville, 
Idaho, is assigned to preside over further proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this 1--day of October 2009. 
35 . 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ASSIGNTNG JUDGE was mailed to: 
Theodore Creason 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
The HonJohn Bradbury Yv\.-
Grangeville, ID 83530 
on this ~ day of October 2009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
Lewiston Independent School 
District #1, et ai, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 















CASE NO. CV 09-2057 
ORDER FOR PRETRIAL 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Pursuant to Civil Rule 16(a)(1) & (3) & 16(b) a telephonic pretrial scheduling 
conference will be held with the District Judge at Grangeville, Idaho, on Thursday, 
December 10, 2009 at 2:45 p.m. Counsel and unrepresented parties shall be prepared 
and with authority to discuss' and stipulate regarding those issues set forth in Civil Rule 
16(b). The court will place the call. 
In preparation for the conference and within 30 days of this order, each party, 
without the need for a formal discovery request, shall file with the court and provide every 
other party the following: 
1. The name, last known address and telephone number of each person known by a 
party to have knowledge or information about the claims or defenses of any party to this 
action, together with the subject of the knowledge or information. Witnesses to be used 
ORDER FOR PRETRIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 1 
37. 
solely for impeachment need not be included. 
2. Make available for copying or inspection all documents, data compilations, and 
tangible things that are subject to the control of the disclosing party that are relevant to 
the claims or defenses of any party to this action, unless it is to be used solely for 
impeachment. 
3. Computations of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party and make 
available for inspection and copying the non-privileged documents and other evidentiary 
material on which the computations are based and any other documents or materials that 
pertain to the nature and extent of the damages. 
4. Any insurance or indemnity policy that may cover any claims or defenses in this action 
or indemnify any party for some or all of any judgment rendered in this action. 
As soon as practicable after complying with the foregoing paragraph, the parties 
shall confer to (1) better define the bases of their claims and defenses, (2) discuss the 
possibilities of settlement, and (3) develop a discovery plan which shall include a list of 
agreed discovery and a list of discovery to which a party objects, noting who objects and 
the gist of each objection. The parties shall be jointly responsible for formulating the 
discovery plan and filing it with the court not later than 5 days before the date of the 
scheduling conference. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT. 
DATED this 21st day of October 2009. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
/ ,. , " 
, )'{(tVlli/J< __ 
Deputy Coyrt Cfok 
ORDER FOR PRETRIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR PRETRIAL 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE, was mailed, postage prepaid or hand delivered by the 
undersigned at Grangeville, Idaho, this 21st day of October 2009, to: 
Theodore Creason· 
Attorney at Law 
PO Drawer 835 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
Don Roberts 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box617 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
Nez Perce County District Court 
Attn: Janet 
PO Box 896 
Lewiston, 1083501 
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FILED 
DON L. ROBERTS 
Lewiston City Attorney 
um om l.. PM Z. 05 
ISB No.1984 
1422 Main Street 
P.O.Box617 
PAT O. WEEK~~, 
CLERK F E~T. ~~ 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-7948 
Facsimile: (208) 746-7952 
Attorney for the Defendant 
D PUT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #1, an Idaho body politic and 
corporate; LEWIS-CLARK STATE 
COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and 
corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal 
subdivision of the State of Idaho; PORT OF 
LEWISTON, a publicly created Port District 
within Nez Perce County, Idaho; LEWISTON 
ORCHARDS IRRIGATION DISTRICT, a 
duly organized Irrigation District within Nez 
Perce County, Idaho, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 























CASE NO. CV 09-02057 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, the Defendant City of Lewiston, by and through its attorney of record, Don 
L. Roberts, and in response to the Complaint hereinbefore filed in the above entitled matter, 
answers as follows: 
ANSWER 
l. 
The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII., 
VIII., XII., XIII., XV., Xx., XXIII., and XXVI of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
2. 
The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs XIV., XVI., XVII., XVIII., 
XIX., XXI., XXII., XXIV., XXV., XXVIII., XXIX., and XXX. of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3. 
The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained 
on paragraphs IX., X., XI., and XXVI of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not specifically 
and expressly admitted herein. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or 
to avail themselves of other processes. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the failure to comply with notice requirements of 
Idaho Code Sections 6-901 et seq. 
WHEREFORE, the City of Lewiston, having fully answered Plaintiffs' Complaint, prays as 
follows: 
ANSWER 
1. The Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed; 
2. The Defendant be awarded its costs of suit herein incurred; 
3. For such other and further relief as to the Court seems just and equitable in 
the premises. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2009. 
Don L. Roberts 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER was hand 
delivered to the attorney for Plaintiffs, 
Theodore o. Creason 
1219 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, Idaho, 83501 
on this 2nd day of December, 2009. 
ANSWER 
Don L. Roberts 
Attorney for the Defendant 
FILED 
um oeJ 11 ffl't 9 1'1' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND~,HI?lq!~4:E>rH~TRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR T~tE~~blm~ -N,E;@1!IRERCE 
Lewiston Independent School 
District #1 
Plaintiff, 












CASE NO. CV 09-2057 
ORDER 
The attached Litigation Plan (Proposed) dated December 4, 2009 is 
incorporated as a part of this order. The trial is set for September 20, 2010 at 
Lewiston, Idaho. 
The issue of whether or not Nez Perce County is the appropriate venue 
for a jury trial will be discussed and decided at a mutually convenient date but 
not later than August 6, 2010. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT. 
Dated this 10th day of December 2009. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
ORDER - 1 
Mailing Certificate 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a copy 
of the foregoing document to the following persons on December 10, 2009: 
Theodore Creason 
Attorney at Law 
PO Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Don L. Roberts 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 617 
Lewiston, I D 83501 
o RIOlIDER 2 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
~YA C):J!J BYY~~fL{]0G~< 
/Deput~Ctleo/ ~ 
vs. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 













CASE NO. CV ____ _ 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
The plaintiff wm pursue at trial the following claims: (E.g., breach of contract, 
violation of Idaho Code § 48-603(6). The defendant will pursue the following affirmative 
defenses and/or claims: (E.g:, accord and satisfaction, estoppel, waiver). 
ADMITTED FACTS 
The following facts are admitted by the parties: (Enumerate every agreed fact, 
irrespective of admissibility, but with notation of objections as to admissibility. List 1, 2, 3, 
etc.) 
CONTENTIONS 
The plaintiff contends as follows: (List 1, 2, 3, etc.) 
The defendant contends as follows: (List 1, 2, 3, etc.) 
(State contentions in summary fashion, omitting evidentiary detail. Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, the factuaJ contentions of a party shall not exceed two pages in 
length. Examples of properly and improperly drafted contentions are set forth below) 
-1-
ORDER 
ISSUES OF LAW 
The foUowing are the issues of law to be determined by the court: (List 1, 2, 3, . 
etc., and state each issue of law involved. A simple statement of the ultimate issue to be 
decided by the court, such as "Is the plaintiff entitled to recover?" will not be accepted.) If 
theparties cannot agree on the issues of law, separate statem~nts n1.<lY be.given in the 
pretrial order. 
EXPERT WITNESSES 
(a) Each party shall be limited to expert witness(es) on the issues of 
(b) The name(s) and addresses of the expert witness(es) to be used by each party at the 
trial and the issue upon which each will testify is: 
(1) On behalf of plaintiff; 
(2) On behalf of defendant. 
OTHER WITNESSES 
The names and addresses of witnesses, other than experts, to be used by each 
party at the time of trial and the general nature of the testimony of each are: 
'(aY On behalf of plaintiff: (E.g., Jane D~e, 10 Elm Street, Seattle,WA; will testify 




(b) On behalf of defendant: (fonow same format) . 
. (As to each witness, expert or others, indicate "will testify," or "possib\e witness only." 
Also indicate which witnesses, if any, will testify by deposition. Rebuttal witnesses, the 
necessity of whose testimony cannot reasonably be anticipated before trial, need not be 
named.) 
EXHIBITS 
(a) Admissibility stipulated: 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 
1. Photo of curve in the highway. (Examples) 
2. Photo of guardrails. 
3. Photo of speed advisory sign . 
. Defendant's Exhibits 
A-i. Weather report. (Examples) 
A-2. Highway maintenance record 
A-3. X-ray of plaintiffs foot. 
A-4. X-ray of wrist. 
(b) Authenticity stipulated, admissibility disputed: 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 
4. Inventory Report. (Examples) 
Defendant's Exhibits 
A-5. Photograph. (Examples) 
(c) Authenticity and admissibility disputed: 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 
5. Accountant's report. (Examples) 
-3-
. ORDER if? 
Defendant's Exhibits 
A-6. Doctor's report. 
(No party is required to list any exhibit Which is listed by another party, or any exhibit to be 
used for impeachment only. See below for further explanation of numbering of exhibits). 
ACTION BY THE COURT 
(a) This case is scheduled for trial (before a jury) (without a jury) on _____ _ 
20_, at _______ , 
" 
(b) Trial briefs shall be submitted the court on or before ~ _______ '
(c) Jury instructions requested by either party shall be submitted to the court on or before 
__________ ,. Suggested questions of either party to be asked of the 
jury by the court on voir dire shall be submitted to the court on or before 
(d) (Insert any other ruling made by the court at or before pretrial conference.) 
This order has been approved by the parties as evidenced by the signatures of their 
counsel. This order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by 
a subsequent order. This order shall not be amended except by order of the court 
pursuant to agreement of the parties or to prevent manifest injustice. 
DATED this __ day of _____ " 20 __ ' . 
FORM APPROVED 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Counsel for Defendant 
ORDER 
-4-
JOHN H. BRADBURY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
(2) Drafting of Contentions. Statement of contentions as to disputed facts should be brief 
and generally worded. 
The purpose of this section of the order is to apprise the court and other parties of the 
generai position of each party on major facts issues. Lengthy recitals and evidentiary 
detail are of little assistance, and serVe only to impose unnecessary burdens upon the 
lawyer drafting them. . 
For example: 
Proper. 
1. Correspondence between the parties in November and December, 1982, established. 
the price, quantity and time of delivery of the goods. 
Improper: 
1. On November 3. plaintiff wrote to defendant, stating _______ (etc.) . 
2. On November 7, 1982, defendant responded -,-_______ (etc.) 
3. On November 12,1982, plaintiff replied ___ ----'-__ -'---_(etc.) 
Proper: 
1. Defendant was negligent in that: (a) the stabilizer on the aircraft was defectively 
deSigned; and (b) the airline was not given proper instructions as to maintenance and 
. . inspection of the stabilizer. 
Improper: 
·1. The stabiliLer on the aircraft was 117 inches in len.gth and _____ --,----(etc.) 
2. Accepted industry standards provide that stabilizers must be ______ (etc.) 
3. At an air speed of 510 mph, a stabilizer ______ --'-___ (etc.) 




1. Plaintiffs discharge was due to unsatisfactory performance of her job and 
insubordination to her supervisors. It was unrelated to her sex. 
Improper: 
1. Plaintiff made an error in balancing accounts on July 5, 1980, resulting in cost of 
$7,300 to defendant. 
. 2. Defendant attempted to provide plaintiff training and counseling about his incident~ but 
she refused. .. .. - . 
3. On August 13, 1980, plaintiff again __________ (etc.) . 
ORDER 5(). 
-. 
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_ 'Cf>.SE ltO Q'\)()d.~ 
IN tHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
_ STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COumYm~E~y:ER 
-ERIC CASTLEBERRY, ) 
) Case No. CV02-00341 
PlaU1~ ) 
) 
VS., ,:- --, ) PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
- ) 
CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF)~ ) 
DEPARTMENT, OROFINO POLICE ) 
DEPARTMENT, - ) 
fr, CLEARWATER COUNTY DEPUtY) 
-.;rOE NEWMAN AND OFFICER - ) 
, JERALD HlNE~ OF THE OROFINO.' ) 
_ - - ~ITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, in ) 
- -their individual'capacip..es and their ) 
capacities as law emorcement officers )-
_ ' of the county and city; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
1. CLAlMS AND DEFENSES 
ORDER 
£laiutiffwill pursue the following claims at trial: 
1) - That defendants Newman and Hin.er violated his right Fourth -
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure by 
effectuating his arrest with excessive force; and, 
2) That defendants Newman and Hiner committed the tort of ~tentional 
'infliction of emotional distress by effectuating his arrest with exCessive 
force. 





That the force used by defend~ts Newman and Hiner'in eff;y.~tuatinK 
plaintiff s arrest was objectively reasonable and necessary under all of 
·the· circumstances and therefore did not violate plaintiffs Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from· an unreasonable sepme~ 
'That defendants Newman and Hiner are entiUed to qua1i.Uedimmunity 
from liability for the alleged violation of plaintiff s Fourth Amendment 
. right to be free from an unreasonable. seizure; . 
That 'conduct of defendants" Newman and Hiner'was not sUfficiently 
':e~eine or outrag~ousto support au intentional infliction of em.otional 






On De0mber 30, .2001, defendailtJoe Newman was eriiployed by the 
Clearwater County Sheriff s Office as a deputy sheriff. 
On Dece~ber 30,2091, defendant Gerald Hiner was employed by the 
City of.')roflno·as a'police 01nceL . 
On December 30,2001, plaintiffwas residing with his 1?arents, Darrell . 
and Juanita C~tleberry, ~t their home in the City of Orofino, Idaho. 
: 4) At approxiinately 9:00 PM on December 30,2901, plailitiffs brother~ 
in-law; Larry . Jones,. telep"koned 911 and reported ·tha.t 3: ·domestic 
disturbance involving p\aititiff ari.4 his :father ~aS occurring at the' 
. GaStleberry home: 
. 5) 'Defendants Joe Newman and-Gerald Hiner were- on duty ti;lat evening' 
" and:were dispatched to ·the Castleberry hom.e.ill. response tq the 911 Call. . 
6)'. SometimeafierdefendantSNewmanandHifierarrivedattheCastleberry 
home, plaintiff's father began experiencing chestp~in and an ambulance 
was called . 
. 7) After the ambulance was called, plaintiff went to the home ofhls uncle, 
. Thomas CasUeberry, Vlho is Darrell CastleberrY's brother; and told him 
"that Da:i:rell Castleberry- was having chest pains arid that an ambulance 
ha.d been called. 
8) _Thomas -Castleberry-theil-went to the home of Diiuell aIl~ Juanita 
Castleberry and began yelling at Juanita Castleberry because he thought 
- thatthe behavior of Juanita-and plaintiff toward Darrell Castleberry was 
caUSing Darrell health problemS. 
- --
9) Juanita Castleberry toldThomas Castleberry to leave the home and he 
complied by waikiug out of the home and onto the home' s ~eck. 
'10) After Thomas Castleberry walked out outo the deck, there was some 
form of ~hysical contact between plaintiff and Thomas ~tleberry. 
. .' 
.:. i1) The noise from the physical contact betwec!l' plaintiff and Thomas 
~tleberry caused defendants Newman and Hiner to leave the house 
-and go out-onto the deck to investigate. 
~2) After ~efendants ;Newman and_ Hiner went out onto the .d~k, they 
handc'QiIed plaiIitiff' s ~ be~d his back. 
:- 13) .D~g the handcuffing procel1s; plam.tiff s ri~t-arm broke. , . 
14) PlaintiJf was placed Ufi9-er arrest by .defendant Hiner and charged with_ 
.battery upon-Thomas -Castleberry. 
15) The charge against plaintiffwas l~ter amended to. disturbing the peace 
_ and plamtiffplead ~tyto that charge. -
.ill. -CONTENTIONS 
ORDER 
Plaintiff ~ntends as-follows: 
1) 
7-.) 
- -3) . 
4) 
~laintiff and his father had engaged in a verbal argument on the night of 
_December 30,2001, but there had been no violenc({ between them. 
, . Plaintiff was upset with Thomas Castleberry for speaking to his mother 
in an 4nproper manner, but he at no time assaulted Thomas <;astkberry. 
Plaintiff fell' onto Thomas Castleberry on the deck outside of the home. 
Plaintiff was trying to help Thomas Castleberry up when'defendants 
Newman and Hiner walked out of the house and onto the deck. -
53 
ORDER 
5) Defendants Newman and HID.er ~ediately seized -plaintiff, took 'him 
down to the floor of the deck, and began forcing -pl~intiff' s arms behind 
bisback. 
~} Plaintiff told defendants-Newman and Hiner that he w~s not resisting 
arrest and that they were breaking his arm, but defendants persisted -in 
thei1: efforts to cuffhis arms behlndhls back. 
_ -7) _ -o.ffi~r Newman broke plaintiff s rigbi ann in the course ofh~dcuffing 
_ :_ -__ -: -plaintiff. 
. - .' . 
-8) - -_ Plaintiff s bro~e).l ~ required surgery, wiit"requfre addition.al surgery, 
and has caused significant pain and suffering. 
---9) Essentially, plaintiff alleges that his- ~est. vias- effectuated with 
--unreasonable and unnecessary force and has resUlted in a serious and 
-permanent injury. '-
DefendantS contend as follows: 
1) When defendants a.n;ived at the Castleberry home, -plamtiff w!lS ~y 
eJIlotional and agitated and threaten¢ them with b~dily harm. - -
2) Plaintiff'~ fath~r told defendants that -plaintifthad-been d~g, that 
plaintiff was off his medication for his bi-polar: disordet; that plaintiff 
had struck hlm. 
3) -piain&s father to\d:defendants that he waS going-to- take plaintiff to-
State Hospital Noi:th the ne-rt day, that he didnotwant plaintiff arrest~ 
.an.d--that he si):nply wan.~ plaintiff removed from the home. 
4) Defel\dants told -plaintiff's_ father th~t they would comply with his 
- request and-then -proCeeded to calm the scene down ruid secure-medical 
attention for plahttiff' s father after -plaintiff sfather re-ported chest pain. 
5) While the EMT) s were wo~g with plaintiff s father, defendants heard 
a 10ud nois-e -~d shouting on the deck outside of the castleberry home. 
When defendants went outside to investigate, they saw plaintiff standing 
-over and violently kicking Thomas Castlebefty; who was laying on tl1.e 
floor of the deck 
. 7) . Defelldan.i:s then pu1le.d plaintiff away from Thomas Castleberry, took 
him to th~ floor of the deCk, an.d began attempting to get plaintiffs arrn.s 
. behind his back so that they could handcuff plaintiff an.d control an.d 
arrest him. 
~) Plaintiff strenuously resisted defendants' attempts to gethis arrn.s behind 
his back and, as a consequence of his resistance, plaintiffs right arm 
broke .. 
-
9) Althou~ plaintiff'!? rii;ht arm did require surgical r~pair and will require 
one minor additi(;matsurgery, the kjury is not assignilic8,nt as plaintiff 
. cl~ and he will Ultimately have fUll use of his am1 with no residual· 
pam. 
10) Essentially, defendants NeWD;lanandHinder contend that they used only 
. objec~yelyreasonable and ne9CSsary force under ilie ~ircumstan.ces 'they 
. were faced with at the Castle'?erry home and that plamtiff' s arm broke 
·as a consequence ofhis own actions. 
IV. ISSUEs OF LAW 
1. Whether' defendants. Newman and Hiner .ate· entitled to qualified: 
iinmunityftom plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 19&3 claim . 
. ' . 2. Whether the .evidence presented by plaintiff in.his .case in chief is 
sufficient ~o withstand a motion for dir.ected verdict. 
:3 ~ Evidentiary issues during the course of 'the trial. 
A. ~urY instruction issues._ . 
V. . EXPERT WITNESSEs 
ORDER 
.Plaintiff's Experts: . 
1. ·Dr. Peter Crvcelius, Orofino Idaho. Dr. Crecelius will testify 
con~ming the diagnosis of plaintiff's right arm irijury, the.pastmedical 
care and treatment provided to plaintiff for his right ~ injury, and the 
~~e medical care and treatment plaintiff vrill require for his right arm 
ffiJUry. 
2. . J obn Garrlson, KP.T .)Orofino~ Idaho. _Mi. <!arrison. Will testify 
concerning the physical therapy he provided to plaintiff as a 
conseq~ence of the right arm iJijury . 
.Defendants' Experts: 
1. Dr. Gerald McManus. Dr. McManus is an orthopedic surgeon who 
-conducted an independent medical examination of plaintiff. Dr. 
McManus will testify co~ce~the results of that exam.in.ation and his 
opinions concerningp1ainti.ff's right arm ipjury. . 
2. -Edward «Tad" Leach. Mr. Leach is a police tactics a.n-dp~ocedures 
~xpert. Mr. Leach will testify concerning his opinions regarding the 
appro.priateness of the force used to effectuate plaintiff s arrest and the 
-use ~f force in arrest situations -generally. 




1. Eric Castleberry, Orofino, Idaho. _Eflc Castleberry will testify-
concerning the events of December 30,2001 aild his cl3im~ i.nJuries. 
WILL TESTIFY. . 
-: -- .- - 2. _-,Darrell Castleberry, Orofino· Idaho. Darr~ll1 Castlebei:ry will testify 
:C9n~ming the even~ of December 30, 2001. ~L TEstIFY .. 
-3. . J~unita Castleberry; Orofino, Idaho.: Jaumta Castleberry will testify 
concernitlgthe events ofD~mber 30,2001. WILL TESTIFY. - -
4. . Thomas Castleberry, Springfield, Oregon. Thomas Castleberry will 
testify concerning the events of December 30,2001. WILL TESTIFY .. 
S. Sandy Castleberry, Springfield, Oregori.. Sandy Castleberry' Will testify 
concerning the events ofDecember-30, 2001. WILL TESTIFY .. 
Defendants; witnesses: 
1.. Joe Newman, Omfmo, Idaho. Joe Newman will testify concerning his 
training and experience as a police officer and the events of December 
30, 2001. WlLL TESTiFY. 
Sf; 
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. 2. 'Geral~ Hiner, Orofino, Idaho. GeraldHmerwll1 testifycOncerningbis 
training and experience as a police officer md the events of December 
30,200L WILL TESTIFY. 
3. Larry Jones, Orofino, Idaho. Larry Jones will testify concetning the 
events of Decembei: 30,2001. WILL TESTIFY. 
·4. Shannon Jones, Coeur 'd'Alene, Idaho. Shannon Jones.will testify 
. concemingthe events ofDecember-30, 2001. WILL TESTIFY. 
. _. -$'. _ I~s Eves, Of9fino, Id~~. Les Eves-was' an EMf whotr~ted Darrell 
Castleberry at the Castleberry home on December 30, i001 and will 
testify concerning his ~bservations atthe Castleberry home'thatevening. 
-WILL TESTIFY. . '. . 
.6.. leannine Martin, Orofino, IdahO'. J eannin:e Martin was'a bartender at the 
I:t.omestead bar and would testify concerIll,ng her observations. of Eric . 
. Castleberry and statements made by-Eric Castleberry at the Homestead 
'Bar . during ·tli.e aft~rnoon 'an<\ evening of December 30,' 200 L 
POSSlBLE \YITNESS' ONLY. 
'7.· Robert Wilh.~1m, Orofino, Idaho. Mr. Wi1he~w~uldt~stifyconCerning . 
statements made tQ him by Eric and Darrell Castleberry' d~g the. . 
:·afternoon· of December 30~ 2001. POSSlBLE.WITNESS ONLY.. -
8. . ChlbfPomerinke, Orofino, Idaho. 'CbiefPomerinke-wouldtestifyto the 
- .City'"s policies ~d procedm:es regarding artesttechniques. ·PQSSlBLE 
WITNESS.ONLY:- . -. .' 
9. Sheriff Alan Hehgen, Orofino, IdahO'. Sheriff Hengen-would testify to 
the Counties policies and procedures xegarding arrest techniques. 
POSSIBLE WITNESS ONLY. 
. . 
10. 'Rebecca Drewery, Orofino, Idaho .. Rebecca Drewery would" teStify to 
her Investigation offue 1213"0/01 arrest. POSSJ;BLE WITNESS ONLY. 
VII. EXHIB1TS 
A. Admissibility stipUlated. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits: 5 7. 
L -Medical records olClerowater Villey Hospita13nd Clinic' 
2. Medical records of John Garrison., R.P.T 
3. Medical Records ofSt Joseph Regional Medical Center 
4. Medical Records oft.ewiston Orthopedic Associates 
5. -Medical bills for treatment of plaintiff s arm injury 
_ -.: -:Plainfrff ~d :d~fendantS :hereby stipulate to the ~dmission of any tmQ all additional medical 
records regarding plaintiftwhlch plaintiffm:q choose to offer at trial. 
Defendants' Exhibits: . 
_ A-6 Dr. Ger~d McManus'. 1MB report 
A-7 Dr. Gerald.McManus' vitae 
A-& .l3dward <CTa<f' Leach's vitae 
.' A-9 1'1l7/99 Port ofH~pe Diagnostic Suffimary. and Assessment Staffuig 
- . A-to 121&/99 Departn:lent of Health ahd Welfare Scr~ening Report -
_ A-11 12115/99 State Hospital.North Therapeutic Recrea.ti<;lU AssessJ,llent_ 
. A-12. 12115/99 State HospiW.North-hotesQfFraunI~lercbillget; M.D .. 
A-13' 1f28fOOStateHospital ~qrth: Discharge S~aly 
A-14 .3111100" evHe Dr. "Peterson tec9rds 
A-15 311 If 00 CVHC records 
-- A-16·. 5125/00 SJ1\MC Emergency Department Report 
-'--a-17 SfZ5fOQ SJRly1C Intetdisciplinaty.Progress.N.otes 
A-18 Sf2SfOO SJRMC Mental Healfu. Admission Records 
- - -A-19 . 1216/QQ pepartmeilt of Health and Welfare C:ons~tation Report 
ORDER 
·A-2Q 12Ji4fOO Dr: Coile·Consultatioll. Report 
A-2I 3128/01SSA Drug and Alcohol Use Questionnaire 
A-I2 1213{)fO 1 CVH b~ood. test report '. 
&23 1f4f03 .State Hospital North-Robert Wilheltn. Report 
A-24 4f4f03 Report of Rebecca Alexander, ph.D. 
_ A:-25 Ulustrative drawing of Castleberry house 
Plaintiff and defendants hereby stipulate.to· the admission of any and all additional medical 
records regar4ing plaintiffwbich defendants may choose to offer at trial. 
B. Authenticity stipulated, admissibility disputed. 
Sf. 
_ Plaintiff's Exhibits: 
None 
" Defendants' Exhibits: 
A-I Report of Joe Newman re Arrest Ie 12130[01 aitest -
. -A-2 Gerald Hiner's Affidavit for Initial DetelJIlination ofPr'obable cause Ie 
1213.0/01 attest 
A-3 Gerald Hiner's Narrative Report dated lf~/02 
A·4 Citation # 5334 issued toplaintiffre 12130/01 arrest 
.A-5 10/21102 Record of plaintiff's guilty plea for distrllbi~g the peace re 
12130/01 arrest 
. C. - - Authenticity and admissibility disputed.-
Vilt 
ORDER-





-. ACTION BY THE COURT 





_ c;learwater C~uuty Courthouse in Orofiuo,.Idaho: 
Trial Briefs- shall be subnrltted to the-court on -o~ before Novembei 10,2(X)3. 
Jury iuStnictions requested by either party shall be submitted to the~urt on or 
before November 10,2003. -
Suggested questions of either party to be asked of the jury by the court on voir 
dire shall be submitted to the court on or before November 10,2003. 
(Insert any other ruling made by the court at or before pretri<ll wnference) 
sr. 
· . :This order haS-been approved by the parties as eVidenced by the signatures of 
their counsel. This order shall control the subsequent course of action un\ess modified by a 
.subsequent order. This order shall not be amended except by order of the court pursuant to 
agreement of the parties or to prevent manifest injustice. . 
DATED this ~ day ~ - > 2003 
'. BRADBURY, District Judge 
ORDER 60 . 
CERTTInCATEOFSERVlCE 
. I hereQY certify that on the __ day of , 2003, I caused to be 
-. served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
ORDER· 
; ~ . - ~ " 
James W. Grow 
Jam.esW. Grow, PLLC 
1301 "G" Stre~t 
Lewisto~]D ·83501 
_ -'Bentley G. Stromberg 
- Glements, B.rown & McNich~ls) P.A. 
P. O. Box: 1510 
Lewisto.u, ID 83501 




PM-TRIAL ORDER " . ~, 
Deputy Clerk 
-11- , ,,',\ ~:..:.; 
6/. 
PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROTOCOL FOR CLEARWATER, IDAHO AND 
LEWIS COUNTIES 
EXHIBITS 
1. Counsel should review their exhibits with each other before trial, eliminate duplicates 
and identify which exhibits you agree: 
1) are admissible. 
2) are authentic but are objected to as not relevant 
.3) .there is an objection about the exhibit's foundation. 
2. When possible, I will rule on the foundation questions before tria\. 
3. Have the list of your exhibits identifie<:I as above with you at the pretrial conference. 
4. Number the pages of multiple paged exhibits. 
5. If using only a few pages of amultiple paged exhibit, have the few pages of the exhibit 
marked as a separ;:lte exhibit as a sub-part of the master exhibit . 
Example: 
1. SL Joseph Hospital records. 
1 a. Nurse's notes. 
1 b. Radiologist's notes. 
6. Have as many copies of exhibits as there are jurors plus a copy for opposing counsel 
and the court or arrange to show the exhibit to the jury with an overhead projector. 
7. Arrange to mark aU exhibits with the clerk before trial in the approximate order you 
expect to use them. . 
8. ·The clerk will keep physical custody of an exhibits during trial. Obtain from and return 




. 1. List your witnesses in the approximate order you expect to call them and provide a 
copy of the list to the court at the pretrial conference. 
2. Counsel are required to advise opposing counsel of the witnesses that will be called the 
day before they are called to testify. 
3~ You are not required to ask for permission to approach a witness or the bench. You will 
-beexpected to hand the witness the exhibit you want to use but you are expected to 
question witnesses while at the counsel table or a podium. -
4. Witnesses will be excluded from the courtroom until excused after their testimony has 
.. been heard. In criminal cases the State may designate one person as the party, even if he 
or she will testify. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
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DISTRICT # 1> an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; LEWIS~CLARK STATE ) 
COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal ) 
subdivision ofthe state ofIdaho; PORT OF ) 
LEWlSTON, a publicly created Port District ) 
within Nez Perce County, Idaho; aIld ) 
LEWISTON ORCHARDS IRRIGATION ) 
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District within Nez Perce County, Idaho, 
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Corporation, 
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Case No. CV 09-02057 
ORDER PENDENTE LITE 
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Based upon the Stipulation for Entry of Order Pendente Lite dated December 23, 2009, 
and filed herewith, the Court being fully advised in the premises, aud good cause appearing, 
IT lS HEREBY ORDERED that the City of Lewiston not take any steps to collect or 
enforce payment of the Stormwater Utility fees the City contends are billable to the plaintiffs, nor 
charge nor take any action to collect or enforce the addition of any penalty Or interest upon 
Stomlwater Utility fees against any of the plaintiffs, pending the outcome of these proceedings or 
further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event any party shall seck modification of this 
Order Pendente Lite, the party shall request this Court to consider the same upon motion upon 
not less than two weeks notice. 
DATED thi;;l:;: day of December, 2009. 
ORDER PENDENTE LITE- Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this j4"ri day of December, 2009, a copy of the foregoing 
ORDER PENDENTE LITE was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P. O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ill 83501 
Don L. Roberts, Attomey 
City of Lewiston 
1422 Main Street "'/~ov.:f- o/iattc4.£lO 
P. O. Box 617 ;t 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Attorneys for Pla\ntiffs 
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LEWISTON, a publicly created Port Djstrict ) 
within Nez Perce County, Idaho; and ) 
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PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Creason. Mool'c, Dokken & Cddl.l'LLC 
1'.0. D,'llwer 1>'35, l'''",iston. lD !:l3S01 
(208) 743-1516; Ji'IU: p08)746-2231 
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Based upon the Stipulation of the parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintiffs, Lewiston Independent School District #1, Lewis-Clark 
State College, Nez Perce County, Port of Lewiston, and Lewiston Orchards Irrigation 
DistTlct, (hereinafter "Governmental Entities"), agree to respond to Inten-ogatory No.1 to 
the extent of identifying to the best oftheir ability each engineer, architect or other de:;igu 
professional with which they have contracted in the last six years to eyalua~e, study, 
quantify, divert, alter, store, or design for surface water runoff on any real property owned 
or controlled by them located within the City of Lewiston_ 
2_ The: Governmental Entities shall not be required to make any further 
response to the City of Lewiston's First fnten'ogatories and Requests for Admission and 
Production dated the 1726,2010. . 
DATED this I day QfMarch. 2010, 
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Crt>IIS011, Moon, Dokken & Gcldl, PLLC 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on tills --4 day of March,. 20.10, a copy of the 
foregoing PROTECTIVE ODER was served by the method mdlcated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Don L. Roberts, Attonley 
City of Lewiston 
1422 Main Street 
P.O.Box617 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Tod D. Geidl 
Creason, Moore) Dokken & Geidl. PLLC 
121 9 Idaho Street 
P. O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
iIJ? fIRST-CLASS MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAlL 
-:l FAX TRANSMISSION 
CLERK OF THE CQURT 
)y ( . ~ ~ 1(A,t(\;' .. . I BY----f,L-~.-c---"7'"'-' --___ _ 
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1219 Idaho Street . I 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516 
Fax: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #1, an Idaho body politic and 
corporate; LEWIS-CLARK STATE 
COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and 
corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal 
subdivision of the state ofIdaho; PORT OF 
LEWISTON, a publicly created Port District 
within Nez Perce County, Idaho; and 
LEWISTON ORCHARDS IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT, a duly organized Irrigation 
District within Nez Perce County, Idaho, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF LEWISTON, an Idaho Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
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COME NOW, the plaintiffs by and through their attorney of record, Theodore O. 
Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, and pursuant to I.R.c.P. 56 hereby 
move the Court for entry of summary judgment against the defendant, City of Lewiston. 
This Motion is made upon the facts set forth in the memorandum and affidavits 
herewith filed. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2010. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
U' '&"'" , ;; /\ ' \./1u~L4d~vd--z£~ 
Theodore O. Creason 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of April, 2010, a copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Don L. Roberts, Attorney 
City of Lewiston 
1422 Main Street 
P. O. Box 617 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
X HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
FAX TRANSMISSION (208)746-7952 
heodore O. Creason 
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COME NOW, the plaintiffs (hereinafter "Governmental Entities" or "Entities"), 
by and through their attorney of record, Theodore O. Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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& Geidl, PLLC, and hereby submit this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 11, 2008, the Lewiston City Council passed Ordinance 4512, 
purporting to establish a "Storm Water Utility" in the City of Lewiston. See Lewiston 
City Code (L.C.C.) §§ 36-151 to -162. Pursuant to the Ordinance, the utility has 
regulatory authority over the "planning, design, construction, maintenance, administration 
and operation of all City storm water conveyances and facilities." L.C.C. § 36-153. The 
structure of the utility was not set forth in the Ordinance, but was left to be determined 
through subsequent enactments. L.C.C. § 36-154. According to the stormwater business 
plan, the utility would be "a separate legal entity within the City of Lewiston's 
management structure designed to operate and regulate the City's stormwater 
management systems and programs, account for the costs of the program, and secure 
funding for the costs." (Dechert Dep. Ex. 1, p. 2, Nov. 14 & 16,2009.) To date, the City 
Council has notpassed a resolution establishing the organizational structure ofthe"storm 
water utility." 
In the recitals preceding the Ordinance, the City Council indicated that passing the 
Ordinance was necessary to fund maintenance of the City's stormwater system. l The 
Ordinance's statement of purpose indicates: 
The City Council finds and declares the need for adequate and effective 
maintenance, operation, regulation and control of the existing storm water 
drainage system in all areas within the City to improve the health, safety 
and general welfare of the City. The City Council finds that those citizens 
1 In the recitals the City also alludes to its application for a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "is issuing" to the City. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
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receIVmg the benefits of the City's management of the storm water 
drainage system should pay for those benefits through a storm water fee. 
The City Council fmds that the establishment of a Storm Water Utility is 
the preferred funding and management method for the City's storm water 
system. 
L.C.e. § 36-151. 
To fund the goals relating to stormwater management, Ordinance 4512 established 
a "service charge rate." L.C.C. § 36-153. Under the Ordinance, "[a]ll persons 
responsible for properties within the corporate limits of the City of Lewiston" are "subject 
to the regulatory authority of the Storm Water Utility" and required to "pay a service 
charge determined by the rate structure created by [the Ordinance]." L.C.C. § 36-155; see 
also L.e.C. § 36-157. A "person responsible" is defmed as an "owner, agent, occupant, 
lessee, tenant, contract purchaser or other person having possession or control of property 
or the supervision of an improvement on the property." L.C.c. § 36-152. Billings for the 
fee are "assessed to the record owner of the parcel against which the fee is being 
charged." L.C.C. § 36-160. Failure to pay the assessed fee may result in collection of 
~ past due- amounts through "any manner-permitted 
delinquency charge. L.C.c. § 36-161. 
The rate structure established by the Ordinance is based upon the Nez Perce 
County property parcel tax database. L.c.e. § 36-156. Under the Ordinance, parcels are 
classified as either residential or non-residential depending upon their tax identification. 
Id. This classification determines how equivalent residential units (ERUs) are assigned to 
the parcel. Id. An ERU is the City's method of calculating the amount of impervious 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
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surface2 on a piece of property. Lewiston's Ordinance defines an ERU as an impervious 
surface area of 4,000 square feet. L.e.e. § 36-152. Residential parcels are all assigned 
one ERU. L.e.C. § 36-156. The number ofERUs assigned to a non-residential parcel is 
determined by dividing the individual parcel's impervious surface area by one ERU. Id. 
The resulting quotient is the number ofERUs that will be assigned to the parcel. Id. The 
fee assessed to a given parcel is based on the parcel's ERUs. Fees are assessed for each 
ERU assigned to a piece of property. L.e.e. § 36-157. The amount of the fee imposed 
for each ERU is established annually by City Council resolution. Id. 
Under the Ordinance, there are no exceptions to payment of the stormwater fee. 
Although the Ordinance permits the City Council to "establish credits and exemptions ... 
for classes of parcels identifiable in the Nez Perce County Tax Parcel base map," 
exemptions or reductions based upon other considerations are not authorized. L.C.e. 
§ 36-1-58. Fee assessments may only be appealed on the grounds that a "particular 
assigned fee is unwarranted or based on an incorrect calculation of impervious surface or 
challenging the Ordinance itself or for appealing aspects of the fee that do not otherwise 
pertain to incorrect calculations or applications of the rate structure. See id. 
All storrnwater utility. fees collected pursuant. to the Ordinance must be 
"depositedeJ and credited to a special fund to be designated as the Storm Water 
Enterprise Fund." L.e.C. § 36-162. The fees may be used "for the payment of the 
2 Impervious surfaces are surfaces that "repel water and prevent precipitation and meltwater from 
infiltrating soils." L.e.e. § 36-152. 
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requirements for the maintenance, operation, repairs and upkeep and improvements of the 
storm water system of the City, including the payment of bonds issued therefore." Id. 
"The accounts of the fund [must] show all receipts and expenditures for the maintenance, 
operation, upkeep and repair and capital outlay of the storm water system, including the 
payment of bonds issued to finance such capital outlay. " Id. 
Approximately two months after enacting the Ordinance, on October 27,2008, the 
City Council passed Resolution 2008-55. The Resolution set the "base rate charge" per 
ERU at $6.00 per month. Res. 2008-55 § 1(1). It assigned all residential parcels a value 
of one ERU to be paid at 100% of the base rate. Id. § 1(5). Non-residential parcels were 
assessed a fee of 100% of the base rate multiplied by the number ofERUs assigned to the 
property. Id. § 1 (6). Exemptions were given, however, for property parcels consisting of 
less than 2,000 square feet, undeveloped parcels, and residential parcels whose owners 
qualify for Circuit Breaker status.4 Id. § 1(2)-(4). Conspicuously, there are no 
exemptions for property owners who contain stormwater on their property or who 
otherwise-do-not-discharge-stormwater-into-infrastructures-owned-or-operateci-by -the -City:--
(Davies Dep. 60:10-15, Feb. 16,2010.) 
Pursuant to the Resolution, stormwater fees were to be phased in over a three-year 
period. The City would assess 5Q%of the fee the first year (October 1, 2008thrQugh 
September 30,2009), 75% of the fee the second year (October 1, 2009 to September 30, 
3 In reality, the City does not maintain a separate depository account for storm water revenues, but rather 
comingles it with tax revenue by depositing those funds into the City's general checking account. (Marsh 
Dep. 36: 19-37:16, Feb. 16,2010.) 
4 Circuit Breaker is a property tax reduction program for certain low-income homeowners. Idaho Tax 
Commission, Property Tax Reduction (Circuit Breaker), http://tax.idaho.gov/l-1052.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2010). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 
governmental entitieslpleadingslsummary judgment_memo Jznal 76 . 
2010), and 100% of the fee after October 1, 2010. Res. 2008-55 § 2. The City Council 
modified the phase-in plan in 2009 by Resolution 2009-68. In that resolution the Council 
retained the base rate charges and exemptions established by Resolution 2008-55, but 
extended the 50% phase-in rate for an additional year ~ from October 1, 2009 through 
September 30,2010. 
In addition to modifying the payment schedule, Resolution 2009-68 included an 
additional section limiting the purpose for which stormwater fees may be expended. 
Section 3 of the Resolution provides that "[a]ll Storm Water Utility Fees collected ... 
only be expended to maintain, operate, or enhance the Storm Water Utility system of the 
City of Lewiston." Res. 2009-68 § 3. According to the City, stormwater utility revenues 
are currently being used for "stormwater activities," which include: all street sweeping 
for the City of Lewiston, curb and gutter patch back, trash and debris clean up, road 
shoulder grading and ditching, weed control clean up, and other "interdepartmental" 
charges assessed by the City streets division and other departments and divisions of the 
- 8ityofLewiston~-(Bingman Dep; 37: 19-38 :22, Feb. 23, 201O.} Prior to efraetment-0-f~-- ---~~-~----
Ordinance 4512, these "stormwater activities" were paid for out of the City's general 
revenue fund. Id. 38:6-11; (Dechert Dep. 47:1-13.) 
On October 1, 2008, the City began billing the Governmental Entities for 
stormwater charges.- -Consequently, on September 28,2009, the Entities filed a complaint 
against the City seeking a judgment declaring the Ordinance invalid as an unlawful 
exercise of authority. The Complaint alleges, among other things, that the so-called 
stormwater utility fee is really a disguised tax that the City is precluded from imposing on 
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the Governmental Entities. (Compl. 5-6.) Based upon these allegations, the Entities are 
now seeking summary judgment declaring Ordinance 4512 void. 
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. STANDARD FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents before the court indicate no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Baxter v. 
Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The burden of proving the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. Baxter, 135 Idaho at 
170, 16 P.3d at 267. Once the moving party has shown the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish an issue of fact 
regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 
416, 420 (1996). The issue of whether a statute or ordinance is constitutional is a pure 
question of law. See, e.g., Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable 
847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009); see also Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 
424,428, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985). 
B. ORDINANCE 4512 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHERW1SE 
UNLAWFUL ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER THE 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES. -------
The City has no authority to levy taxes against other government entities. 
Article VII, section 4 of the Idaho Constitution provides "[tJhe property of ... the state, 
counties, towns, cities, villages, school districts, and other municipal corporations and 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
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public libraries shall be exempt from taxation." IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 4. The Idaho 
Code further prohibits municipalities from levying taxes against other governmental 
bodies. Under Idaho law, governmental entities including counties, irrigation districts, 
school districts, educational institutions, and port authorities, are exempt from paying 
municipal taxes. See LC. § 63-602A (exempting property belonging to the state, county, 
municipal corporation, or school district from taxation); Le. § 63-602N (exempting 
irrigation water rights, irrigation infrastructure, and irrigation organizations from property 
taxes); LC. § 63-602E (exempting property used for nonprofit school and educational 
purposes from taxation); Le. § 63-6020 (exempting property used for generating and 
delivering power for irrigation and drainage purposes from taxation); LC. § 70-2003 
(exempting property owned by port districts from municipal taxes). Although the Idaho 
Constitution prohibits the City from imposing a tax on the Governmental Entities, a 
municipality may charge a "user fee" when certain detailed criteria are met that 
distinguishes the charge from a tax. See Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 
authorized by either the Idaho Constitution or the Legislature. See Caesar v. State, 101 
Idaho 158, 160,610 P.2d 517,519 (1980). 
The City's "stormwater fee"js in actuality a revenue generating tax for the City 
streets division and other divisions of the City that cannot constitutionally be assessed 
against the Governmental Entities. Even if the City's stormwater charge qualified as a 
user fee, the City has not been granted the authority by the Idaho Constitution or 
Legislature to assess the charge as against the Governmental Entities. 
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1. The City's Stormwater Charge Does Not Begin to Meet the Criteria 
for a "User Fee" and, thus, Constitutes an Unconstitutional Tax 
Against the Governmental Entities. 
"A tax is generally defined as 'an enforced contribution exacted pursuant to 
legislative authority for the purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or 
governmental purposes.'" City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 811, 215 P.3d 
514, 531 (2009) (quoting 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 1 (2009)). "[T]axes serve the purpose of 
providing funding for public services at large, whereas a fee serves only the purpose of 
covering the cost of the particular service provided by the state to the individual." Idaho 
Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 744, 890 P.2d 326,330 
(1995). The Idaho Supreme Court has enumerated several factors to consider in 
determining whether a fee is a disguised tax. See, e.g., id. at 743, 890 P.2d at 329. 
Relevant considerations include whether the "fee" was enacted solely for the purpose of 
raising revenue; whether it has any provisions of regulation; whether there is anything in 
the ordinance that limits the use of the revenue generated; whether the revenue is used to 
------hberrefit-those-paying-the-fee-or;-instead-;-tb:e-public-at-farge;-whether--administrative----
charges are already imposed for the activity; whether the fee is targeted at specific users; 
and whether the fee was "designed to generate revenues to be used for capital 
improvements throughout the Cityby all residents, and not solelyfor the benefit of those 
[paying the fee]." State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358, 360-61 (1923), overruled on 
other grounds by Greater Boise Auditorium Dist. v. Royal Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho 844, 
684 P.2d 286 (1984); see also Idaho Bldg. Contractors, 126 Idaho at 743-44,890 P.2d at 
329-30 ("The fee is imposed on certain individuals for use by the public at large, and we 
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thus hold that it is a tax and therefore not within the legitimate regulatory powers of the 
City."). If a municipality purports to assess a user fee pursuant to the police powers 
granted under Idaho Constitution, article XII, section 2, then it is subject to the additional 
requirement that a fee be "rationally related to the cost of enforcing the regulation and not 
'assessed purely as a revenue-generating scheme.'" Potts Constr. Co. v. N Kootenai 
Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 681, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005). With the exception of this 
additional requirement, the factors that the court considers to determine if a municipal 
assessment is a tax or a fee are identical. See Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 
502,504-05, 768 P.2d 765, 767-68 (1988). 
First, we will analyze the factors that the Idaho courts deem significant to 
determine if a municipal assessment constitutes a fee as opposed to an impermissible tax. 
Next, we will examine case law that deals specifically with attempts by municipalities to 
assess a "stormwater utility fee." Although there are no Idaho cases directly on point in 
this regard, case law does exist from foreign jurisdictions that examines ordinances 
the City's stormwater utility scheme to demonstrate that, from the planning phase all the 
way through the current operation of the City's "stormwater utility," it is designed to 
supplement the general operating budgets 0 f various divisions of the City, particularly the 
City streets division, for activities that have little or no connection to stormwater 
regulation and which benefit the public generally rather than the Governmental Entities in 
proportion to the amounts they are assessed. In sum, the stormwater utility assessment is 
not a fee related to services directly rendered to the Governmental Entities, but is a tax 
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used to supplement the general revenues of the City for the "good of the general public;" 
(Dechert Dep. 133:3-14,135:4-6; see also Davies Dep. 63:1-9.) 
a. Idaho Case Law on the Distinction Between a Valid Fee and an 
Impermissible Tax. 
The controlling case in Idaho pertaining to whether a purported fee is really a 
disguised tax is Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). In 
Brewster, the City of Pocatello enacted an ordinance imposing a street restoration and 
maintenance fee on property within the city. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 502, 768 P.2d at 765. 
Prior to imposition of the fee, the city used ad valorem tax revenues to finance street 
repair and maintenance. Id. at 503, 768 P.2d at 766. The fee was calculated based on "a 
formula reflecting the traffic which is estimated to be generated by [a] particular 
property." Id. Failure to pay the fee could result in the city obtaining a judgment 
permitting the imposition of a lien upon the property owned by the delinquent payer. Id. 
Several plaintiffs brought a challenge to the ordinance in an effort to prevent the 
city from collecting the fee. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 503, 768 P.2d at 766. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the grounds that the fee was 
a disguised tax and, therefore, invalid because the city did not obtain voter approval. Id. 
at 502-03, 768 P.2d at 765-66. The city appealed the district court's ruling. Although the 
city conceded that if the fee was really a tax it was not authorized under Idaho law, the 
city maintained that the fee was permissible under Idaho Code section 63-2201A. That 
section provided: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the governing board of any 
taxing district may impose and cause to be collected fees for those services 
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provided by that district which would otherwise be funded by ad valorem 
tax revenues. 
Id. at 503, 768 P.2d at 766. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rej ected the city's argument. fd. It reasoned 
that section 63-2201A only authorized the imposition of fees - not the levying of taxes. 
fd. at 503-04, 768 P.2d at 766-67. Because the "fee" imposed by the city's ordinance was 
really a tax, it was invalid and outside the scope of the city's authority. fd. at 504, 
768 P.2d at 767. 
In reaching its decision, the Court enumerated several guidelines for 
distinguishing a fee from a tax. According to the Court, "a fee is a charge for a direct 
public service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by 
the public at large to meet public needs." Id. at 505, 768 P.2d at 768; see also fdaho 
Bldg. Contractors, 126 Idaho at 744, 890 P.2d at 330 ("The impact fee at issue here 
serves the purpose of providing funding for public services at large, and not to the 
individual assessed, and therefore is a tax. The fact that additional services are made 
necessary by growth and development does not change the essential nature of the services 
provided: they are for the public at large."). The Court reasoned that the fee imposed by 
the city was really a tax because it was clear the ordinance was enacted for the purpose of 
raising revenue. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767. The Court also found it 
significant that the ordinance contained no provisions of regulation, thus excluding the 
constitutional police powers as a basis for assessment of the fee. fd. Because the 
ordinance was enacted primarily to raise revenue, it could only be justified by the 
municipality's power to tax. fd. As further explained by the Court: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12 
governmental entities/pleadings/summary judgment_memo Jznal Y3. 
In the instant case it is clear that the revenue to be collected from 
Pocatello's street fee has no necessary relationship to the regulation of 
travel over its streets, but rather is to generate funds for the non-regulatory 
function of repairing and maintaining streets. The maintenance and repair 
of streets is a non-regulatory ftmction as the terms apply to the facts of the 
instant case. We view the essence of the charge at issue here as imposed 
on occupants or owners of property for the privilege of having a public 
street abut their property. In that respect it is not dissimilar from a tax 
imposed for the privilege of owning property within the municipal limits 
of Pocatello. The privilege of having the usage of city streets which abuts 
one's property, is in no respect different from the privilege shared by the 
general public in the usage of public streets. 
Id.; see also Idaho Bldg. Contractors, 126 Idaho at 744,890 P.2d at 330 (concluding that 
a development impact fee was "no different than a charge for the privilege of living in the 
City .... It is a privilege shared by the general public which utilizes the same facilities 
and services as those [paying the fee],,). Unlike other services provided by 
municipalities, such as water, sewer, or electrical services, the street fee was not "based 
on user's consumption of the particular commodity." Brewster, 115 Idaho at 505, 
768 P.2d at 768; see also Idaho Bldg. Contractors, 126 Idaho at 744, 890 P.2d at 330 
(finding it significant that revenue generated by the development impact fee was "paid 
~~~~ ~--- ~-~ --~-~--~-~ ---- --~--------~-------
into a general fund" the proceeds of which were spent both inside and outside of the 
development). Thus, fees collected to benefit the public at large will be regarded as taxes 
by Idaho courts. 
b. Case Law Related to "Stormwater Utility" Assessments and the 
Distinction Between a "User Fee" and a Tax. 
In the specific context of stormwater utilities, the distinction between a tax and fee 
has been considered by numerous courts across the country. In the seminal case on the 
classification of a stormwater utility fee, Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 
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1998), the Michigan Supreme Court relied on several of the factors also used by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in striking down a city ordinance that imposed a stormwater utility fee. 
The fee involved in that case was very similar to that imposed by Ordinance 4512. The 
ordinance in Bolt was enacted to finance a combined sewer overflow control program, 
which would cost approximately $176 million over the course of thirty years.s Bolt, 587 
N.W.2d at 266. To do so, it established a stormwater enterprise fund that would be 
financed through the imposition of an annual stormwater service charge. ld. at 267. The 
service charge was assessed against each parcel of property in the city through "a formula 
that attempted to roughly estimate each parcel's storm water runoff." !d. The formula 
was calculated based upon impervious surface area and was very similar to the City of 
Lewiston's ERU method; however, the fonnula in Bolt also took into account several 
"run off factors" that could increase or decrease the fee assessed and permitted reductions 
in the fee assessed for properties that did not receive stormwater or sewage services. ld. 
Fees collected pursuant to the ordinance were to be used to help fund "the administration, 
operation, maintenance,---and-C01TstnrcitcfIlOrth:e~teTIn·l.LL"~-flyfd-. -'Such------
expenditures had previously been funded out of the city's general revenue fund. ld. at 
267 n.4. Failure to pay the fee could result in being subjected to "delayed payment 
charges, rebilling charges, property liens ... , and attorney fees." ld. at 267. 
A city fee payer subsequently challenged the ordinance on the grounds it was a 
disguised tax that could only be imposed with the approval of a majority of qualified 
electors. Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 268. The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed and 
5 The program was deemed necessary in large part because heavy precipitation events often caused the 
stormwater system to overflow and discharge untreated sewage into local rivers. Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 266. 
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concluded the ordinance imposed a valid user fee that did not constitute an unlawful tax. 
Id. The fee payer then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. On appeal, the 
Michigan Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals and struck down the fee on the 
grounds that it was an unconstitutional tax.6 The Court based its decision primarily on 
the consideration of three factors: (1) whether the fee was "proportionate to the necessary 
costs of the service"; (2) whether the fee served "a regulatory purpose rather than a 
revenue-raising purpose"; and (3) whether payment of the fee was voluntary. Id. at 269; 
see also Nat 'I Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) ("[A] fee ... 
is incident to a voluntary act" and may normally be exacted when the government 
"bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other members of society.") According 
to the Court, all three factors justified the conclusion that the stormwater fee was a 
disguised tax. 
In considering the first factor, the Court concluded the fee was not proportionate 
to the cost of any service provided. It rejected the city's argument that basing the fee on 
ImpervIOus surface calculations rendereCltheree proportionate rutile costsofservi:ce 
provided. Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 270 n.14. Because "a major portion of the costs 
constitute[ d] capital expenditures and, consequently, an investment in infrastructure that 
6 Significantly, Michigan law distinguishes fees from taxes in the same manner as does Idaho. As stated by 
the Michigan Supreme Court: 
Determining whether the storm water service charge is properly characterized as a fee or a 
tax involves consideration of several factors. Generally, a "fee" is "exchanged for a 
service rendered or a benefit conferred, and some reasonable relationship exists between 
the amount of the fee and the value of the service or benefit." ., .. A "tax," on the other 
hand, is designed to raise revenue. 
Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 269 (quoting Saginaw v. John Sexton Corp. of Michigan, 591 N.W.2d 52, 56 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998)). 
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will serve the city for many years after property owners have paid for it," the fee was not 
proportional to any service provided. Id. The Court adopted the following reasoning of 
the dissenting Court of Appeals judge: 
[N]o effort has been made to allocate even that portion of the capital costs 
that will have a useful life in excess of thirty years to the general fund. 
This is an investment in infrastructure that will substantially outlast the 
current "mortgage" that the storm water charge requires property owners 
to amortize. At the end of thirty years, property owners will have fully paid 
for a tangible asset that will serve the city for many years thereafter. 
Accordingly, the "fee" is not structured to simply defray the costs of a 
"regulatory" activity, but rather to fund a public improvement designed to 
provide a long-term benefit to the city and all its citizens. The revenue to 
be derived from the charge is clearly in excess of the direct and in~irect 
costs of actually using the storm water system over the next thirty years 
and, being thus disproportionate to the costs of the services provided and 
the benefits rendered, constitutes a tax. 
Id. at 270 (quoting Bolt v. City of Lansing, 561 N.W.2d 423, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) 
(Markman, J., dissenting)). 
In further analyzing the first factor, the Court concluded that the "charges imposed 
do not correspond to the benefits conferred." Id. at 271. The Court pointed out that a 
maJoritY-Of property owners in the city were not serveuoytb:e new-smtmwatersyste:m-. --
Id. Nonetheless, those owners were being charged the same amount as those who would 
"enjoy the full benefits of the new construction." Id. The credit system and appeal 
procedures established in the ordinance did not remedy this deficiency since there was no 
credit for those owners not served by the system. !d. at 271 n.15. Because "[a] true 'fee' 
... is not designed to confer benefits on the general public, but rather to benefit the 
particular person on whom it is imposed" and the fee at hand applied equally to all 
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property owners regardless of the benefit actually received, it was an invalid tax. 
Id. at 271. As stated by the Court: 
[T]he lack of correspondence between the charges and the benefit 
conferred demonstrates that the city has failed to differentiate any 
particularized benefits to property owners from the general benefits 
conferred on the public. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the acknowledged goal of the 
ordinance is to address environmental concerns regarding water quality. 
Improved water quality in the Grand and Red Cedar Rivers and the 
avoidance of federal penalties for discharge violations are goals that 
benefit everyone in the city, not only property owners. As stated by the 
Court of Appeals dissent, 
The extent of any particularized benefit to property owners 
is considerably outweighed by the general benefit to the 
citizenry of Lansing as a whole in the form of enhanced 
environmental quality .... When virtually every person in a 
community is a "user" of a public improvement, a 
municipal government's tactic of augmenting its budget by 
purporting to charge a "fee" for the "service" rendered 
should be seen for what it is: a subterfuge to evade 
constitutional limitations on its power to raise taxes. 
Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 271 (quoting Bolt, 561 N.W.2d at 430-31 (Markman, J., dissenting)). 
-nrotherwoTds;to-bevalitl;'~[a-yproperiee-mu:stTeflect-the-hestowal--of--a-corresponding---
benefit on the person paying the charge, which benefit is not generally shared by other 
members of society." Id. 
Next, the-Courtcorichided the feedid:n6f serve aieguIafOrypurpose. ThEC()urf 
reached this conclusion based on consideration of the use to which the funds were put and 
the lack of any element of regulation. Rather than facilitating regulation, the fee was 
designed for the purpose of raising general revenue to fund capital expenditures. Bolt, 
587 N.W.2d at 270. According to the Court, use of the funds in that manner 
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"constitute[ dJ an investment in infrastructure as opposed to a fee designed simply to 
defray the costs of a regulatory activity." Id. This was true even though funds were not 
deposited in the general revenue fund. Id. 
The lack of any regulatory provisions was also of particular significance. Id. at 
272. Although the ordinance "regulate [ d] the amount of rainfall shed from a parcel of 
property as surface runoff," it did not impose any controls based upon the "presence of 
pollutants on each parcel that contaminate such runoff and contribute to the need for 
treatment before discharge into navigable waters." Id. Nor did it "distinguish between 
those responsible for greater and lesser levels of runoff," establish "end-of-pipe treatment 
for the storm water runoff," or include rights of way in its scope. Id. Because the 
ordinance was designed to raise revenue and did not contain any elements of regulation, 
the Court concluded it did not serve a regulatory purpose. 
After concluding the fee did not serve a regulatory purpose, the Court noted 
several other considerations that supported the conclusion the stormwater fee was a 
-------cdisgur~ed-ta:x:--Payment-ofthe-fee-wasuDtvuluntary:__The_program-fimded-by_the-f~e-wa~s ----
"previously funded by the general fund revenues from property and income taxes," "the 
storm water service charge [could] be secured by placing a lien on property,"? and the 
sufficient on their own to justify the conclusion that the stormwater fee was a disguised 
tax, these considerations reinforced that determination. 
7 In relying on this fact, the Court noted that "( w ]hile ordinarily the fact that a lien may be imposed does not 
transform an otherwise proper fee into a tax, this fact buttresses the conclusion that the charge is a tax in the 
present case, where the charges imposed are disproportionate to the costs of operating the system and to the 
value of the benefit conferred, and the charge lacks an element of volition." Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 272. 
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The Court summarized its opinion as follows: 
We conclude that the storm water service charge imposed by Ordinance 
925 is a tax and not a valid user fee. To conclude otherwise would permit 
municipalities to supplement existing revenues by redefining various 
government activities as "services" and enacting a myriad of "fees" for 
those services. To permit such a course of action would effectively 
abrogate the constitutional limitations on taxation and public spending .... 
The danger to the taxpayer of this burgeoning phenomenon [the imposition 
of mandatory user fees] is as clear as are its attractions to local units of 
government. The "mandatory user fee" has all the compulsory attributes of 
a tax, in that it must be paid by law without regard to the usage of a 
service, and becomes a tax lien of [sic]the property. However, it escapes 
the constitutional protections afforded voters for taxes. It can be increased 
any time without limit. This is precisely the sort of abuse from which the 
Headlee Amendment[8] was intended to protect taxpayers. 
Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 272-73 (quoting Headlee Blue Ribbon Commission, A Report to 
Governor John Engler § 5, pp. 26-27 (Sept. 1994)). 
The Idaho cases that have considered the tax versus fee distinction and cases from 
foreign jurisdictions that have done the same, in the context of storm water utility 
assessments, are in substantial agreement on the significant legal factors. The most 
irnpDTta:n.t-currsid:eration-byfaris-whether;-un-the -one-hand;-the-ml:lllicipa1--assessment-i:s-----~· 
based upon the benefit to the user of the service provided and, on the other hand, whether 
the proceeds of the assessment are used to provide services to the general public. See 
at 743, 890 P.2d at 329; Craig v. City of Macon, 543 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Mo. 1976); 
Fulton County Taxpayers Ass 'n v. City of Atlanta, 1999 WL 1102795 *3-4 (Ga. Super. 
1999). Another significant factor considered by the courts is whether the assessment is 
8 The Headlee Amendment required tax increases to be approved by voters. 
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for the enforcement of a regulatory function, particularly where a municipality is relying 
upon its police power authority, or if it is for revenue-generating purposes. Foster's Inc. 
v City of Boise, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941); Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504-05, 
768 P.2d at 767-68; Idaho Bldg Contractors, 126 Idaho at 743, 890 P.2d at 329; see also 
Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 269. Even in cases where a municipality's police powers are not 
implicated, it cannot treat the fees collected as revenue to be deposited and spent like 
general tax revenue. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 440, 807 P.2d 1272, 1278 
(1991); see also Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 272. Finally, the cases do not allow a municipality 
to assess enforced involuntary contributions against other governmental entities. See 
Robb v. Nielson, 71 Idaho 222, 228, 229 P.2d 981, 984 (1951); see also Nat'l Cable 
Television, 415 U.S. at 340-41; Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 272; United States v. City of 
Huntington, 999 F.2d 71, 73-74 (4th Cir. 1993). 
c. The Planning, Implementation, and Execution of the City's 
"Storm water Utility Fee" Demonstrates That it is Not a 
Permissible User Fee, But Instead an Unconstitutional Tax Levied 
Upon the Governmental Entities. 
The City freely admits that it charges its stormwater fee to property owners who 
either do not have any stormwater run-off or do not utilize any of the City stormwater 
infrastructure. See, e.g., (Dechert Dep. 51:2-25-52:1-21, 131:23-25-133:1.) 
Nevertheless, they are still required to pay the stormwater assessment because, according 
to the City, it funds a service that is beneficial to the City as a whole like City streets, the 
City Police Department, and the City Fire Department. Id. at 135:4-6. The City further 
admits that stormwater capital improvement projects that are scheduled to be funded will 
not address any of the stormwater generated by certain of the Governmental Entities, 
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despite the fact that these entities are charged among the highest monthly rates of any 
other property owners within the City of Lewiston. 
There are no regulatory functions that are funded by the stormwater assessment. 
Although Ordinance 4512 calls for a stormwater utility, no such utility has actually been 
created. Instead, various preexisting departmental and divisional managers of the City 
and their employees constitute the "structure" of the so-called stormwater utility. The 
operating budget that the City maintains for stormwater shows that a significant portion 
of the funds budgeted is allocated to pay the salaries and wages of these managers and 
employees. Much of what the revenue collected does fund bears little relationship to 
stormwater activities. The stormwater utility - such as it is - comingles the stormwater 
assessments· with tax revenue in the City's general depository account and disburses it 
just like other tax revenue. 
Finally, the Governmental Entities must pay the stormwater assessment regardless 
of whether they manage their own stormwater or maintain their own stormwater system . 
.... . ---.-~ ~·-'fher-e-are--I1o-ex-emptiofl:s-that·apply-to·theGovemmefl:tal-Rntities~The~Gityptff]3orts--te - ------~ 
maintain lien rights and penalties if the Governmental Entities refuse to pay the 
assessment. 
1. The City'sst6rfuwalefassessmertt ish6t based tip6na 
benefit the Governmental Entities receive, but is rather 
assessed to fund activities that benefit the general public at 
large. 
Both the City public works director, Chris Davies, and the City stormwater 
program coordinator, Tom Dechert, frankly admit that regardless of the runoff generated 
from a particular piece of property, each parcel is currently assessed a 50% base rate that 
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must be paid.9 (Dechert Dep. 133:3-20; Davies Dep. 52:13-55:2.) Mr. Davies asserts 
that he is in charge of managing the stormwater utility. (Davies Dep. 21 :2-3.) Mr. 
Dechert as stormwater program coordinator was charged with development of the 
stormwater utility, which included drafting Ordinance 4512 and making related 
presentations to City Council. (Dechert Dep. 32:9-38:21.) Mr. Dechert explained the 
formulation of the fee as follows: 
There are two parts to the stormwater fee. There's the storrnwater fee that 
we all pay as a community to operate and maintain the storrnwater system 
as it exists in the city. And as that individual who has - who lives out on 
the edge of Tammany where his or her water discharges onto the farmland 
or county property, that person is still driving city streets and visiting city 
businesses and expecting the City to manage the stormwater throughout 
the city. That's the part of the fee that is currently being charged .... The 
second part of the fee was the part of the fee that we were talking about for 
capital improvements that does relate to specific areas and particular 
properties, particular projects, which is not - the Council is not charging 
them.Co] 
(Dechert Dep. 133:4-14; see also Davies Dep. 52:17-53:14.) As explained below, neither 
aspect of the stormwater fee is based upon the provision of an actual service. 
9 The City Council was aware of this 50/50 fee structure when it enacted the Ordinance. (Dechert Dep. 
154:24-155:2.) 
10 A similar explanation was provided in a City handout. It states: 
The storrnwater fee is based on two aspects of the storrnwater system One portion of the fee, charged to 
every property parcel in the City limits, will be for administration and maintenance of the City's public 
stormwater system as a whole; as cOl11liiunity-stipportedinfrastructure. The other portion of the fee is based 
on each individual parcel's contribution of stormwater runoff to the community system 
(Dechert Dep. Ex 6.) Exhibit 10 to Mr. Dechert's deposition also contained a similar explanation: 
The total fee is based on two parts: 50% of the fee for each property is each property's contribution to 
maintaining the City's system as a whole, the other 50% is designed to reflect each individual's property's 
stormwater contribution to the system 50% is for the community and 50% is for the individual. The 
proposed system is setup so every property in the City must pay at least 50% to support the community's 
stormwater system It's aflXed cost for being in the City. 
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The first aspect of the fee, which is used for maintenance ofthe existing system, is 
not tied to the provision of a service. There are many fee payers who do not receive a 
service because their property does not generate run-off or is not connected to the City's 
stormwater system. (Davies Dep. 60:l3-20, 61:14-22.) Lewiston's stormwater system 
consists of a "patchwork" of curb, gutter, and pipes that have been established over the 
decades by both publicly and privately financed projects. (Dechert Dep. 52:16-2l.) As 
such, stormwater drainage within the City is accomplished largely on private property and 
through natural and federally owned drainage systems. The system was explained by Mr. 
Dechert as follows: 
Lewiston's stormwater system is comprised of stormwater pipes that are in 
the ground. We have curbs and gutters which channel stormwater along 
many of the streets. We have open drainages flowing across many 
properties, mostly in natural channels, but sometimes in newly created 
channels that weren't part of the natural drainage system. We have a 
number of detention, retention ponds around the city, mostly on private 
properties, but our - which are part of the stormwater drainage system. 
And then a lot of Lewiston's stormwater drainage system goes into the 
Corp of Engineers' ponds and drainage system down there. 
-(I:Jechert ]:Jep~ 49: 11 ::22 -(emphasis added) ):Mr. -Dechert-admits -that-"[1jots- of properties- ---
have stormwater systems that are not built by the ... City." Id. at 51 :6-7. Mr. Davies 
further confirms that some property owners contain all of their stormwater and that other 
property owners do not discharge- anystoriliw-aIer irito--exisliIigCitystorriiwater-
infrastructure. (Davies Dep. 54:21-55:17.) A property owner must still pay $3.00 per 
ERU regardless of how much or how little stormwater the property owner actually 
discharges into City stormwater infrastructure. See Res. 2008-55; Res. 2009-68. The 
Id. at Ex. 10, p.l (emphasis added). Similar language can be found in a fact sheet currently on the City's 
public website at http://www.cityojlewiston.org/index.aspx?NID=225, Stormwater Utility Information Flyer 
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· same is true of the second portion of the stormwater fee that IS to be dedicated to 
stonnwater capital improvements. 
Many fee payers will not benefit from the capital improvements that will be 
funded by the fee. Some stonnwater basins will not receive any capital improvements 
under the City's "twenty year" capital improvement plan. For example, drainage 
Basin 15, the basin in which the Port is located, is not scheduled to receive any 
improvements. (Dechert Dep. 191:1-193-16; Id. at Ex. 7, p. 1, Ex. 8.) The Port, 
however, is charged one of the highest annual amounts in stonnwater fees of all property 
owners inthe City based upon its calculated ERUsY (Davies Dep. Ex. 2, p. 2.) At the 
same time, a disproportionate number of improvements are planned to be made in the 
Nonnal Hill and Downtown drainage basins. See id. Property owners in those basins pay 
the same stonnwater rate as those in basins who are not scheduled to receive any 
improvements. The explanation given by the City for this disproportionate treatment of 
fee payers is that the stonnwater fees are really meant to benefit the City as a whole. 
----The City empioyees-responsrbk-for-developing-the-stormwater-i-ee- -eoneede- that- - ----- -- -
the fee was not calculated based on the provision of individual service, but instead on the 
benefit the general publicreceives.12 Mr. Davies acknowledged that "[a] service is being 
- Answers to Questions. 
11 The Port's stormwater ERUs are only exceeded by the airport. (Davies Dep. Ex. 2, p. 2.) 
12 The ERU method is based largely on admillistrative convenience. (Davies Dep. Ex. 3, p. 5.) ("[T]here 
is no real way to determine the actual amount a residential parcel discharges into the storm sewer, so it 
would [be] very difficult to determine how much to charge."); (Dechert Dep. Ex. 1, p. 10) ("The plans for 
fee structures to date have been to establish a base to cover the costs for city streets (25%) and 
administrative costs (15%) (= 40%) which must be paid by every ERU. However, the proposal is that we 
set 50% as the base fee to simplify admillistration."); id. at Ex. 10, p. 1 (noting that a credit system was not 
implemented because "it would be difficult to track and admillister"); (Dechert Dep. 127:3-129:14) 
(acknowledging the existence of more equitable methods of assessing the stormwater fee that were not 
implemented because they would be more difficult to admillister); see also (Davies Dep. 35:22-36-12.) 
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provided that not everyone may receive, but everyone will be charged a base fee." 
(Davies Dep. Ex. 3, p. 5; see also Davies Dep. 70:1-12.) Charging a fee to everyone 
regardless of actual receipt of a service was deemed appropriate since imposition of the 
fee would benefit the city as a whole. (Davies Dep. 38:14-17, 60:13-20.) In this respect, 
the fee is equated to the provision of services such as fire, police, and streets. See 
(Dechert Dep. 134:13-23, Ex. 6, p. 2) (noting that each portion of the fee reflects 50% of 
the entire amount charged and that the first portion of the fee is used for "fixing, building, 
and maintaining the stormwater system that benefits the whole City .... [j]ust like [city] 
streets"); id. at 135:4-6 (noting stormwater is "like police services, I mean, even though 
you never call the policemen to your house because you're law abiding" the service still 
benefits the public generally); (Davies Dep. 55:9-56:9) ("We have a street system, and 
there may be people out there that probably never use Bryden or never use 21 st or Main 
Street. Yet, we use dollars that they generate to maintain those streets. So the analogy is 
the same. There is a benefit to all for maintaining the existing system. .,. [I]f I'm a 
-taxpayer, though~ potentiallyI could use 21 ~t Street I~may never use it, it's true. At least 
I would have the potential to use it. ... The roads are part of have storm water runoff. 
Those go into the system. You use those roads, so you are, in essence, part of the 
. Tssue:")' The same explamitioii is-given for the second pari of tliifeelTsedfofulld-
stormwater capital improvement projects. When confronted with the fact that there is no 
provision in the City's twenty-year capital improvement plan for any capital projects 
within the Port of Lewiston's drainage basin, Mr. Dechert described the outside 
improvements "as being a benefit to the city as a whole." (Dechert Dep. 191:9-192:10.) 
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As explained above, however, generating funds for the benefit of the public at 
large must be done through taxation, not through the imposition of user fees. Provision 
of a public benefit cannot serve as the basis for a user fee, particularly when it is assessed 
against a govemmental entity that is constitutionally exempt from taxation. The 
Governmental Entities are being assessed a charge that is not based upon a benefit they 
actually receive. This becomes all the more evident when we examine how the proceeds 
of the assessment are being managed and budgeted. 
11. The assessment is not used for enforcement of a regulatory 
function or other proper fee-based service, but instead 
supplements the general tax revenue of the City and funds 
the budgets of preexisting departments and divisions for 
non-stormwater related purposes. 
Like the ordinance struck down in Bolt, Ordinance 4512 does not contain 
provisions purporting to control activities relating to stormwater. The Ordinance does not 
impose controls or fees based upon the presence of chemicals or other pollutants on a 
given parcel that may contaminate stormwater runoff nor distinguish between parcels 
.- .. generating greateramo'Unts--of -runoff:. --Beeause-there-are- no-stermwaterregulatioflS---
contained in the Ordinance or, for that matter, any other section of the City Code, the 
utility fee has no reasonable relationship to the cost of enforcing a scheme of regulation. 13 
with NPDES requirements mandated by the EPA, that cannot serve as the basis for a 
valid user fee. While admirable, goals such as ensuring water quality, improving the 
environment, and avoiding federal NPDES violation penalties are all public purposes, the 
13 Unlike the parking fee upheld in Foster's, none of the revenue from the stormwater fee is budgeted for 
enforcement of regulations. See Foster's, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d at 722. 
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benefit of which accrues to everyone in the City - not just fee payers. Bolt, 587 N. W.2d 
at 271. The City pUblications regarding the assessment recognize that: 
[TJhe fee will go towards fixing, building, and maintaining the stormwater 
system that benefits the whole City. Just like streets or the wastewater 
system, it's part of what we pay for as a community. We want to ensure 
that stormwater discharged to the rivers and creeks from the City meets 
water quality standards to maintain the fish and wildlife we value. 
(Dechert Dep. Ex. 6, p. 2.) Using the City assessment to fund NPDES requirements is 
therefore not related to the provision of services to individuals. Even if it were, the 
portion of the fees allocated for federal environmental compliance is negligible. 14 The 
vast majority of the assessment is used to supplement general revenue through the City's 
"storm water utility." 
Although the Ordinance purports to establish a "utility" to regulate stormwater, 
the City Council has not adopted a utility structure. (Dechert Dep. 67:25-68: 14.) Any 
semblance of a utility that does exist was developed primarily by Thomas Dechert, the 
City stormwater program coordinator. 15 Mr. Dechert has no experience or training in 
ueveloping- a -stormwater·· management- system:16-Nonetheless, -he· was given -primary 
14 The highest estimate given by the City for the portion of the fee related to EPA compliance was 20%. 
(Dechert Dep: 83: 11:::12.) . As it fuiTis out,this-lafgel},consists Of MY: Dechert's salary and benefits. -Id. at 
84: 11-85: 1 There is no water quality monitoring at this time. Id. 
15 Other individuals involved in developing the utility include Chris Davies, City Public Works Director; 
Dan Marsh, City Administrative Services Director; Keith Bingman, City Street Maintenance Manager; and 
Shawn Stubbers, City Assistant Engineer. None of the individuals had training or experience developing a 
stormwater utility. (Davies Dep. 50:16-20; Bingman Dep. 8:11-23, 46:17-47:5.) Although Mr. Davies 
admitted he was supposed to hire a consultant to help develop a defensible stormwater utility fee, he 
neglected to do so. (Davies Dep. 47:8-49:7.) 
16 Mr. Dechert's post-high school education was in agronomy and soils. He has no educational background 
in stormwater or public utility management. (Dechert Dep. 9:7-20, 13:4-7.) Mr. Dechert admitted in his 
deposition that developing the utility was not part of his original job description and that, prior to his 
experience at the City of Lewiston, he had never participated in the creation of a stormwater utility. !d. at 
30:2-7,32:2-14. 
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responsibility for drafting and implementing Ordinance 4512. 17 As it turns out, the 
"utility' is comprised of various employees in the City Public Works Department who 
were employed in their same capacities before enactment of Ordinance 4512. (Dechert 
Dep. 46:25-49:4, Ex. 1.) There is no separate organizational division or department that 
is the "storm water utility.,,18 City Administrative Services continues to be responsible 
for the accounting of funds for stormwater use.!9 (Dechert Dep. 47:3-4; Marsh 
Dep. 31: 13-15.) The City Engineering Division still has responsibility for designing and 
constructing stormwater capital improvement projects. The City Streets Maintenance 
Department continues to have responsibility for maintenance of the stormwater system 
and city streets.20 (Dechert Dep. 49:2-4.) The only full-time employee of the "utility," 
Mr. Dechert, was also employed by the City before the Ordinance was passed. Currently, 
Mr. Dechert's employment as stormwater program coordinator has been reduced to half-
time?! (Marsh Dep. 63:3-8; Stubbers Dep. 43:13-20, Feb. 23, 2010.) In addition to 
funding the salaries and wages of existing department and division heads and their 
17 Mr. Dechert created the draft of the Ordinance by looking at three or four stormwater ordinances from 
other jurisdictions, although he cannot now remember which ordinances he referenced. (Dechert Dep. 
64:10-24.) He "cut and paste" from those sources to "make the [draft Ordinance] look like that it was 
something that was going to work here for the City." Id. at 65: 1-12. 
18 When asked to explain the utility structure, public works director Davies, became perplexed and 
. responded bydiagr:fu:riIiliig the orgalliiatiOnalstiuctiife of the Public Works Depatl::i'nelit.(Davies Dep~· 
Ex. 10; Davies Dep. 13: 1-23.) He was unable to identify any separate division for the stormwater utility. 
(Davies Dep. 15:14-16:5.) 
19 The stormwater "fund" is billed approximately $60,000.00 per year for administrative services that were 
being provided without charge before the Ordinance was enacted. (Marsh Dep. 56:12-57:2.) According to 
Mr. Marsh, the administrative services charge billed to stormwater is only a rough estimate, or 
"guesstimate," that is not based upon any definite criteria. Id. at 57:7-12. Other departments within the 
City that receive the same services, such as the streets division, are not charged for the administrative 
services. !d. at 31:13-25, 63:11-16. 
20 Part of Mr. Bingman's salary and the wages of employees who work in his division are funded by the 
stormwater assessment. (Bingman Dep. 42:7-21.) 
21 The funds previously used for Mr. Dechert's full time salary are now being utilized to pay the salary of a 
City GIS tech, who is employed by City engineering. (Stubbers Dep. 43: 16-20.) 
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employees, activities related to City streets that have little to no connection with 
stormwater are also funded by the assessment. 
In both fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the City allocated $298,920 in its Stormwater 
budget to an expense item designated "JNTERDEPT SERVICES." (Marsh Dep. 71 :20-
22,78:10-15; Ex. 2, p. 9; Ex. 5, p. 11.) This expense budget item is determined by Mr. 
Bingman and is solely for "interdepartmental services" that the City streets division 
provides for "stormwater" activities?2 See (Marsh Dep. 71 :20-72:30; Bingman 
Dep.37:19-38:22.) Although Mr. Bingman created a preliminary list of activities he 
believed should be attributable to the Stormwater budget, no final written standards were 
ever generated.23 (Bingman Dep. 44:16-24, 122:8-18.) Mr. Bingman gives the City 
employee who is responsible for inputting the street maintenance work orders a "general 
idea of what I was looking at, what I was targeting as stormwater activities .... Any type 
of sweeping, shoulder grading, curb work ... any types of things like that just basically 
gave him a laundry list of the activities that we did that I felt like were storm water 
related." Id.at43:9-20,-79:8::13,118:1-) (emphasis added);--Theemployee inputting the-- -
numbers, Tom Myklebust, has no independent qualifications or training to make such 
determinations. Id. at 79:14-80:13. Even though Mr. Bingman is the only person that 
.. purportedlyha.s conclusive knowledge o(what constitufesa siormwaIer activitY; he -onlY···-
22 Mr. Bingman is also responsible for budgeting expenses for motor fuel ($18,823.93 for FY 2009), 
depreciation and replacement of vehicles and equipment ($54,144.00 for FY 2009), and rental for fleet 
maintenance and operations ($82,908.00 for FY 2009). (Marsh Dep. 65: 13-70:21; Ex. 2, p. 1.) These 
expenses are incurred for the street sweepers and other equipment used by the City streets division for 
"stormwater" purposes. See (Bingman Dep. 115:6-116:23.) City Administrative Services is unaware of 
how the City streets division determined these allocations for the Stormwater budget. (Marsh Dep. 65:13-
70:21.) 
23 According to Mr. Bingman, the only conclusive classification system for stormwater activities is in his 
head. 
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reviews Myklebust's determinations pertaining to large expenditures. Id. at 81:16-21, 
83:15-85:21, 88:18-22, 92:1-8. There is no comprehensive review of stormwater 
expenditures submitted by the City streets division. 
The City streets division bills for services that have little or no relationship to 
stormwater. Mr. Bingman bills all street sweeping activities for the entire City of 
Lewiston to Stormwater, despite his admission that street sweeping provides several other 
functions that have nothing to do with stormwater. Id. at 55:16-56:9. Other activities 
charged by the City streets division to Stormwater are localized street repairs, berm 
placement, curb and gutter patchbacks, trash and debris clean up, oil spill cleanup, tree 
and limb removal, hauling debris, shoulder grading and ditching, utility locates, system 
mapping, weed cleaning, and other non-categorized work.24 Id. at Ex. 8. Whether and 
how certain activities are attributed to stormwater are ultimately determined in the 
discretion of Mr. Bingman in his capacity as the City's street maintenance manager.25 
Id. at 55:5-10. These allocations are based largely on administrative convenience.26 
Id:-at-S6:22=51-2?i.Themannerin which the revenues from the fee are managed also - --
indicates the fee was imposed to generate general revenue. 
The fees collected for stormwater are deposited into the City's primary checking 
account. the City's Administrative Services Director, Dan Marsh, testified that there is a 
24 Non-categorized work is a catchall category that encompasses things that do not fit squarely into the other 
categories and can include anything from "picking up a dead skunk in the road" to putting chains on the 
trucks. (Bingman Dep. 81:5-12.) 
25 The only defrnite billing standard requires all street sweeping costs to be billed to stormwater. (Davies 
Dep. 42:10-14.) Stormwater fees are therefore even used to pay for street sweeping necessitated by 
community events and activities. (Bingman Dep. 111 :12-20.) 
26 For example, Mr. Bingman admitted that several of the functions paid for from stormwater funds, such as 
street sweeping, have functions other than stormwater management but are nonetheless charged solely to the 
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primary account at Wells Fargo that serves as the operating account for the City. (Marsh 
Dep. 28:9-29:3.) When funds are received from the stormwater assessment, they are 
deposited into the primary account. Id. at 36:8-24. The bank: does not segregate the 
funds in any way and all of the funds are comingled. Id. at 37:4-16, 49:10-20. Neither 
does the City account for Stormwater deposits and disbursements on a cash basis. Id. at 
54: 17 -21. Expenditures for city streets are not allocated to stormwater until the end ofthe 
fiscal year.27 (Bingman Dep. 112:7-19.) At that time, the City retroactively allocates 
certain costs, such as street sweeping, to stormwater to meet its annual budget.28 How the 
City operates the Stormwater budget is not surprising in light of the fact that one of the 
pnmary purposes of the Ordinance is to supplement the budget of the City streets 
division. 
The stormwater assessment was designed to offset the cost of other maintenance 
projects within the City and make general revenue funds available for other purposes. 
More specifically, implementing the "fee will :free up about $700,000 in the Streets 
.. - -- -- - . .- .. .. - .- . ,,29 .. .. -- . - ... - . . 
Program, so CIty streets WIll oenefit. (Dechert Dep. Ex. 6, p. 1; see also DaVIeS Dep. 
stormwater utility. According to Mr. Bingman, this billing procedure is followed for purposes of 
administrative convenience. 
27¥ore specifically, interdepartmental charges to the utility from the streets department are billed at the end 
of the year. (Bingman Dep. 112:7-19.) -.. ..- . - -.. -
28 Mr. Bingman admitted in his deposition that he modified the year-end interdepartmental charge 
attributable to stormwater ($295,582.22) in order to meet the allocated budget. (Bingman Dep. 37: 19-
38:22,98:5-99:1; 106:7-107:6, 112:7-19; Marsh Dep. Ex. 3.) He then submitted a bill reflecting an amount 
he knew to be incorrect in order to adjust down to what he mistakenly believed to be the budget number. 
(BingmanDep. 108:11-25, 112:7-19.) 
29 The City's stormwater publication indicates that: 
In the past, the City has managed its stormwater system using general funds allocated to the Street 
Department .... [U]sing the storrnwater utility revenues to pay for all storrnwater management costs will 
free up about $700,000 per year in the Transportation Fund that is currently being used to pay stormwater 
costs. 
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Ex. 4, pp. 5-7 (noting in a presentation to the City Council, among other things, that 
without the fee, downtown revitalization will not occur and the transportation fund will 
not receive the $600,000 to $800,000 it needs ')ust to keep up pace"); Davies Dep. Ex. 5, 
p. 2 (noting that imposing the fee at a rate of $6.35 per ERU "would fund a capital 
improvement program at $1 million for the next 17 to 20 years, and take care of not only 
the downtown area, but solve the previously outlined top ten problem areas within the 
City. Additionally it would free up between $600,000 and $800,000 that is currently 
taken from the Transportation Fund that could be directed at street improvements"); 
Dechert Dep. Ex. 6 ("[U]sing the stormwater utility revenues to pay for all stormwater 
management costs will free up about $700,00 per year in the Transportation Fund that is 
currently being used to pay stormwater costs. Since stormwater management has been 
being funded out ofthe Streets program, it is most likely that Council will use these funds 
for street maintenance."); Dechert Dep. 136:4-116 (noting that freeing up money for 
streets was "one ofthe driving forces" for implementing the stormwater fee)). 
Thestormwater assessinent is clearly not for erifotcemel1t of a regulatory purpose, 
but is instead imposed to generate general revenue to supplement other City divisional 
budgets, particularly for city streets. There is virtually no accountability for how the 
-
-"-~--"--~- -- - - -~--------- ---
proceeds are allocated. The City Streets Maintenance Manager has discretionary 
authority for well over half of the entire Stormwater expenditure budget. Since the 
stormwater assessment revenues are comingled with tax revenue in the City's general 
depository account, it is impossible to determine how the stormwater proceeds are 
(Dechert Dep. Ex. 6, p. 2.) 
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actually disbursed. We do know that at fiscal year-end the City streets division bills an 
interdepartmental charge that contains items relating to non-stormwater activities. 
Because the stormwater assessment is a general revenue raising measure, it constitutes a 
tax that cannot be levied against the Governmental Entities. 
111. The stormwater assessment imposes. an enforced and 
involuntary contribution against the Governmental Entities. 
There is no exemption or reduction in payment for those who do not use the 
stormwater system, including those whose property does not contribute runoff into the 
systemoy contains its own stormwater management system.3D No credit is given even 
though the City's stormwater utility business plan indicates that roughly 30% of charged 
ERUs would quality for credit.31 (Dechert Dep. Ex. 1, p. 10.) This is the case even 
though individual property owners have been and continue to be required to pay for 
stormwater improvements on their own property. Mr. Dechert admits that, with respect 
to stormwater, "almost all capital improvements that occur are funded by the private 
sector during development and redevelopment." Id. at Ex. 1, p. 2; see also L.C.C. §§ 31-
48 & 31-51; (Bingman Dep. 11:19-12:12) (noting that private landowners pay for the 
~~-----"----- -30------------------~--~-------~------~~---~-----~~---'----~~-~------
When questioned about people being upset for having to pay the fee when they do not contribute to the --~-.. -
system, Mr. Davies admitted: 
I can understand that. I don't agree with it. I would say the same thing. They could 
come to me and say, I never use 21 5t [Street]. I don't want to pay for it. I never use the 
police department. I never use the fITe department. I've lived here six years. I've never 
used them, so I want my tax money back. You know, there is to me the argument that 
there is the good for the all. I guess if you don't believe that, then, we start breaking 
down. 
(Davis Dep. 63:1-9.) 
31 Even if the Council adopts such a credit, the current utility structIrre only permits a credit of up to 50% of 
the total fee for non-residential properties. (Dechert Dep. 155: 18-23.) 
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curb and gutter abutting their property and are responsible for repairs). This is especially 
true in the case of the Governmental Entities. 
For example, Lewis-Clark State College (LCSC) recently constructed an 
underground detention pond to retain stormwater on its property. See Herbst Aff. ~~ 2-4. 
There are no exemptions available in the Ordinance or the subsequent resolutions passed 
by the City whereby LCSC could receive a reduction in its stormwater assessment for 
taking such measures. In fact, there are no exemptions for relief from the stormwater 
assessment that could apply to any of the Governmental Entities - period. Mr. Davies, 
who as Public Works Director is the final appeal for any fee reduction request, confirms 
that the only nonresidential fee exemptions that exist are for parcels with less than 2,000 
square feet. (Davies Dep. 57:22-60:22); see also Res. 2009-68. Failure of the 
Governrnental Entities to pay can result in the imposition of a lien on their property and 
the assessment of delinquency charges. L.C.C. § 36-161. The City stormwater 
assessment is an enforced and involuntary exaction against other governrnental entities, 
and as such, constitutes an impermissible tax. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that, like the street fee in Brewster, the 
stormwater utility fee is essentially a charge for the benefit of living or owning property 
-----~~------------~---~-- --~ --- - ---------~-~~---------
in the City of Lewiston. See (Dechert Dep. 134:16-25, Ex. 10 (noting that fuestormwa{er----------
fee is "part of what we pay for as a community")). It is not targeted at specific users or 
related to the provision of any particular service, but is imposed on all owners or 
occupants of property. Allowing the City to impose a stormwater "fee" to fund activities 
traditionally funded out of the general revenue in this manner would allow it to transmute 
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"virtually all of what now are considered 'taxes' ... into 'user fees' by the simple 
expedient of dividing what are generally accepted as taxes into constituent parts." United 
States v. City of Huntington, 999 F.2d 71, 74 (4th Cir. 1993). Nothing would preclude 
the City from imposing a street fee, fire fee, or police fee. Any benefit received by fee 
payers is equally shared by the public at large. Everyone, regardless of payment of the 
fee, receives cleaner streets, traversable roads, and, eventually, capital stonllwater 
improvements. No individual service is being provided; instead, the fee is being used to 
further the common good. While undoubtedly an admirable goal, it is not enough to 
validate an otherwise unlawful fee or tax. See Brewster, 115 Idaho at 505, 768 P.2d at 
768. Because the stonnwater assessment is really a tax, it may not be constitutionally 
assessed against the Governmental Entities. See IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 4. Even if the 
Court concludes the assessment is in fact a fee, however, for the reasons discussed below, 
the fee is still invalid under Idaho law. 
2. The City Has Not Been Granted Authority to Levy a Stormwater Fee 
Under the Provisions it Cites in the Ordinance. 
Idaho adheres to the "Dillon's Rule" theory of municipal power. Caesar v. State, 
101 Idaho 158, 160,610 P.2d 517,519 (1980). Under Dillon's Rule, a municipality "may 
Id. Because a municipality is a "creature of the state," it only possesses - and may only 
exercise - "those powers either expressly or impliedly granted to it." Id. The Legislature 
has discretionary authority to both vest and divest a municipality of its powers. Id. 
There are three sources of municipal power cited by the City to enact Ordinance 
4512: article XII, section 2 (police power); article VIII, section 3 (bond issuing power); 
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and independent legislative authorization. See Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 742-43, 890 P.2d 326, 328-29 (1995). As further 
explained below, none of these available sources of authority permit the City to impose 
the stormwater utility fee established by Ordinance 4512. 
a. The Storm water Utility Fee is Not a Valid Exercise of the Police 
Power. 
The first basis for imposition of the stormwater fee is the City's police power. See 
Idaho Bldg. Contractors, 126 Idaho at 743, 890 P.2d at 329. Article XII, section 2 of the 
Idaho Constitution grants municipalities the power to enact and enforce regulations 
pertaining to their local police powers so long as the regulations do not conflict with state 
law. The provision provides: 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its 
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in 
conflict with its charter or with the general laws. 
IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2. The section has been construed to authorize the imposition of 
regulatory fees. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767; Potts Constr. Co. v. N 
Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 681, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005). However, any fee 
imposed must "be rationally related to the cost of enforcing the regulation and cannot be 
_______________ assess~~tpurely as a rev~nue-g~1!eL(lting_s~heme." Potts Constr., 141 Idaho at 681, 116 
---.-~~~~---.-~~--~~- .. ----.- ---~-.---.~-~--.~-
P.3d at 11. 
In the recitals of Ordinance No. 4512, the City cites to its "police power" as 
authorization to "establish a Storm Water Utility." As demonstrated previously though, 
the Ordinance does not contain any stormwater regulations. The resulting stormwater 
utility operations do not budget or spend the proceeds from the City stormwater 
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assessment to enforce stormwater regulations. The stormwater assessment is a revenue 
raising device to fund operations of the City that were previously funded out of general 
revenues. Since the Ordinance does not relate to the enforcement of a regulation and 
does not call for a regulatory fee, article XII, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution is not a 
basis of authority for the City to enact the Ordinance. 
b. The Storm water Fee is Not Valid Under the Revenue Bond Act 
Because the City Did Not Comply With the Procedures That Must 
be Followed Under the Act. 
The next source of authority cited by the City to enact Ordinance 4512 is Idaho 
Code section 50-1027 et. seq., otherwise known as the Revenue Bond Act. The Act was 
promulgated pursuant to article Vill, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, which pertains 
to limitations on municipal indebtedness. The section generally prohibits municipalities 
from incurring indebtedness in excess of the revenue generated for a given year without 
first obtaining approval of 2/3 of the qualified voters. IDAHO CONST. art Vill, § 3. There 
is, however, an exception to this general rule permitting: 
any city or other political subdivision of the state [toJ own, purchase, 
construct, extend, or equip, within and without the corporate limits of such 
city or political subdivision, water systems, sewage collection systems, 
water treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, and may rehabilitate 
existing electrical generating facilities, and for the purpose of paying the 
"_~~ __ ~ _____ ~ _____ ~ostlht::Leo:t:~~y--,-withollD~gard -10 any limitation herein il!!2osed,~ith _____ "_""~ __ "_" __ _ 
the assent of a majority of the qualified electors voting at an election to be 
held for that purpose, issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and 
interest of which to be paid solely from revenue derived from rates and 
charges for the use of, and the service rendered by such systems, plants 
and facilities, as may be prescribed by law. 
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Id. Although the votes required under the public works exception is lower than the 
general 2/3 approval requirement for indebtedness, the debt must still be approved by a 
majority of electors. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted article Vill, section 3 as the basis for 
municipalities imposing fees to accomplish their proprietary functions. See Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (noting that "[t]here is 
... a difference between the exercise of the police power and the proprietary functions of 
a municipality"). The operation, construction, and maintenance of a public utility or 
public works are considered proprietary functions that are governed by that provision. 
Id.; see also Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 60,256 P.2d 515, 522 (1953). 
Thus, cities may "impose rates and charges to provide revenue for public works projects" 
if they do so in accordance with article Vill, section 3. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437-38,807 
P.2d at 1275-76. 
To implement article Vill, section 3, the Idaho Legislature enacted the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act. LC. §§50-1027 to -1042; see also Loomis; 119 Idaho at 438, 807 
P.2d at 1276. The Act authorizes cities to operate "works for the use and benefit of those 
served by such works and for the promotion of the welfare and for the improvement of 
---~--~------ -~-~ ----- ------------
the health, safety, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the city." I.C. TSO':'----- -~ ---
1028. Under the Act, works may not be operated primarily for the purpose of generating 
revenue. Id. "Works" are defined to include "water systems, drainage systems, [and] 
sewerage systems." LC. § 50-1029(a). "Drainage systems" "include ditches, channels, 
creeks, ponds, intake structures, diversion structures, levies, storm sewers, pump stations, 
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appurtenances necessary, useful or convenient for the collection, treatment and disposal 
of any surface water, nuisance ground or subsurface water or stormwater of any city." 
Id. § 50-1029(g). 
To enable cities to operate works in the manner required by the Act, section 50-
1030(e) grants cities the power "[t]o issue ... revenue bonds ... to fmance, in whole or 
in part, the cost of the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, improvement, betterment 
or extension of any works." Le. § 50-1030(e); see also Loomis, 119 Idaho at 438, 807 
P.2d at 1276. Once a city issues bonds, thereby triggering the Revenue Bond Act, the city 
may also "prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges" - even against other 
governmental units - to fund "the services, facilities and commodities furnished by such 
works." Le. § 50-1030(f). Such fees may be collected and expended for several 
purposes, including: "to provide for all expenses of operation, maintenance, replacement 
and depreciation of such works ... including reserves therefor" and to "provide a reserve 
for improvements to such works." Le. § 50-1033(b) & (e). The.fees collected must be 
dedicated to the particular work, only charged to users of the services, not used for future 
expansion,32 "kept in a separate, segregated account and ... not used for general fund 
purposes." Loomis, 119 Idaho at 440, 807 P.2d at 1278. So long as the fees are 
allocated, and dispersed in accordance with the terms of the Act, they will not be 
32 The Court in Loomis indicated it was not deciding whether fees collected pursuant to the Revenue Bond 
Act could be used for future expansion of the system, however, later in the opinion the Court cited the fact 
that the fee was not used for future expansion as a factor that supported the validity of the fee. Loomis, 119 
Idaho at 441, 807 P.2d at 1279 ("The connection fees collected by the City of Hailey are inadequate to 
provide for the total replacement of the existing systems as those systems wear out, and any future 
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considered taxes. Id. at 439, 807 P.2d at 1277 (holding fees collected pursuant to the 
Revenue Bond Act were valid when "[n]o funds collected ... are placed into or used by 
the general operating fund of the city, and the monthly user fees are used for normal 
expenses of operation, including repair and maintenance not requiring replacement of 
system components as well as for payment of principal and interest on the revenue 
bonds"). If, on the other hand, the "fees are collected under the disguise of the Act and 
allocated and spent otherwise, then the fees are primarily revenue raising and will be 
construed as taxes." Id. 
Here, the City purports to rely on the Revenue Bond Act as a source of authority 
for imposing the stormwater fee. Although the City is allegedly using revenues from the 
stormwater utility fee to fund operation, maintenance, and improvements to the 
stormwater system, the fees are not authorized by the Act. To fall under the scope of 
section 50-1033, the City must be issuing revenue bonds. See Loomis, 119 Idaho at 440, 
807 P.2d at 1278 (concluding that a city that held a bond election and actually issued 
. revenue bonds was entitled to rely on the Revenue Bond Act as authority for imposing 
water and sewage fees); I.C. § 50-1032 ("The council ofa city issuing bonds pursuant to 
this act shall prescribe and collect reasonable rates, fees, tolls or charges for the services, 
facilities and commodities furnished by such works." (emphasis added)); I.C. § 50-1033 
("Any city issuing bonds under sections 50-1027 through 50-1042, Idaho Code, for the 
acquisition, construction, reconstruction, improvement, betterment or extension of any 
expansion of the existing water and sewer system will reql).ITe additional funding from other sources of 
revenue."). 
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works or to rehabilitate existing electrical generating facilities, shall have the right to 
appropriate, apply or expend the revenue of such works." (emphasis added)). 
The City in this case has not issued any revenue bonds or initiated the procedures 
necessary to do so. Although the Ordinance indicates that funds in the Storm Water 
Enterprise Fund may be used to pay bonds issued for improvements, the City has not 
taken any steps to even initiate the procedure for issuing bonds. As such, the City may 
not rely on the Revenue Bond Act as authority to impose the stormwater utility "fee." 
The proper procedure for the City to collect fees pursuant to the Act would have to been 
to hold an election for approval to incur indebtedness for costs associated with the 
stormwater system, obtain approval from a majority of the qualified electors in the City, 
and then impose fees and charges for use of the system to repay the bonds issued. Even 
then, however, because the fee is imposed primarily for the purpose of generating general 
revenue, it could not be justified under the Revenue Bond Act.33 The City did not follow 
the proper procedures for imposing fees pursuant to the Revenue Bond Act. It cannot rely 
on the Act as authority for imposition of the stormwater utility fee. 
c. The City Has Not Been Given Independent Legislative 
Authorization to Impose the Stormwater Fee. 
~_~ __ ~_____Even \\Then tIle Legislature delegates authority to a municipality to imp()se a fee, 
there are constitutional and statutory limitations on a municipality's power. A 
municipality's power to assess a fee "is not self-executing or unlimited," but instead "is 
limited by what . . . power the legislature authorizes in its implementing legislation." 
City of Lava Hot Springs v. Campbell, 125 Idaho 768, 769, 874 P.2d 579, 580 (Ct. App. 
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1994); see also Brewster, 115 Idaho at 503, 768 P.2d at 766. The Ordinance identifies 
several statutory bases of authority for imposing the stormwater utility fee, namely: 
"LC. 50-304, LC. 50-315, Ie. 50-332 and Ie. 50-33[sic]." None of those statutes vest 
the City with the authority to impose the fee created by Ordinance 4512. 
Section 50-304, does not vest the City with the authority to impose the stormwater 
utility fee. That provision provides: 
Cities may establish a board of health and prescribe its powers and duties; 
pass all ordinances and make all regulations necessary to preserve the 
public health; prevent the introduction of contagious diseases into the city; 
make quarantine laws for that purpose and enforce the same within five (5) 
miles of the city. 
IC. § 50-304. A general grant of authority to provide for the public health such as that 
contained in section 50-304 does not authorize the City to impose a tax or fee on its 
residents. With the exception of regulatory fees, the authority to levy a tax or fee must be 
specifically granted by the Legislature. Potts Constr. Co. v. N Kootenai Water Dist., 141 
Idaho 678, 681, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005) ("A municipal corporation's taxes on the general 
public require specific legislative authorization."). For the same reason, section 50-31534 
does not vest the City with any additional authority to impose the stormwater fee. 
33 The fact that revenues from the fee are deposited in the City's primary operating account also precludes 
the City from relying on the Act to justify the stormwater fee. 
34 That section provides: 
Cities may provide for the repairing, rebuilding and relaying of pavement, curb, gutter, 
sewer or other improvements, the procedure and manner of payment to be the same as 
provided by law for making such improvements in the first instance. 
I.e. § 50-315. 
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Although the final two provisions relied upon by the City, sections 50-332 and 50-
333,35 do vest the City with the authority to impose fees, the sections do not justify the 
stormwater utility assessment imposed under Ordinance 4512. Section 50-332 provides: 
Cities are authorized to clear, cleanse, alter, straighten, widen, pipe, wall, 
fill or close any waterway, drain or sewer or any watercourse in such city 
when not declared, by law, to be navigable and, as provided in section 50-
1008, assess the expense thereof in whole or in part to the property 
specially benefited thereby. 
I.e. § 50-332 (emphasis added). Similarly, section 50-333 provides: 
Cities are authorized to prevent the flooding of the city or to secure its 
drainage, to assess the cost thereof to the property benefited, and for such 
purpose may make any improvement or perform any labor on any stream 
or waterway, either within or without the city limits, when necessary to 
protect the safety oflife and property of the city. Any city shall have power 
to cause any parcel of land within its limits on which water may at any 
time become stagnant to be filled or drained in such manner as may be 
directed by a resolution of the council, and such owner or his agent shall, 
after service of a copy of such resolution, comply with the directions of 
such resolution within the time therein specified; and in case of failure or 
refusal to do so, it may be done by said city and the amount of money so 
expended shall be assessed against such property and the amount thereof 
collected as special assessments under section 50-1008. 
I.e. § 50-333 (emphasis added). 
The stormwater utility fee is not authorized by section 50-332 or section 50-333 as 
it does not involve the assessment of the costs of securing or maintaining a drainage 
system. As discussed above, the stormwater fee is assessed against property regardless of 
the extent of any benefit received or service provided. The fee is imposed upon all 
properties within the City of Lewiston - not just those properties specially benefited by 
stormwater infrastructure. Because the fee is not based upon the expense or cost of 
35 The Ordinance states it is authorized by Idaho Code section 50-33, however, such a code provision does 
not exist. Presumably, the reference was meant to be to section 50-333. 
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providing service to a particular parcel, it is not authorized under sections 50-332 or 50-
333. None of the statutory provisions relied upon by the City in enacting Ordinance 4512 
authorize the imposition of a stormwater utility fee. The City was not authorized to 
impose the fee under Idaho law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no genume Issue of material fact regarding the character of the 
stormwater utility "fee" established by Ordinance 4512. The Ordinance establishes a tax 
that may not constitutionally be assessed against the Governmental Entities. The City 
acted without authority in imposing the fee against the Entities and, as such, the fee is 
invalid. The City should not be permitted to use the stormwater utility fee "as a shield or 
subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce a revenue-raising ordinance or statute." 
Foster's, Inc., v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941). 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2010. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
G14~-l~~~ 
Theodore O. Creason 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and 
corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal 
subdivision of the state ofIdaho; PORT OF 
LEWISTON, a publicly created Port District 
within Nez Perce County, Idaho; and 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
1. Affiant is the Vice President for Finance & Administration for plaintiff 
Lewis-Clark State College (LCSC) in the above matter. The information contained in 
this affidavit is of affiant's personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
2. LCSC currently has two underground detention ponds located on its 
property to manage stormwater. 
3. The primary detention pond is located west of Fourth Street between Tenth 
and Eleventh A venue, while a smaller detention pond is located on Fourth Street between 
Seventh Avenue and Eighth Avenue. 
4. The projects in which the detention ponds were constructed were 
substantially completed on October 1, 2009, and were paid for by state annual capital 
improvement project funding for LCSC. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2010. 
Chet Herbst 
Vice President for Finance & Administration 
for Lewis-Clark State College 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 st day of April, 2010. 
~.c ""- t{ c.uw 2J 
Not Public in and for said State, 
residing at or employed in Lewiston. 
My Commission Expires ? /.:2 g / /s 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
1. Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for the plaintiffs in the above 
matter. 
2. Attached hereto are true and accurate transcripts of the following 
depositions and deposition correction sheets: 
• Thomas Dechert taken November 14 and 16,2009; 
• Thomas Dechert taken January 27,2010; 
• Daniel Marsh taken February 16, 2010; 
• Chris Davies taken February 16,2010; 
• Keith Bingman taken February 23,2010; and 
• Shawn Stubbers taken February 23,2010. 
3. Copies of these transcripts are provided for reference to citations in the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs , Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. The CD-Rom in the attached envelope is a digital copy of the attached 
transcripts provided for convenience. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
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DATED this 2nd day of April, 2010. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of April, 2010. 
Notary Public in an for said State, 
residing at or employed in Lewiston. 
My Commission Expires 0611012010 
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CASE NO. CV 09-02057 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant City of Lewiston, by and through its attorney of record, Don 
L. Roberts, and herby moves this Honorable Court for entry of summary judgement against the 
Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter, all as provided for in Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 
/~3 . 
Proceedure. This Motion is based upon the Memorandum in Support 0 Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Defendant hereby requests oral argument before the Court. 
DATED this day of April, 2010. 
Don L. Roberts, City Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT was hand delivered to the attorney for Plaintiffs, 
Theodore O. Creason 
1219 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, Idaho, 83501 
onthis 60 day of April, 2010 . 
Don L. Roberts 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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CASE NO. CV 09-02057 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through its attorney of record, Don L. Roberts, and 
hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
MEMORANDUM L"I SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 of24 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 11, 2008, the City of Lewiston (the "City") enacted Ordinance No. 4512 (the 
"Ordinance") which created a City-controlled Storm Water Utility (the "Utility") and authorized 
imposition of a storm water utility fee to fund the Utility's actions. For the Court's convenience, 
a copy of the Ordinance is set out as Exhibit A. The Ordinance created a new Storm Water 
Utility Ordinance codified at sections 36-151 to 36-162 of the Lewiston City Code. The 
Ordinance became effective on October 1,2008. 
The Ordinance was adopted in response to new regulatory requirements mandated by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1342. Section 402 requires that entities discharging storm water to "waters of the 
Unites States" obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. 
The City's NPDES draft permit issued in 2007 requires the City to undertake comprehensive 
management of its storm water system to reduce pollutant loading to receiving waters. Even 
though the permit is in draft .form, the city is obligated to comply with its provisions. 
(Deposition of Tom Dechert, pages 74:23 through 75: 12. For the convenience of the Court a 
compact disk with all depositions was appended to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment). The Ordinance recognized that storm water runoff must be managed 
effectively in order to address a variety of public concerns including water pollution, property 
damage, erosion, degradation of City streets and the transportation system, reduced citizen access 
to emergency services, and other hazards to lives and property. Under the Ordinance, the Utility 
was given regulatory authority for planning, design, construction, maintenance, administration, 
and operation of all City storm water conveyances and facilities. 
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The Ordinance recognized that storm water occurs as a result of and in proportion to the 
extent of impervious surfaces (primarily roofs and pavement), and that all persons having 
impervious surfaces on their property generate storm water and thereby contribute to the need for 
storm water management. The Ordinance provides that all landowners 1 benefited by the City's 
storm water management should pay for those efforts through a storm water utility fee reflecting 
their proportional contribution of storm water to the system. 
The Ordinance created a rate structure to ensure that landowners pay a storm water utility 
fee that is reasonably proportional to the extent of impervious surfaces on the property. In order 
to promote efficiency, simplicity, and fairness, the rate structure classifies property into 
residential and non-residential categories.2 The fee for each residential property is the same 
(defined as one "equivalent residential unit" or "ERU") based on the assumption that the extent 
of impervious surfaces is roughly equal. The fee for non-residential properties is a sliding scale 
in which the number ofERUs is calculated based on a site-specific quantification of impervious 
surfaces. 
The Ordinance contemplated further action in the form of a resolution creating the 
specific organization structure of the Utility. Likewise, the Ordinance contemplated that the fee 
for each ERU would be set by resolution of the City Council. The Ordinance created an appeal 
1 The Ordinance makes the "responsible person" liable for the utility fee. The responsible person may be 
the owner or a person having possession of the property. Lewiston City Code § 36152. For convenience in this 
brief, we refer to the responsible person as the "landowner." Section 36160 provides that the storm water utility fee 
will be billed to the record owner of the parcel. Section 36-161 makes the owner and the occupant of the premises 
jointly and severally liable for the fee. 
2 Although the storm water utility fee is not a property tax, the distinction between residential and nOR 
residential users tracks the guidance provided by the Idaho State Tax Commission and codified in IDAP A 
35.0l.03.130, as noted in the Ordinance. This is a legitimate distinction repeatedly recognized by the Idaho 
Supreme Court for both taxes and fees. See for example, Kootenai County Property Owners Assn. v. Kootenai 
County, 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989) (upholding flat fee forresidential sewer hookup), discussed below. 
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process by which a landowner may challenge the fee as being (1) unwarranted or (2) based on an 
incorrect calculation of impervious surface or other aspect of the rate structure. 
The Ordinance created a storm water enterprise fund into which all fees collected are 
deposited. The funds so deposited will be segregated from other revenues of the City and will be 
available only for payment of costs of maintenance, operation, repairs, upkeep, and capital 
improvements to the City's storm water system, including the payment of bonds issued therefore. 
Finally, the Ordinance recited statutory, common law, and constitutional authority for the 
Ordinance.3 
As contemplated by the Ordinance, the City Council adopted Resolution No. 2008-55 on 
October 27,2008 (attached as Exhibit B). The Resolution set the fee at $3.00 per ERU per 
month. By establishing a $3.00 per ERU fee the City Council choose not to fund the capital 
improvement component of the utility. The Resolution exempted parcels ofless than 2,000 
square feet, excluding condominiums. It also exempted undeveloped properties and owners 
qualifying for "circuit breaker" status. On August 24, 2009, the City Council adopted Resolution 
No. 2009-68 retaining the $3.00 per ERU monthly fee (attached as Exhibit. C). 
The Resolutions specified that the number ofERUs for non-residential developed 
properties will be determined by the City Public Works Department based on a computerized 
mapping analysis of each parcel, except that non-residential condominiums will be assigned a 
value of one ERD. 
3 The Ordinance identified the City's police power, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 et seq., 50-304, 50-315, 50-
332, and 50-33. The reference to Idaho Code § 50-33 was in error. The reference should have been to section 50-
334. In addition to these, other statutory authorities supporting the Ordinance are identified in sectionII.B(3) at 
page 22. 
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On September 28,2009, a group of five public entities (Lewiston Independent School 
District #1, Lewis-Clark State College, Nez Perce County, Port of Lewiston, and Lewiston 
Orchards Irrigation District) brought suit against the City alleging that it has no authority to adopt 
the Ordinance and Resolution. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint states, "The City's power to tax or regulate is limited to grants of 
authority given it by the Idaho Legislature." Complaint ~ XV at 5. As discussed below, it is true 
that the power to tax is not self-executing and requires legislative authority. In contrast, the 
power to regulate under the police power is broad and self-executing. 
The Complaint continues: "The Idaho Legislature has not granted authority to the City, 
or any Idaho municipal corporation, the authority to impose a storm water utility tax on 
Plaintiffs, except as may be specifically provided and regulated under Title 50, Chapter 3, Title 
50, Chapter 10, Title 50, Chapter 20, and Title 50, Chapter 31 of the Idaho Code. The City's 
Ordinance exceeds these Constitutional and legislative grants of authority and as such is ultra 
virus [sic]." Complaint, Count XVI. 
First, Plaintiffs fail to recognize that the City's utility fee is not a tax based on property 
value. Rather, it is a service fee imposed on the user of the service in proportion to the extent of 
the service provided. Accordingly, the fee may be sustained under the police power without any 
implementing legislation. In any event, whether required or not, there is ample implementing 
legislation. Finally, the statutes cited above do authorize the fee, but the list provided by 
Plaintiffs is incomplete. It omits, for instance, Idaho Code § 63-1311 which expressly authorizes 
cities to impose user or service fees like this one. Other authorities are set out in section II.B(3) 
at page 22. 
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Standard of Review 
The standard of review on a motion for summary judgment is well settled. The moving 
party must demonstrate there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c), and most recently 
announced in Brown v. City of Pocatello, 2010 Opinion No 38, April 1, 2010. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
UTILITY FEE. 
Before getting to the meat of their argument, Plaintiffs allege in paragraph IV oftheir 
Complaint that their property is exempt from taxation as governmental entities, citing Idaho 
Code §§ 63-602A, 63-602E, 63-602N, and 63-6020. This contention is easily disposed of. 
While it is true that these statutes exempt certain property from assessment for local ad valorem 
property taxes, the City's utility fee is not an ad valorem tax. 
An ad valorem tax is a tax imposed on the landowner pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-203, et 
seq. Ad valorem taxes are based on the market value of the property. Idaho Code § 63-205. 
First, the storm water utility fee at issue here is not based on the market value of the property. 
Second, unlike a property tax, it is assessed against both the owner and occupier of the land (see 
footnote 1 at page 3). Therefore it is not an ad valorem tax. 
As discussed below, it is not a tax of any kind, but a lawful fee imposed pursuant to the 
City's police power as well as authorizing statutes. Accordingly, the statutory exemptions from 
ad valorem taxes are inapplicable to the storm water utility fee. 
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II. THE UTILITY FEE IS A PROPER FEE UNDER THE POLICE POWER, NOT A DISGUISED 
TAX. 
A. The source ofthe City's powers to tax and regulate are both found in 
the Idaho Constitution. 
(1) Idaho cities are subject to Dillon's Rule, meaning that their 
authority to act is not inherent but must be found in the 
Constitution or statute. 
The Plaintiffs' complaint misconceives the constitutional basis of authority for municipal 
corporations. Accordingly, we begin with the basics. 
Unlike cities elsewhere in the nation, Idaho cities are not "home rule" cities. Instead, all 
municipal corporations in Idaho, including cities and counties, are subject to Dillon's Rule,4 
which provides that they may exercise only so much authority as they are granted by the state 
constitution or statute. Our Supreme Court summed up the rule this way: 
Our analysis of this issue necessarily involves a review of 
the basic tenets of municipal corporation law. Idaho has long 
recognized the proposition that a municipal corporation, as a 
creature of the state, possesses and exercises only those powers 
either expressly or impliedly granted to it. This position, also 
4 Dillon's Rule is named after the fonner chief justice of the Iowa Supreme Court. Justice Dillon stated: 
In detennining the question now made, it must be taken for settled law, that a 
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no 
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied 
or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely 
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply 
convenient, but indispensable; fourth, any fair doubt as to the existence of a 
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation-against the existence of 
the power. 
Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868) (Dillon, C.l). In Merriam, the Court invalidated the sale 
of a home for nonpayment of a special tax, noting that the Legislature authorized the tax, but did not expressly 
authorize the sale of property for nonpayment of the tax. The qucted passage is restated in nearly the same words in 
1 l Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 237 (5th Ed. 1911). 
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known as "Dillon's Rule" has been generally recognized as the 
prevailing view in Idaho. Thus, under Dillon's Rule, a municipal 
corporation may exercise only those powers granted to it by either 
the state constitution or the legislature and the legislature has 
absolute power to change, modify or destroy those powers at its 
discretion. 
Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160,610 P.2d 517, 519 (1980)(citations omitted). 
(2) Idaho's Constitution addresses both the police power and the 
power to tax. 
Accordingly, we look first to the Idaho Constitution to determine what authority has been 
granted to municipal corporations. The Idaho Constitution contains two provisions that support 
city authority to impose taxes and fees: 
• The police power: 
Local police regulations authorized. - Any county or incorporated 
city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local 
police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its 
charter or with the general laws. Idaho Const. art. XII, § 2. 
• Municipal taxation: 
The legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any 
county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may by law 
invest in the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the power 
to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation. 
Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6. 
(3) The municipal taxation power is limited and not self-executing. 
The Constitution's municipal taxation section, Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6, is a grant of 
authority to the Legislature. It is not a self-executing grant oftaxing authority to cities.5 The 
5 "However, that taxing authority is not selfexecuting and is limited to that taxing power given to the 
municipality by the legislature." Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene ("IBCA"), 126 Idaho 
740,742,890 P.2d 326,328 (1995). "Thus the grant of taxing power to cities is not selfexecuting or unlimited. It 
is limited by what taxing power the legislature authorizes in its implementing legislation." Sun Valley Co, v, City of 
Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 427, 708 P.2d 147, 150 (1985) (upholding the local option resort city tax law, Idaho 
Code §§ 50-1043 to 40-lO49). 
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effect of this constitutional provision is simply to authorize the Legislature to delegate taxing 
power to local governments.6 In other words, this constitutional provision is not a direct grant of 
taxing authority at all. Instead, Idaho cities and counties must look to some statutory 
authorization (or other constitutional delegation of power) for their taxing authority. 
In Idaho, there are only a few express delegations of the power to tax. In addition to 
those discussed in the footnote,7 the Legislature has granted cities and counties the authority to 
impose certain "impact fees" for specified capital development projects under the Idaho 
Development Impact Fee Act of 1992 ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to 67-8216. Unlike ad 
valorem taxes, which are assessed on all property owners, impact fees are directed only to 
homebuilders and other developers engaged in new development. IDIF A, however, is not 
applicable here. Although the City could have employed IDIF A to fund storm water 
management activities, such an impact fee would be applicable only to new developments. In 
this case, the City developed a rate structure applicable to all those who contribute storm water, 
not just to new developments. 
In sum, the storm water utility fee is neither an ad valorem tax nor an impact fee under 
IDIFA. Indeed, it fits into none of the categories of municipal taxes authorized by the 
Legislature. Accordingly, the City readily concedes that if the storm water utility fee is an 
6 "Although the state legislature mqy not pass local laws for the assessment and collection of taxes, it may 
by law invest in municipal corporations, the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporations'.' 
City of Lava Hot Springs v. Campbell, 125 Idaho 768, 769, 874 P.2d 576, 580 (1994). 
7 For instance, the Legislature has granted cities and counties the authority to impose certain ad vabrem 
taxes, which are imposed on all property owners within the jurisdiction. Idaho Code § 63-203 et seq. Under very 
limited circumstances, cities and counties also have the authority to impose certain sales taxes. E.g., Idaho Code §§ 
50-1043 to 40-1049 (resort city tax authority), discussed inSun Valley Co. v. City a/Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424,708 
P.2d 147 (1985). In addition, there are various specialized tax and fee authorization statutes, e.g., Idaho Code § 31-
4404 (authorizes counties to impose taxes and fees for solid waste disposal). 
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ordinary, revenue-generating tax, it is illegal. But it is not a tax. As discussed below, it is a user 
fee imposed pursuant to the City's police power as well as express legislative authorization. 
(4) The police power is broad and self-executing, and includes 
power to collect fees incidental to exercise of the power. 
Unlike the limited taxing authority discussed above, the police power granted by the 
Idaho Constitution is broad and self-executing. In addition to the power to regulate, the police 
power carries with it limited authority to impose what are known as regulatory fees, user fees, 
and exactions. A regulatory fee is a fee that funds a regulatory program, such as a filing fee, 
license fee, or permit fee. A user fee is a fee that funds a service provided to the user, such as a 
sewer fee. An exaction is a requirement to payor contribute something in exchange for a 
regulatory approval, such as a street dedication requirement for a new development. The first 
two categories overlap and sometimes can be difficult to distinguish; courts often speak of them 
as one. An exaction is a different animal and is not applicable here. All three, however, are 
authorized by the police power, and all are not deemed to be taxes. 
Because the police power does not include the power to tax, a key distinction arises 
between legitimate fees and exactions on the one hand and unauthorized taxes on the other. In 
the words of our Supreme Court: "In addition, under its police powers, the municipality may 
provide for 'the collection of revenue incidental to the enforcement of that regulation.' However, 
if the fee or charge is imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes, it is in essence a tax and 
can only be upheld under the power of taxation." Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 742-43, 890 P.2d 326, 328-29 (1995) (citation omitted). 
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Accordingly, in states like Idaho that follow Dillon's Rule, the courts have carefully 
limited the police power to regulation, services, and exactions-not taxation. These are distinct 
powers. "[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has always treated [the powers to tax, to annex, and to 
condemn] as separate and distinguishable from the police power." Michael C. Moore, Powers 
and Authorities of Idaho Cities: Home Rule or Legislative Control?, 14 Idaho L. Rev. 143,145 
(1977). "A city or village cannot, in the exercise of its police power, levy taxes." State v. 
Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 722, 213 P. 358, 361 (1923). Rather, the thrust of the police power is to 
authorize cities to make and enforce local regulations and to charge those served for particular 
services provided pursuant to that police power. 
A well developed body of law has emerged to distinguish proper fees and exactions under 
the police power from unauthorized taxes masquerading as fees. The Idaho Attorney General 
offered this summary: "To be valid under the police power delegation, the fee must (1) be 
charged for a service or benefit not shared by members of the general public; (2) not be a forced 
contribution; and (3) not raise revenue, but only compensate the governmental entity for the 
expenses it incurred in providing the service." Idaho Att'y Gen. Op. 93-5 (Apr. 7, 1993) at 58. 
It is readily apparent that the City's utility fee has all the attributes of a legitimate fee and 
none of the attributes of a disguised tax. The fee is charged only to those who contribute storm 
water and in rough proportion to the amount contributed. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
repeatedly upheld mandatory user fees imposed pursuant to the police power, so long as they are 
limited to those benefiting from the service. E.g., Kootenai County Property Owners Assn. v. 
Kootenai County, 115 Idaho 676,679, 769 P.2d 553,556 (1989) (upholding the county's 
mandatory solid waste disposal fee). The fee is not a general, revenue-generating mechanism. 
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Funds collected are segregated in a fund used solely for providing the storm water service, and 
they do not exceed the cost of the service provided. 
B. The City's utility fee is a proper exercise of the police power. 
As noted above, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized three broad categories of fees 
and exactions that are proper exercises of the police power without any authorizing legislation: 
(1) fees incidental to a regulation, (2) user fees for services, and (3) certain entitlement exactions. 
The City's storm water utility fee falls into the second category of fees imposed under the police 
power. Curiously, there is little if any appellate authority in Idaho dealing with the third 
category. In this brief we address the first two categories, because they are closely related and 
the same basic constitutional analysis applies to each of them. 
(1) Fees incidental to regulation. 
The first category deals with fees implemented to support a regulatory activity. Thus, for 
instance, a city might adopt an ordinance requiring dog owners to obtain dog licenses. Such an 
incidental "regulatory fee is different from an ordinary tax, because it targets the individual (in this 
case, the dog owner) and makes that person pay the administrative costs of the regulatory 
program. The same logic applies to vehicle emission testing fees, fees for recording documents, 
professional licensing fees, building permits, and the like. 
To be a proper regulatory fee, however, the size of the fee must be reasonably related to 
the cost of the regulatory program that it funds: 
Such police power regulation may provide for the collection of 
revenue incidental to the enforcement of that regulation. ... If 
municipal regulations are to be held validly enacted under the 
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police power, funds generated thereby must bear some reasonable 
relationship to the cost of enforcing the regulation. 
Brewster v. City a/Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988). Thus, fees may 
raise revenue directly linked to a particular regulatory activity or service provided without losing 
its character as a fee. If, however, the purpose of the charge is actually to raise revenue for the 
benefit of the community at large, it is not a fee but a tax. 
Our Supreme Court has drawn a bright line on this point: "However, if the fee or charge 
is imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes, it is in essence a general tax and can only be 
upheld under the power of taxation." IBCA, 126 Idaho at 743,890 P.2d at 329. In other words, 
if it is really a revenue-generating mechanism there must be authorizing legislation. 
This distinction has been recognized for decades. In a 1923 decision, the Court provided 
this clear guidance: 
It is quite clear that the ordinance in question in the instant 
case was enacted for the purpose of raising revenue only, first 
because by its terms it so provides, and secondly, it has no 
provisions of regulation. A license that is imposed for revenue is 
not a police regulation, but a tax, and can only be upheld under the 
power of taxation. . .. 
One of the distinctions between a lawful tax for regulatory 
purposes and one solely for revenue is: If it be imposed for 
regulation, under the authority of section 2, art. 12, of the 
Constitution [the police power], the license fee demanded must 
bear some reasonable relation to the cost of such regulation .... 
State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 722, 213 P. 358, 361 (1923) (citation omitted) (striking down a 
"license tax on certain occupations" imposed by the City of Rexburg). 
While the fee must bear a "reasonable relation" to the cost of the regulatory program it 
funds, precision is not required. In Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 
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(1941), the owner of a furniture store challenged the City's authority to install parking meters on 
the public street in front of the store. The Court upheld the parking meter fees as a proper 
exercise of the police power, despite the fact that they apparently generated somewhat more 
income than required to cover the cost of the meters: 
The fact, that the fees charged produce more than the actual 
costs and expense of the enforcement and supervision (of traffic 
and parking regulation), is not an adequate objection to the 
exaction of the fees. The charge made, however, must bear a 
reasonable relation to the thing to be accomplished. 
The spread between the actual cost of administration and 
the amount of fees collected must not be so great as to evidence on 
its face a revenue measure rather than a license tax measure. 
Foster's Inc., 63 Idaho at 219, 118 P.2d at 728 (citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it plain that it will look past the label assigned by the 
city or county to a particular charge and examine its actual nature. In 1988, the Idaho Supreme 
Court struck down the City of Pocatello's "street restoration and maintenance fee" on property 
owners. Brewster v. City a/Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). City voters had 
repeatedly rejected taxes to improve the city's streets. In response, city officials imposed a street 
fee, claiming it was not a tax, but a regulatory fee under the police power.s The Court said that, 
irrespective of what it was called, it had the attributes of a general tax: 
We view the essence of the charge at issue here as imposed on 
occupants or owners of property for the privilege of having a 
public street abut their property. In that respect it is not dissimilar 
from a tax imposed for the privilege of owning property within the 
municipal limits of Pocatello. The privilege of having the usage of 
8 The Pocatello case (Brewster) did not involve an impact fee on new development. The street tax at issue 
in that case applied to all residents. Thus, the Pocatello case involved a general tax masquerading as a regulatory 
fee. In contrast, the Coeur d' Alene case (fBCA) involved an impact fee masquerading as a regulatory fee. Either 
way, it is unconstitutional. 
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city streets which abuts [sic] one's property, is in no respect 
different from the privilege shared by the general public in the 
usage of public streets. 
Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767.9 
The Brewster Court further explained that when the purpose of a permit fee is not to fund 
regulation or enforcement, it is a tax: 
In the instant case it is clear that the revenue to be collected 
from Pocatello's street fee has no necessary relationship to the 
regulation of travel over its streets, but rather is to generate funds 
for the non-regulatory function of repairing and maintaining 
streets. The maintenance and repair of streets is a non-regulatory 
function as the terms apply to the facts of the instant case. 
Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767. 
Seven years later, in Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene 
("IBCA"), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995), the Court struck down the City of Coeur 
d'Alene's development impact fee. IO Citing the Brewster case, the Court emphasized, again, that 
a fee to provide for services benefiting the entire community is really a disguised tax: 
Similarly, the assessment here is no different than a charge for the 
privilege of living in the City of Coeur d'Alene. It is a privilege 
shared by the general public which utilizes the same facilities and 
services as those purchasing building permits for new construction. 
The impact fee at issue here serves the purpose of providing 
9 Brewster demonstrates that distinction between fees and taxes is based on practical and functional 
considerations, not semantics, and that the courts will not be confused by labels. "Not surprisingly, local 
governments will frequentlY attempt to employ the label most likely to survive judicial scrutiny. However, they do 
not always use consistent terminology, and therefor cash payments related to land development have been called 
many things. ... This ploy is met with mixed success since courts feel free to take a fresh look at the device under 
attack and to characterize it as they see fit." Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use 
Regulations: Paying/or Growth with Impact Fees, 59 S.M.U. L. Rev. 177,204-05 (2006). 
10 Note that the City of Coeur d' Alene sought to justifY its imptct fee ordinance under the constitutional 
police power because, at the time, IDIFA applied only to cities with a population of200,000 or more. The Act was 
amended in 1996 to remove this limitation. 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 366. In any event, the cit)1s ordinance was 
broader than allowed under IDIF A. 
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funding for public services at large, and not to the individual 
assessed, and therefore is a tax. 
IBCA, 126 Idaho at 744,890 P.2d at 330. 
It bears emphasis that the good intentions of the local government and legitimacy of the 
public policy served are not relevant to the constitutional analysis. Pocatello's street 
maintenance fee was not saved by the fact that it was urgently needed. "The issue is not the need 
for funding .... [It does not matter] how well-intentioned and desirable the ultimate result may 
be." Brewster v. City a/Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 503, 505, 768 P.2d 765, 766, 768 (1988). 
Likewise, Coeur d' Alene's impact fee was struck down "no matter how rationally and reasonably 
drafted" it was. IBCA, 126 Idaho at 745,890 P.2d at 331. 
The City of Lewiston's utility fee stands in sharp contrast to the disguised taxes struck 
down in Brewster and IBCA. In those cases the purported "fee" bore no relationship to the 
regulatory function provided to the individual landowner and was simply an effort to raise 
revenues from landowners or developers to provide services to the community as a whole. 
(2) User Fees for Services. 
(a) Common law recognition of user fees under the police 
power. 
In addition to incidental fees charged to fund regulatory programs, cities and counties also 
may charge consumers for the cost of services directly provided to them. This power also falls 
within a local government's police power and requires no authorizing legislation. The City's 
utility fee falls into this category and plainly passes muster. 
In Brewster, the street maintenance tax case, the Court recognized that, in addition to 
incidental regulatory fees, the police power authorizes cities to impose user fees. "We agree with 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 16 of24 /1-0. 
appellants that municipalities at times provide sewer, water and electrical services to its 
residents. However, those services, in one way or another, are based on a user's consumption of 
the particular commodity, as are fees imposed for public services as the recording of wills or 
filing legal actions. In a general sense a fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to the 
particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public 
needs." Brewster, 115 Idaho at 505, 768 P.2d at 768. 
The following year, the Court upheld Kootenai County's mandatory solid waste disposal 
fee in Kootenai County Property Owners Assn. v. Kootenai County, 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 
(1989). In this case, the county relied on a specific statutory authorization for taxes and/or fees to 
fund solid waste programs, Idaho Code § 31-4404, which is not applicable here. Nevertheless, 
its reasoning is broadly applicable to the tax versus fee issue generally. The Court rejected the 
idea that a fee must be voluntary: 
The association further argues that when the benefit derived 
is a benefit to the general public, fees to provide the benefit must 
be considered a tax. A fee, according to the association, is 
voluntarily paid for specific services while a tax is involuntarily 
obtained for the general public benefit. However, the legislature, 
under its police powers, may mandate that citizens must accept 
certain services, and then require a fee for the receipt of those 
servIces. 
Kootenai Property Owners, 115 Idaho at 679, 769 P.2d at 556. 
The Court also determined that it made no difference that there is no opportunity to "opt 
out." "Their basic premise was that all humans live in residences and create solid waste, and 
whether they put it in their own trash cans or someone else's, or on the street, the refuse 
ultimately ends up in the same place, an authorized county waste disposal site (landfill)." 
Kootenai Property Owners, 115 Idaho at 678, 769 P.2d at 555. Finally, the Court ruled that it is 
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not necessary that the fee be based precisely on how much garbage is generated and that a flat fee 
for residential use is reasonable. Kootenai, 115 Idaho at 678-79, 769 P.2d at 555-56. 
A year later, the Court handed down Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136, 795 
P.2d 298 (1990). InAlpert, customers of Boise Water Corporation and other utilities challenged 
various cities who had entered into franchise agreements with the utilities. The franchise 
agreements imposed a three percent franchise fee paid by the utility to the city and, in tum, 
passed it along to the utility customer as part of the rate structure. The utility customers 
challenged this on various grounds, including that it was a disguised and illegal tax. 
The Alpert Court began by recognizing, once again, that cities may exercise only those 
powers granted to them by the Constitution or the Legislature. That test, however, was easily 
met here; the authority of cities to provide utility services and/or to enter into franchise 
agreements with private utilities is established by both the state Constitution and by statute. 
Alpert, 118 Idaho at 142, 795 P.2d at 304. The Court went on to recognize that franchise 
agreements are lawful contracts and that a franchise fee is a legitimate consideration for the 
contract. Finally, the Court rejected the utility customers' argument that the franchise fee was, in 
reality, a disguised tax such as that struck down in Brewster. The Court distinguished Brewster 
noting that the franchise fee passed along to the consumer is based on consumption of the 
servIce: 
The water and gas services provided by the utilities in this case are 
based on consumption and use by the resident. As noted in 
Brewster, the providing of sewer, water, electrical and other utility 
services to residents based on consumption of the commodity is a 
charge for a direct public service as compared to a tax which is a 
forced contribution by the public-at-Iarge for revenue raising 
purposes. As such the tax imposed in Brewster is clearly 
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distinguishable from the fee charged on the accounts of the 
consumers of the utility service presented in this case. We hold 
that the three percent fee charged to the customers of the various 
gas and water utilities is a valid franchise fee and not a prohibited 
tax. 
Alpert, 118 Idaho at 145, 795 P.2d at 307. 
In Loomis v. City o/Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991), the Court upheld the 
city's mandatory sewer connection fee called an "equity buy-in." The fee of$1,800 was placed 
into a separate account used only for replacement of existing system facilities and equipment. A 
separate monthly utility fee, which was not challenged, covered operating expenses and funded 
revenue bond retirement. Citing Brewster, the Court observed that cities may impose fees 
pursuant to their police power so long as they "bear some reasonable relationship to the cost of 
enforcing the regulation." Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437,807 P.2d at 1275. The Court went on to 
analyze the connection fee not as a police power function but as a "proprietary" function of the 
city. The Court ruled that the buy-in fee was authorized under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, 
Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 to 50-1042, which, in tum, was authorized by Idaho Const. art. VIII, § 3, 
dealing with limitations on municipal indebtedness. Although the decision rested on the narrow 
issue of the revenue bond act, the Court stated more broadly: "Thus, when rates, fees and 
charges conform to the statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act or are imposed 
pursuant to a valid police power, the charges are not construed as taxes." Loomis, 119 Idaho at 
438,807 P.2d at 1276. 
In Waters Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648,67 P.3d 1260 (2003), a private 
solid waste disposal firm that competed with the county's landfill by shipping the waste out-of-
state challenged the county's mandatory solid waste disposal fee. This time, the Court backed 
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off its broad proclamation in Kootenai Property Owners that a local government may impose a 
mandatory fee for services with no opt out provision. 
Although Waters Garbage arose under specific legislation not applicable here (Idaho 
Code § 31-4404(2)), like Kootenai Property Owners, it has broader applicability to the fee versus 
tax issue. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the private disposal company that the "basic 
premise" in Kootenai Property Owners (quoted above) was not applicable to the circumstances 
in Waters Garbage. In Waters Garbage, a landowner could contract with a company to lawfully 
dispose of its solid waste elsewhere, eliminating the need to use the county landfill. In this case, 
the Court ruled, the county cannot force the landowner to pay for a service it does not need and 
still call that a fee. Thus, the Court did not question the authority ofthe county to impose a solid 
waste fee, but it required the county to include an opt-out provision for those who demonstrably 
did not need the service because they had made alternative arrangement for disposal. Waters 
Garbage, 138 Idaho at 651-52,67 P.3d at 1263-64. 
The Waters Garbage opt-out requirement is satisfied by the City's Ordinance. As 
discussed in the introduction, an administrative appeal process is available whereby landowners 
may demonstrate that the utility fee is "unwarranted" as to them. 
The components of the City of Lewiston's storm water fee include payment for 
maintenance and operation of the existing storm water system, salary for the storm water 
coordinator (Deposition of Tom Deckert, pages 36:18 through 37:12), and payment for 
equipment such as street sweepers, jet truck, dump trucks, storm water mitigation and 
construction materials and wages for employees working storm water duties (Deposition of Keith 
Bingman, pages 38:3 through 39:25). Storm water maintenance and operation included street 
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sweeping (Deposition of Keith Bingman, page 56:11-21), pavement repair around storm water 
installations (Deposition of Keith Bingman, pages 49:8 thorugh 50:3). All of these expenses are 
reasonably related to legitimate storm water expenses. 
(b) Statutory authority for user fees under Idaho Code 
§ 63-1311. 
Thus, even without implementing legislation, such user fees would be constitutional. As 
it turns out, however, there is implementing legislation for such fees, thus eliminating any 
question as to the authority oflocal governments to charge such fees. The legislation provides: 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
governing board of any taxing district may impose and cause to be 
collected fees for those services provided by that district which 
would otherwise be funded by property tax revenues. The fees 
collected pursuant to this section shall be reasonably related to, but 
shall not exceed, the actual cost of the service being rendered. 
(2) No charge, other than property taxes shall be included 
on a tax notice unless the taxing district placing such charge has 
received approval by the board of county commissioners to place 
such charge on the tax notice and meets the criteria set forth in 
section 63-902, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 63-1311. II 
II The provision now codified to Idaho Code § 63-1311 was originally codified to Idaho Code § 63-2201A. 
It was enacted in 1980, 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 290, amended in 1988, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 20 ~ and 
recodified in 1996, Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 98. The legislative history to the original 1980 enactment (based on R.S. 
5694 and H.B. 680) is not extensive, but it shows that the legislation means what it says. "The purpose of this 
legislation is to give county commissioners and the governing boards of other taxing districts the power to collect 
fees for services in lieu of ad valorem taxes." Statement of Purpose (R.S. 5694). "Mr. Young explained that RS 
5694 is permissive legislation for those levies that county commissioners do not have the power to impose. It will 
allow authority which many already have." Minutes of the Munger Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Revenue and Taxation (Feb. 28, 1980). "Mr. Young explained that the purpose ofRS :ti94 is to allow county 
commissioners and governing boards of other taxing districts the authority to collect fees in lieu of ad valorem taxes. 
Many are now already doing this and this makes it all inclusive. Some examples of those fees are: garbage, waifr 
and sewage. Mr. Munger stated that it is permissive legislation and is not mandatory." Minutes of the House 
Revenue and Taxation Committee (Feb. 29,1980). "Chuck Holden, Association ofIdaho Counties, stated H 680 
adds to the existing law to allow counties and taxing districts to impose fees for providing services which are 
normally funded by ad valorem tax revenues. Cities have had this authority for a number of years and haven't 
abused it and we feel the counties should have it. Much discussion flHowed." Minutes of Senate Local Gov't and 
Taxation Committee (Mar. 22, 1980). "H680 Tax and Taxation - Adds to existing law to allow counties and taxing 
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The Idaho Supreme Court discussed this provision, then codified at section 63-2210A, in 
Brewster. The Court found that the street fee was not a user fee under the statute because it was 
not related to a direct public service. 12 
In contrast, the fee imposed by the City of Lewiston qualifies as a user fee under Idaho 
Code § 63-1311 because it is related to a service provided to specific users: It is most closely 
analogous to a user fee for sewer service. In the case of sewer service, the city or county treats 
sewage coming from the user and charges accordingly. Here the storm water utility fee is used to 
treat storm water runoff and the charge is tailored specifically to reflect the quantity of runoff 
coming from each unit. 
(3) Other statutory authority. 
Given the ample support for the Ordinance found in the police power itself (as delegated 
by Idaho Const. art. XIL § 2) and in Idaho Code § 63-1311 (authorizing fees as an alternative to 
districts to impose fees for providing services which are normally funded by ad valorem tax revenu5." Official 
computer summary oflegislation by House Revenue and Taxation Committee (tracking action through passage on 
Ap. 1, 1980). The 1988 amendment added the following sentence: "The fees collected pursuant to this section shall 
be reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the actual cost of the services being rendered." Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 
201. The legislative history of the 1988 amendment reinforced the purpose of the original legislation. "The concept 
of this bill is to start the move to fund those functions that are clearly user oriented with fees collected from the users 
themselves, rather than have so much reliance on ad valorem tax." Minutes of House/Senate Legislative Council, 
Committee on Local Government Revenues, at 3 (Sept. 10, 1986) (regarding R.S. 12966, which would have 
amended Idaho Code § 49-148; instead that section was repealed altogether by S.B. 1304AA in 1988 which also 
added section 63-2201A). 
12 The Brewster case, by the way, was a particularly harsh one against cities. While it seems readily 
apparent that the street fee was not an incidental regulatory fee, the closer question was whether it was a legitimate 
user fee. At the outset of the opinion, the Court acknowledged that the fee purportedly was based on "a formula 
reflecting the traffic which is estimated to be generated by that particular property." Brewster, 115 Idaho at 502, 768 
P.2d at 765. But the Court never returned to that issue nor explained how the formula worked. Apparently the Court 
viewed this as a sham justification. In the end, the Court concluded: 'The privilege of having the usage of city 
streets which abuts one's property, is in no respect different from the privilege shared by the general public in the 
usage of public streets." Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 767. In any event, most of the Court's opinion was 
devoted to the other theory - a discussion of why it was not an incidental regulatory fee. If we speculate as to what 
was in the minds of the justices, it would seem that they v.ere motivated primarily by the fact that the city repeatedly 
had sought and failed to achieve voter approval for a levy override. Thus, the Court saw this fee as an endrun 
around clearly expressed voter disapproval of a new tax. 
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ad valorem taxes), it is hardly necessary to go on In order to be complete, however, we briefly 
identify the following additional statutory authorities that support the utility fee. 
• Idaho Code § 50-301. "Cities ... may ... exercise all powers and perform all 
functions of local self-government in city affairs as are not specifically prohibited 
by or in conflict with the general laws or the constitution of the state of Idaho." 
• Idaho Code § 50-304. Authority to "pass all ordinances and make all needful 
regulations necessary to preserve the public health." 
• Idaho Code § 50-315. Authority for rehabilitation of improvements. 
• Idaho Code § 50-323. Authority for domestic water systems. (This section does 
not expressly name storm water, but it includes the authority "to do all things 
necessary to protect the source of water from contamination." The statute gives 
examples of certain domestic water systems, but says they are "by way of example 
and not by way of limitation." 
• Idaho Code § 50-331. Cities may establish, alter and change the channels of 
watercourses and wall or cover the same within the boundaries of the city and 
outside the corporate limits to the extent necessary to preserve the watercourse. 
• Idaho Code § 50-332. Authority for control of sewers and drains. This section 
includes authority to "cleanse" any "drain" or non-navigable "watercourse." 
• Idaho Code § 50-334. Authority for abatement of nuisances. 
• Idaho Code § 50-1703. Authority to construct drains and treatment systems. 
Section 50-1703(2) authorizes certain extraordinary means of paying for these 
"improvements" but does not say anything about fees. It is clearly not an 
exclusive list of ways to pay for them, however, because it does not mention ad 
valorem taxes. 
• Idaho Revenue Bonding Act, 50-1027 to 50-1042. The act encompasses drainage 
systems, which includes storm water. 
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Conclusion 
There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the City of Lewiston storm water 
utillity fee. It is not a tax. Municipalities in Idaho have statutory authority to assess a storm 
water fee. The Plaintiffs are not exempt from payment of a properly enacted fee. 
DATED the ~o day of April, 2010. 
a<~ .£1 
Don r. RoAerts, City Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand delivered 
to the attorney for Plaintiffs, 
Theodore O. Creason 
1219 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, Idaho, 83501 
on this OC) day of April, 2010 . 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Don L. Roberts 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Page 24 of24 I ~~ · 
1 ORDINANCE NO. 4512 
2 
3 AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF LEWISTON ENACTING NEW SECTIONS 
4 OF THE LEWISTON CITY CODE TO BE CODIFIED AS LEWISTON CITY 
5 CODE SECTIONS 36-151 THROUGH 36-162; ESTABLISHING A STORM 
6 WATER UTILITY AND A STORM WATER UTILITY FEE; PROVIDING 
7 DEFINITIONS; AUTHORIZING A UTILITY RATE STRUCTURE; 
8 AUTHORIZING CREDITS AGAINST CHARGES; PROVIDING FOR 
9 ADMINSTRATION OF THE STORM WATER UTILITY; PROVIDING FOR 
10 THE 'APPEAL AND RECALCULATION OF FEES; ESTABLISHING UTILITY 
11 BILLING AND DELINQUENCY PROCEDURES; EST ABLISIDNG A STORM 
12 WATER ENTERPRISE FUND; REPEALING ALL ORDINANCES AND PARTS 
13 OF ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT HEREWITH; PROVIDING A . 
14 SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
15 
16 WHEREAS, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency is issuing a National 
17 Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit requiring a storm water 
18 management plan to reduce pollutant loading to receiving waters of the United States, 
19 which specifically identifies the Snake River and the Clearwater River branches of Lower 
20 Granite Reservoir, Tammany Creek, and Lindsay Creek, under the authority of the Clean 
21 Water Act; and 
22 
23 WHEREAS, the City Council recognizes that the NPDES permit requires the City 
24 to take certain responsibilities for water quality in all storm water facilities and 
25 conveyances, natural or man-made, owned and/or operated by the City; and 
26 
27 WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Lewiston (the "City") has determined 
28 that the City's growth and development will continue to increase the volume of storm 
29 water runoff collected in and routed through the City's man-made and natural storm water 
30 facilities ("storm water system"); and 
31 
32 WHEREAS, the City Council finds that storm water runoff causes property 
33 damage and erosion; carries concentrations of various pollutants into receiving waters; 
34 degrades the integrity of City streets and the transportation system; reduces citizen access 
35 to emergency services; and poses hazards to both lives and property; and 
36 
37 WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that storm water runoff must be 
38 managed in a manner that protects the public health, safety and welfare; and 
39 
40 WHEREAS, the City Council finds that implementation of City-approved storm 
41 water design criteria, regulations, maintenance, improvements, water quality 
42 management, public awareness and code enforcement are necessary to ensure adequate 
43 storm water quality and quantity control; and 
44 
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2 WHEREAS, the City Council finds that establishing a Storm Water Utility 
3 provides the funding necessary to enable on-going maintenance, operation, regulation, 
4 water quality management and improvement of the system; and 
5 
6 WHEREAS, the City Council finds that all impervious surfaces within the City's 
7 boundaries contribute runoff to the City's storm water system; that all utility users having 
8 impervious surface areas make use of or benefit from the City's maintenance, operation 
9 and improvement of the storm water system; and that all such Storm Water Utility users 
10 should participate in funding of the City's program for maintenance, operation and 
11 improvement of the storm water system; and 
12 
13 WHEREAS, The City Council finds that it has authority, through its police power 
14 as well as through I.C. 50-1027 et seq., I.C. 50-304, I.C. 50-315, I.C. 50-332 and I.C. so-
lS 33 to establish a Storm Water Utility. 
16 
17 
18 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED, by the Mayor and City Council of the 
19 
20 City of Lewiston: 
21 
22 SECTION ONE: That new sections to be codified as Lewiston City Code 
23 





29 ARTICLE V. STORM WATER UTILITY ORDINANCE 
30 
31 Sec.36-151. Purpose. 
32 The City Council finds and declares the need for adequate and effective maintenance, 
33 operation, regulation and control of the existing storm water drainage system in all areas 
34 within the City to improve the health, safety and general welfare of the City. The City 
35 Council finds that those citizens receiving the benefits of the City's management of the 
36 storm water drainage system should pay for those benefits through a storm water fee. 
37 The City Council finds that the establishment ofa Storm Water Utility is the preferred 
38 funding and management method for the City's storm water system. 
39 
40 Sec. 36-152. Definitions. 
41 Impervious Surface: Impervious surfaces are mainly constructed surfaces - rooftops, 
42 sidewalks, roads, driveways, parking lots - covered by impenetrable materials such as 
43 asphalt, concrete, and roofing materials. These materials seal surfaces, repel water and 
44 prevent precipitation and meltwater from infiltrating soils. Soils compacted by urban 
45 development are also highly impervious. 
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1 Persons Responsible: The owner, agent, occupant, lessee, tenant, contract purchaser, or 
2 other person having possession or control of property or the supervision of an 
3 improvement on the property. 
4 Utility: For the purposes of this chapter, all references to "Utility" refer to the Storm 
5 Water Utility. 
6 ERU or Equivalent Residential Unit: For the purposes of this chapter, all reference to 
7 "ERU" shall mean an impervious surface of four thousand (4,000) square feet. 
8 
9 Sec. 36-153. Storm Water Utility Created. 
10 There is hereby created and established a Storm Water Utility and service charge rate 
11 structure. The Utility will have regulatory authority for planning, design, construction, 
12 maintenance, administration and operation of all City storm water conveyances and 
13 facilities. 
14 
15 Sec. 36-154. Utility Administration. 
16 The Storm Water Utility will be administered by the City in a manner consistent with 
17 other City Utilities. The organization structure of the Utility will be approved by 
18 resolution of the City Council. 
19 
20 Sec. 36-155. Applicability. 
21 All persons responsible for properties within the corporate limits of the City of Lewiston 
22 are subject to the regulatory authority of the Storm Water Utility and shall pay a service 
23 charge determined by the rate structure created by this chapter. 
24 
25 Sec. 36-156. Rate Structure. 
26 The Storm Water Utility rate structure shall be based on property parcels as identified in 
27 the Nez Perce County property records. All property parcels within the City will be 
28 classed into one of two classes, residential or non-residential, based on such classes in the 
29 Nez Perce County property records and as designated in Idaho Administrative Rules, 
30 IDAPA 35.01.03.130, except that manufactured homes on single lots will be considered 
31 residential and manufactured home in manufactured home courts or parks will be 
32 considered commercial for the purposes of this section. 
33 
34 All residential class property parcels shall be assigned a value of one (1) ERU. 
35 
36 All non-residential class property parcels shall be assigned a value of one (l) or 
37 more ERUs. The ERU value for each non-residential property shall be 
38 determined as follows: 
39 1) The City shall determine the area of impervious surface for each parcel 
40 2) The City shall divide each parcel's impervious surface area by the surface area 
41 of one ERU, 4,000 square feet. 
42 3) The City shall assign an ERU value of 1 or the result of the division in step 2, 









1 Sec. 36~157. Fee Established. 
2 Each person responsible for properties within the City shall be subject to the provisions 
3 of this chapter and shall pay a Stann Water Utility Fee for each ERU assigned to property 
4 parcels for which they are responsible. The fee per ERU shall be reviewed annually and 
5 set by resolution of the City Council. 
6 
7 Sec. 36~158. Exemptions and Credits. 
8 The City Council may establish credits and exemptions to the rate structure established in 
9 Sec 36-156. Credits and exemptions may be established for classes of parcels identifiable 
lOin the Nez Perce County Tax Parcel base map. All credits and exemptions shall be 
1 I reviewed annually by the City Council as part of setting the fee for each ERU. 
12 
13 Sec. 36~159. Appeal and Recalculation of Fee. 
14 (a) If a person responsible for properties within the City and subject to the fee 
15 established by this chapter believes that a particular assigned fee is unwarranted or based 
I6 on an incorrect calculation of impervious surface or other aspect of the rate structure, 
17 such person responsible may appeal the fee. 
I8 (b) The appellant must first request that the Utility recalculate or explain the fee by 
19 requesting in writing such recalculation or explanation. The request must identify the 
20 basis for disagreement with the assessed fee and be accompanied by relevant supporting 
21 documentation. The Utility shall review the request and notify the appellant of its 
22 decision, in writing, no later than 30 calendar days following receipt of the completed 
23 written request for explanation or recalculation. 
24 (c) If the appellant still believes that the fee is unwarranted, a written appeal may be 
25 submitted to the City of Lewiston Public Works Director, with supporting 
26 documentation. The Public Works Director shall notify the appellant, within 60 calendar 
27 days following receipt of the completed written appeal, with a decision on the appeal. 
28 
29 Sec. 36-160. Billing. 
30 Billings for fees assessed under the provisions of this chapter shall be made on a schedule 
31 as determined by the City CounciL All service fees shall be paid to the City of Lewiston. 
32 Billings shall be assessed to the record owner of the parcel against which the fee is being 
33 charged. 
34 
35 Sec. 36~161. Unpaid Fees and Charges; Lien. 
36 The owner, to the extent pennitted by law, and occupant of any such premises subject to 
37 the fee created by this chapter shall be jointly and severally liable for all fees and charges 
38 assessed by the City. Such fees and charges may be collected in any manner pennitted or 
39 hereafter permitted by law. 
40 A delinquency charge often percent (10%) may be assessed on any balance remaining 
41 unpaid at the time of the next succeeding billing. The charges and fees must be received 
42 by the City prior to the due date shown on the invoice or billing statement. 
43 
44 Sec. 36-162. Storm Water Enterprise Fund. 
45 All fees and charges received and collected under authority of this chapter shall be 
46 deposited and credited to a special fund to be designated as the Storm Water Enterprise 
ME¥~}.{M IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDMENT 
4 
1 Fund. The accounts of the fund shall show all receipts and expenditures for the 
2 maintenance, operation, upkeep and repair and capital outlay of the storm water system, 
3 including the payment of bonds issued to finance such capital outlay. When budgeted and 
4 appropriated, the funds and credits to the account of the Storm Water Enterprise Fund 
5 shall be available for the payment of the requirements for the maintenance, operation, 
6 repairs and upkeep and improvements of the storm water system of the City, including 
7 the payment of bonds issued therefore. 
8 
9 SECTION TWO: That all ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict with this 
10 
11 ordinance are hereby repealed. 
12 
13 SECTION THREE: The provisions of this ordinance are severable and if any 
14 provision, clause, sentence, subsection, word or part thereof is held illegal, invalid, or 
15 unconstitutional or inapplicable to any person or circumstance, such illegality, invalidity 
16 or unconstitutionality or inapplicability shall not affect or impair any ofthe remaining 
17 provisions, clauses, sentences, subsections, words or parts of this ordinance or their 
18 application to other persons or circumstances. It is hereby declared to be the legislative 
19 intent that this ordinance would have been adopted if such illegal, invalid or 
20 unconstitutional provision, clause sentence, subsection, word, or part had not been 
21 included therein, and if such person or circumstance to which the ordinance or part 
22 thereof is held inapplicable had been specifically exempt therefrom. 
23 
24 SECTION FOUR: This ordinance shall take effect and be in full force from and 
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A RESOLUTION SETTING STORMWATER UTILITY FEES AND PROVIDING 
AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
WHEREAS Lewiston City Code Section 36-157 provides that a Storm Water 
Utility Fee shall be set annually by resolution of the City Council. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE 
CITY OF LEWISTON, IDAHO, THAT: 
SECTION 1: The Storm Water Utility Fees shall be as follows: 
(1) The base rate charge shall be six dollars ($6.00) per month per Equivalent 
Residential Unit (ERU), an ERU being established as four thousand (4,000) 
square feet of impervious and semi-pervious surface. 
(2) Property parcels less than two thousand (2,000) square feet area as identified 
in the Nez Perce County property parcel database, excluding condominiums. 
shall be exempt from fees . 
(3) Property parcels identified in the Nez Perce County property parcel database 
as undeveloped shall be exempt from fees. 
(4) Residential parcels whose owner qualifies for 'Circuit Breaker' status in the 
Nez Perce County database shall be exempt from fees. 
(5) All other residential parcels as identified in the Nez Perce County property 
parcel database, including residential condominiums, shall be assigned a value 
of one ERU, and shall be assigned a fee of one-hundred percent (100%) of the 
base rate. 
(6) All developed non-residential property parcels as identified in the Nez Perce 
County property parcel database shall be assigned a fee of one-hundred 
percent (100%) of the base rate multiplied by the number of ERUs on the 
property. The amount of impervious surface and the number of ERUs per 
parcel will be determined by the City Public Works Department, based on a 
computerized mapping analysis of each parcel. 
(7) Non-residential property parcels identified as 'non-residential condominiums' 
in the Nez Perce 'County property parcel database shall be assigned a value of 
one ERU and a fee of one-hundred percent (100%) of the base rate. 
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SECTION 2: The fees herein established shall be phased in over a period of three 
fiscal years. For the period conunencing October 1,2008, through September 30,2009, 
all fees shall be assessed at fifty percent (50%) of the rate established in Section 1 above. 
For the period conunencing October 1,2009, through September 30, 2010, all fees shall 
be assessed at seventy-five percent (75%) of the rate established in Section 1 above. 
Thereafter, conunencing October 1,2010, all fees shall be assessed as established in 
Section 1 above. 
SECTION 3: This resolution shall take effect on October 1,2008, and be in full 
force from and after its passage, approval and publication. 
DATED this~day of od:r::b<c ,2008. 
CITY OF LEWISTON 
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A RESOLUTION AMENDING RESOLUTION 2008-55, SETTING 
STORMW ATER UTILITY FEES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, AND PROVIDING 
AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
WHEREAS, Lewiston City Code Section 36-157 provides that a Stonn Water 
Utility Fee shall be set annually by resolution of the City Council, and 
WHEREAS, the Lewiston City Council approved Storm Water Utility Fees in 
Resolution 2008-55 and the City Council now desires to amend said Storm Water Utility 
Fees. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE 
CITY OF LEWISTON, IDAHO, THAT: 
SECTION 1: The Storm Water Utility Fees shall be as follows: 
(1) The base rate charge shall be six dollars ($6.00) per month per Equivalent 
Residential Unit (ERU), an ERU being established as four thousand (4,000) 
square feet of impervious and semi-pervious surface. 
(2) Property parcels less than two thousand (2,000) square feet area as identified 
in the Nez Perce County property parcel database, excluding condominiums, 
shall be exempt from fees. 
(3) With the exception of condominiums identified in the Nez Perce County 
property parcel database, undeveloped parcels with less than 2,000 square feet 
ofimpervious surface shall be exempt from fees. 
(4) Residential parcels whose owner qualifies for 'Circuit Breaker' status in the 
Idaho State Tax Commission database shall be exempt from fees. 
(5) All other residential parcels as identified in the Nez Perce County property 
parcel database, including residential condominiums, shall be assigned a value 
of one ERU. and shall be assigned a fee of one-hundred percent (100%) of the 
base rate. 
(6) All non-residential property parcels as identified in the Nez Perce County 
property parcel database with greater than 2,000 square feet of impervious 
surface shall be assigned a fee of one-hundred percent (100%) of the base rate 
M~QYM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDMENT 
1 
multiplied by the number of ERUs on the property. The amount of 
impervious surface and the number ofERUs per parcel will be determined by 
the City Public Works Department, based on a computerized mapping 
analysis of each parcel. 
(7) Non-residential property parcels identified as 'non-residential condominiums' 
in the Nez Perce County property parcel database shall be assigned a value of 
one ERU and a fee of one-hundred percent (100%) of the base rate. 
SECTION 2: The fees herein established shall be phased in over a period of three 
fiscal years. For the period commencing October 1, 2009, through September 30, 2010, 
all fees shall be assessed at fifty percent (50%) of the rate established in Section 1 above. 
Thereafter, commencing October 1, 2010, all fees shall be assessed as established in 
Section 1 above. 
SECTION 3: All Storm Water Utility Fees collected shall only be expended to 
maintain, operate or enhance the Storm Water Utility system of the City of Lewiston. 
SECTION 4: This resolution shall take effect on October 1, 2009, and be in full 
force from and after its passage, approval and publication. 
DATED this~day of f1~LR:A::: ,2009. 
CITY OF LEWISTON 
~wlJ.~-. _ 
Douglas ~ns, Mayor 
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Theodore O. Creason, ISB # 1563 
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FILED 
tfJlO tr1If 25' M 9 30 CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516 
rtit ~)t('Jth)'VJ VIA-
Fax: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Case No. CV 09-02057 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the plaintiffs (hereinafter "Governmental Entities" or "Entities"), by and 
through their attorney of record, Theodore O. Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken & 
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Geidl, PLLC, and hereby submit Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The factual background of this case is set forth in the Entities' Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper "when the 
pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Banner 
Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123,206 P.3d 481, 487 
(2009); see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of proving the absence ofa genuine issue of 
material fact rests on the moving party. Banner Life, 147 Idaho at 123,206 P.3d at 487. When 
construing the record on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court generally must draw "all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions ... in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." 
Id. 
Under certain circumstances, when both parties file motions for summary judgment, the 
above-stated standard governing summary judgment proceedings varies. See id. Typically, 
"[t]he fact that both parties file motions for summary judgment does not ... mean that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact." Id. Accordingly, "the filing of cross-motions for summary 
judgment does not transform 'the court, sitting to hear a summary judgment motion, into the trier 
of fact.'" Id. at 123-24, 206 P.3d at 487-88 (quoting Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
103 Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754, 758 (1982)). "Conflicting evidentiary facts ... must still be 
viewed in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. at 124, 206 P.3d at 488. "When cross-motions 
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have been filed and the action will be tried before the court without a jury," however, "the court 
may ... draw probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts." Id. at 123,206 
P.3d at 487. Only when the parties' motions focus "on the same issues and legal theories based 
on the same, essentially uncontroverted facts," may the court deem the parties to have "stipulated 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment is therefor appropriate." 
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 200-01, 899 P.2d 411, 413-14 (1995); 
Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co. (Mut.) , 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986). 
Here, both parties have filed motions for summary judgment based upon the same legal 
issues and theories. No contested genuine issues of material fact have been raised and neither 
party has filed a demand for jury trial. As such, in ruling on the cross-motions, the Court may 
deem the parties to have stipulated to the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Because. 
only issues of law exist to be decided, summary judgment is appropriate. For the following 
reasons, the City's motion for summary judgment should be denied and judgment should be 
entered in favor of the Governmental Entities. 
III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
In its memorandum in support of summary judgment, the City makes three primary 
arguments; namely, that: (1) the statutory exemptions precluding municipalities from taxing 
property belonging to other governmental entities are inapplicable because the City's stormwater 
utility fee is not an ad valorem tax; (2) the "fee" is an authorized exercise of the City's police 
power; and (3) the City had independent statutory authorization to impose the fee. None of the 
City's attempts to justify assessment of the stormwater utility fee against the Entities are valid. 
The "fee" is really a disguised tax that has been assessed against the Entities in violation ofIdaho 
law. 
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A. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE STORMWATER UTILITY FEE IS 
CLASSIFIED AS AN AD VALOREM TAX, THE GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITIES ARE EXEMPT FROM PAYING THE FEE UNDER IDAHO LAW. 
In its memorandum, the City argues that because the stormwater utility fee is not assessed 
according to a property's market value, it is not an ad valorem tax. For this reason, the City 
maintains that the statutory tax exemptions for governmental entities cited in the Entities' 
complaint are inapplicable. As discussed below, even though the stormwater utility fee is not an 
ad valorem tax, the Entities are still exempt from paying the "fee" under the constitutional 
provision exempting the Entities' property from taxation. 
The City's argument ignores the constitutional provision prohibiting municipalities from 
levying taxes against property owned by other governmental entities. Article VII, section 4 of 
the Idaho Constitution 1 exempts public property, including the property owned by the 
Governmental Entities, from municipal taxation. The exemption applies to all property taxes -
not just those based on market value. It is well-recognized in Idaho that a fee may be a disguised 
tax even though it is not calculated in proportion to a property's market value. See Idaho Bldg. 
Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 744, 890 P.2d 326, 330 (1995) 
(concluding an impact fee assessed on new construction was a disguised tax); Brewster v. City of 
Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 504,.768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988) (holding that a "fee" assessed based 
upon the estimated amount of traffic a piece of property generated was a disguised tax); see also 
United States v. City of Huntington, 999 F.2d 71, 72 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding a "municipal 
service fee" assessed based upon a property's square footage was a disguised tax); Fulton County 
I Article VII, section 4 provides: 
The property of the United States, except when taxation thereof is authorized by the United States, 
the state, counties, towns, cities, villages, school districts, and other municipal corporations and 
public libraries shall be exempt from taxation. 
IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
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Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 1999 WL 1102795 *3 (Ga. Super. 1999) (concluding 
stonnwater utility fee was a disguised tax where the formula used to assess the fee was based 
upon "the size of the parcel and the use ofthe property"). Because a "fee" calculated based upon 
the value of the property would not be a disguised tax at all, but instead, an overt fonn of 
taxation, the City's focus on market value assessments is misleading. Since the City's 
stonnwater utility fee is a disguised tax, the City is constitutionally prohibited from assessing the 
"fee" against the Entities. 
The City's argument that the fee is not based upon a property's market value only serves 
as an additional basis for concluding the tax is constitutionally infirm.2 Taxes assessed against 
property must be proportionate to the property's market value. See IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 2 
(The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by valuation, so 
that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its 
property. (emphasis added». In assessing the disguised stonnwater tax on property owned by 
the Entities, the City has therefore violated the Idaho Constitution in two significant respects; 
namely by: taxing property exempt from taxation under Article VII, section 4, and failing to 
assess the tax in proportion to the value of the property as required by Article VII, section 2. See 
IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 2; see also Fulton County Taxpayers, 
1999 WL 1102795 at *2 (stating that a stormwater utility fee that was really a disguised tax 
would "violate[] the constitutional requirement that property taxes be assessed based upon the 
value of the property involved."). Because the City's stonnwater fee is a disguised property tax 
that is not assessed proportionately to a property's market value, it violates the Idaho 
Constitution yet a second time. 
2 In addition to violating the Constitution, the City admits in its memorandum that the stormwater fee "fits into none 
of the categories of municipal taxes authorized by the Legislature." (Mem. in SUpp. ofDef. 's Mot. for Summ. J. 9.) 
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Under the Idaho Constitution, the Entities' property is exempt from taxation regardless of 
whether the tax is classified as an ad valorem tax. For the reasons discussed in the Entities' 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, the stormwater utility fee is a disguised tax. 
As such, the City may not assess the "fee" against the Entities. The City's motion for summary 
judgment should be denied. 
B. THE CITY'S STORMWATER UTILITY FEE IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE 
OF THE CITY'S POLICE POWER. 
The City argues that the stormwater utility fee is a valid exercise of its police power 
because the fee can be classified as either a regulatory fee or a fee for services. In their 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, the Entities thoroughly explained why the 
City's stormwater utility fee could not be justified as a regulatory or service fee and, as such, is 
not a valid exercise of municipal power.3 Those reasons will not be repeated here; however, 
there are a few additional issues raised in the City's memorandum that warrant further response. 
First, the City argues that the fee is valid because it "has all of the attributes of a 
legitimate fee and none of the attributes of a disguised tax." (Mem. in SUpp. of Def.'s Mot. for 
Summ. J. 11.) In setting forth the attributes of valid fee, the City relies upon Idaho Attorney 
General Opinion No. 93-54. That opinion indicates that valid "user fees and regulatory fees" 
share three general "traits that distinguish them from taxes"; namely, such fees: (1) are "charged 
in exchange for a particular governmental service rendered to a particular consumer which 
benefits the party paying the fee in a manner 'not shared by other members of society"'; (2) are 
"not a forced contribution"; and (3) do "not raise revenue but ... compensate the governmental 
3 In discussing its police power, the City maintains that the Entities "misconceive[] the constitutional basis of 
authority for municipal corporations." (Mem. in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 7.) The City's statements of the 
law regarding municipal police powers, however, does not differ in any significant respect from the standards set 
forth by the Entities in their Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. 
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entity for its expenses in providing the services.,,4 54 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 4 (1993). Although 
the City makes the bare assertion that it is "readily apparent" the stormwater utility fee satisfies 
the three elements of a valid fee, it does not explain the basis for its conclusion or rebut the facts 
highlighted in the Entities' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that support the 
opposite conclusion.5 Contrary to the City's assertions, its fee fails all three of the prongs 
identified in the Attorney General Opinion and is not a valid regulatory or service fee. 
1. The Stormwater Fee is Not Charged in Connection with the Provision of an 
Individual Service. 
The City'S fee is not charged for the provision of an individual service, but instead, is 
assessed to fund benefits conveyed upon the general public. The City admits that "a fee to 
provide for services benefiting the entire community is really a disguised tax." (Mem. in SUpp. 
of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 15.) That is precisely the character of the Lewiston stormwater 
utility fee. All of the "stormwater services" the City funds with revenues from the fee are 
benefits conferred upon the general public rather than any individual fee payer. The services 
funded by the fee purportedly include: "maintenance and operation of the existing storm water 
system, salary for the storm water coordinator ... , and payment for equipment such as street 
sweepers, jet truck, dump trucks, storm water mitigation and construction materials and wages 
4 As explained in the Entities' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Idaho courts also rely upon these 
factors in determining whether a fee is really a disguised tax. 
5 The City simply states that "[t]he fee is charged only to those who contribute storm water and in rough proportion 
to the amount contributed. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld mandatory user fees imposed pursuant 
to the police power, so long as they are limited to those benefiting from the service .... The fee is not a general, 
revenue-generating mechanism. Funds collected are segregated in a fund used solely for providing the storm water 
service, and they do not exceed the cost of the service provided." (Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 11-
12.) The City has not pointed to any facts to support these assertions, nor rebutted the facts cited in the Entities' 
memorandum that contravene the City's allegations. 
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for employees working ~torm water duties.,,6 Id. at 20. Everyone III the City of Lewiston 
receives the benefits of the City's "stormwater services." 
Contrary to the City's assertion, the fee is not "charged only to those who contribute 
storm water and in rough proportion to the amount contributed.,,7 Id. at 11. Ordinance 4512 
indicates "that all utility users having impervious surface areas make use of or benefit from the 
City's maintenance, operation and improvement of the stormwater system."g As explained in the 
Entities Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, this proclamation could not be further 
from reality. Not all properties assessed a stormwater fee contribute to the City's stormwater 
system. Instead, numerous properties that retain all of their own stormwater and do not 
contribute to the stormwater system are subject to payment of the fee. Certain properties are not 
even served by an existing stormwater system. 9 Despite these facts, the Ordinance does not 
6 At one point in its memorandum, the City also asserts that "the storm water utility fee is used to treat storm water 
runoff." (Mem in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. 1. 22.) That statement is not supported anywhere in the record 
and there is no evidence the City does anything to treat stormwater runoff let alone use revenues from the 
stormwater fee to do so. 
7 The City also argues that the "expenses are reasonably related to legitimate storm water expenses." (Mem. in 
Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 21.) That argument, however, pertains to whether the fee satisfies due process, 
which is not an issue at this stage in the litigation. The City's due process argument, even if true, does not 
demonstrate how the expenditures confer a unique benefit on individual fee payers. 
8 Similarly, the City's memorandum indicates that "all persons having impervious surfaces on their property 
generate storm water" and that "all landowners benefited by the City's storm water management should pay for 
those efforts through a storm water utility fee reflecting their proportional contribution to the system" (Mem in 
Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 3.) The City's statements, however, fail to take into consideration the admissions 
made by the City's own stormwater program coordinator, as well as other City employees, that not all property 
assessed the stormwater utility fee is benefited by the City's stormwater system Even the affidavit of Shawn 
Stubbers filed in support of the City's motion indicates that property owners are assessed a fee despite the fact they 
manage most of their own stormwater runoff. (Aff. of Stubbers 2-3 ("Some of the storm water run off captured by 
[LCSC's] detention ponds infiltrates into the ground. Some of the storm water run-off captured by the detention 
ponds is 'metered out or overflows' into the city storm water system.") (emphasis added).) 
9 The City admitted as much in its NPDES permit application submitted to the EPA wherein it described its 
stormwater system as follows: 
With respect to existing drainage facilities, the City can be divided into three areas: North Lewiston, 
DowntownlNormal Hill, and the Orchards. The western portion of North Lewiston, primarily the Port District, is 
served by a comprehensive storm drainage system. The area east of Highway 12 has a few minor drainage systems, 
but no comprehensive or coordinated drainage system. East of 31 st Street N., drainage is provided by culverts 
beneath Highway 12/95 with a new system constructed to convey runoff from Lewiston Hill through this area. 
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allow exemptions to be granted to nonusers, including properties having no street frontage or that 
have their own stormwater disposal or retention systems. 10 Under this legislative framework, it 
can hardly be said that only users of the system are assessed the stormwater utility fee. Any 
purported services funded by the fee are shared by members ofthe general pUblic. In light of the 
vast application of the City's fee, it is evident the fee is really a disguised tax. See Brewster v. 
City o/Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988). The fee "is not dissimilar from 
a tax imposed for the privilege of owning property within the municipal limits of [Lewiston]." 
Jd.; see also Fulton County Taxpayers, 1999 WL 1102795 at *3 (concluding stormwater fee was 
really a tax where "not all landowners receive a direct benefit and others receive a 
disproportional benefit" and that "an inchoate benefit to all landowners" could not justify the 
fee). 
The fact that fees paid by an individual may be used to fund projects in a completely 
different area within the City is further evidence that the City's stormwater fee does not 
correspond to any individualized service or benefit. See 54 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 5 (1993) 
(noting that where "revenues generated by impact fees" could be spent outside of the "benefit 
zone within which the fees were raised" the impact fee did not meet the first requirement of a 
valid fee). Some stormwater basins will not receive any of the capital improvements to be 
funded by revenues from the fee. The fee is nevertheless assessed against property owners 
The Orchards neighborhoods are served by natural drainage ways and roadside ditches with some culverts. The 
only systems in the Orchards are in Thain Road from Stewart Avenue to Linden Avenue, 8th Street from Preston 
Avenue to Linden Avenue, and in 18th Streetfrom Grelle Avenue to Alder Avenue. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: NPDES Permit # IDS-028061 , 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/water.ns£fNPDES+Permits/DraftPermitsID/$FILEIIDS028061-FS.pdf 6 (2007) 
(emphasis added). 
10 The Ordinance only permits exemptions to be granted to classes of properties identified in the county tax map, 
and there are currently no exemptions in place for property owners who retain some or all of their stormwater or do 
not otherwise discharge stormwater into the City system. L.C.c. § 36-158. 
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within those basins to the same extent it is in basins receiving improvements. Under such 
circumstances, fee payers in some basins are not receiving any particular service or benefit. 
Individuals located or owning property within basins scheduled for improvement, on the other 
hand, will receive the benefits of the capital improvements regardless of whether they are 
assessed the fee. The City has attempted to justify these disparities on the grounds that the fee 
benefits the "community as a whole." 
Based upon these considerations, the City's fee fails the first factor used to determine 
whether a fee is really a disguised tax. The stormwater utility fee is not "charged in exchange for 
a particular governmental service rendered to a particular consumer" and does not "benefit[] the 
party paying the fee in a manner 'not shared by other members of society. '" 54 Idaho Op. Att'y 
Gen. 5 (1993). Because the City's fee is not related to the provision of an individual service, the 
fee is a disguised tax that violates Idaho law. 
2. The Stormwater Fee is a Forced Contribution. 
The City's stormwater fee is a forced contribution. Essentially everyone within the City 
of Lewiston is subject to assessment of the fee. The Ordinance defines "persons responsible" to 
include owners, agents, occupants, lessees, tenants, contract purchasers, or "other person[ s] 
having possession or control of property or the supervision of an improvement on the property." 
L.e.e. § 36-152. This broad definition includes nearly everyone living or conducting business 
within the City of Lewiston. There is no effective mechanism for these individuals to avoid 
paying the fee. 
'fne:pr€l-vision in the Ordinance establishing a procedure for responsible persons to appeal 
or request a recalculation ofthe stormwater fee ll does not change the fact that the fee is a forced 
Jl Section 36-159 of the Ordinance provides that "[i]f a person responsible for properties within the City and subject 
to the fee established by this chapter believes that a partiCUlar assigned fee is unwarranted or based on an incorrect 
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contribution. Section 36-159 only authorizes bringing an appeal on the grounds that the "fee is 
unwarranted or based on an incorrect calculation." L.e.c. § 36-159. Under the Ordinance, an 
assessment is only unwarranted if it is assessed against property included within a class of 
parcels identified in the county tax map that has been granted an exemption. See 
L.e.e. § 36-158. A fee payer whose property is not within one of the exempt classes has no 
basis for challenging a given assessment as being unwarranted. (Davies Dep. 61:20-22, dated 
Feb. 16,2010.) Unless such a fee payer's particular assessment was improperly calculated, he or 
she has no grounds for appealing the assessment under the Ordinance. Due to the limited nature 
of the appellate procedure contained in the Ordinance, the procedure is not the equivalent of an 
"opt-out" provision that would justify classifying the fee as "voluntary" as the City seems to 
suggest. See Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 267, 272 (concluding that an ordinance imposing a stormwater 
utility fee was a forced contribution even though the ordinance "provide[ d] for a system of 
administrative appeals by property owners contending that their properties have been unfairly 
assessed") . 
In an attempt to justify the mandatory nature of the fee, the City makes the alternative 
argument that the voluntariness of a fee is irrelevant under Idaho law. According to the City, 
"[t]he Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld mandatory user fees imposed pursuant to the 
police power, so long as they are limited to those benefitting from the service." (Mem. in SUpp. 
of Def's Mot. for Surnm. J. 11.) Aside from the fact that imposition of the City's fee is not 
limited to those benefitting from the service, the City's argument misconstrues Idaho law and 
ignores the relevant factors to be considered in determining whether a fee is really a disguised 
tax. Whether a "fee" is a "forced contribution" is a consideration in the tax versus fee analysis 
calculation of impervious surface or other aspect of the rate structure, such person responsible may appeal the fee." 
L.e.e. § 36-l59(a). 
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and depends in large part on the voluntary nature of the fee. See Brewster, 115 Idaho at 505, 768 
P.2d at 768 (defining a tax as "aforced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs" 
(emphasis added». 
The only case the City cites in support of its argument that could possibly be applicable is 
Kootenai County Property Ass'n v. Kootenai County, 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989).12 In 
that case, Kootenai County established a solid waste disposal system pursuant to authorization 
granted by the state legislature. The statute authorizing imposition ofthe fee, Idaho Code section 
31-4404, permitted counties to levy taxes and/or "[ c Jollect fees from the users of the solid waste 
disposal facilities" in order to fund the operation, maintenance, and acquisition of sites and 
facilities for the counties' solid waste disposal systems. I.e. § 31-4404(1) & (2). Under the 
county's system, "the county would have the responsibility for providing for all solid waste 
disposal including landfill sites." Kootenai County Prop., 115 Idaho at 677, 769 P.2d at 554 
(emphasis added). To fund its solid waste system, Kootenai County charged a mandatory waste 
disposal fee on nearly all property owners within the county. A property owner subsequently 
challenged the fee on the grounds it was an invalid tax. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld the county's solid waste disposal fee. The Court reasoned the involuntary nature of the 
fee was irrelevant because Idaho Code section 31-4404 authorized the county "to enact either a 
solid waste disposal tax or a solid waste disposal fee." Kootenai County Prop., 115 Idaho at 680, 
769 P.2d at 557. Because the fee was specifically authorized by statute, its validity did not 
12 Although the City also cites Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1990), and Alpert v. Boise 
Water COJp., 118 Idaho 136, 795 P.2d 298 (1990), to support its argument, those cases are inapplicable. As 
explained in the Entities' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Loomis addressed the validity 
of a fee imposed pursuant to the Revenue Bond Act, which is inapplicable to the fee assessed in this case. Alpert 
addressed the validity of a franchise fee imposed on utilities that was ultimately passed on to consumers. Alpert, 
118 Idaho at 144, 795 P.2d at 306. The Court's decision upholding the fee was based upon the facts that Idaho law 
"allow(s] the charging of a reasonable fee for granting a franchise to a utility," the fee was assessed based upon 
utility users' consumption of a service, and the fee was not directly assessed by the municipality. [d. at 145, 795 
P.2d at 307. As such, that decision also has little if any bearing on the validity of the City's fee. 
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depend upon whether it was a valid exercise of the police power. Id. at 679, 769 P.2d at 556 
(noting that "the legislature ... may mandate that citizens must accept certain services, and then 
require a fee for the receipt of those services"). Moreover, since all property owners assessed a 
fee utilized the county's solid waste disposal system in one way or another, imposition of the 
mandatory fee was valid under section 31-4404. 13 
Contrary to the City's suggestion, Kootenai County did not render the voluntary nature of 
a fee irrelevant to the tax versus fee analysis. Cases decided after Kootenai County have made 
clear that when there is no legislative authority for imposing a mandatory fee, the relevant 
inquiry is still whether the fee is reasonably related to the benefits conferred. See, e.g., V-l Oil 
Co. v. Idaho Petroleum Clean Water Trust Fund, 128 Idaho 890, 894, 920 P.2d 909,913 (1996). 
Absent legislative authorization, mandatory service fees may only be imposed when a service is 
directly provided to the fee payer. See Waters Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648, 
649,67 P.3d 1260, 1261 (2003); V-l Oil, 128 Idaho at 893-94, 920 P.2d at 912-13 (concluding a 
mandatory transfer fee used to fund an insurance pro gram was an invalid tax because it was 
imposed on distributors that did not participate in the insurance program); City of Grangeville v. 
Haskin, 116 Idaho 535,538-39, 777 P.2d 1208, 1211-12 (1989) (noting that "the city may collect 
the charges for the water, sewer and garbage services provided by the city from those who use 
the services" but may not collect a fee where "the services were not ordered, contracted for, or 
used by the owner"). The mandatory fee in Kootenai County was only valid because "everyone 
who paid the solid waste disposal fee was entitled to the benefit of solid waste disposal services." 
V-l Oil, 128 Idaho at 893-94, 920 P.2d at 912-13 (noting that where receipt of a funded service 
13 Significantly, under the statute, taxes could not be levied against property located within a city that operated its 
own solid waste disposal system, thereby preventing duplicate taxation. I.e. § 31-4404( 1). 
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does not depend upon payment of the fee, a mandatory fee may not be imposed against 
nonusers). 
In Waters Garbage, relying upon the same statute construed by the Court in Kootenai 
County, Shoshone County imposed a solid waste disposal fee on all residences and commercial 
entities within the county. Waters Garbage, 138 Idaho at 649, 67 P.3d at 1261. A flat monthly 
fee was assessed against residences while commercial entities were charged a fee "based upon 
the amount of solid waste they generated in the prior year." Id. A commercial entity that 
provided independent waste disposal services, Waters Garbage, challenged the fee after 
acquiring its own disposal facility, thereby negating the need for its customers to use the 
county's facilities. The county rejected Waters' argument and continued to assess the fee against 
nonusers of its system. Waters subsequently filed an action challenging the fee on the grounds 
that Idaho Code section 31-4404 did not authorize imposition of a disposal fee on nonusers ofthe 
system. Id. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with Waters and held the county was 
not authorized to impose fees on nonusers. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the plain 
language of section 31-4404, which only authorizes counties to "[ c ]ollect fees from the users of 
the solid waste disposal facilities." I.e. § 31-4404 (emphasis added); see also Waters Garbage, 
138 Idaho at 651, 67 P.3d at 1263. The Court reasoned that "[g]iving the word 'users' its plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning, the 'users of the solid waste disposal facilities' means those who 
actually use the facilities. Nonusers - those who fail or neglect to use the facilities - would not 
be 'users' as that term is normally used." Id. The Court rejected the county's argument that the 
fee was valid under Kootenai County and, instead, concluded that decision was not controlling. 
According to the Court, because the decision in Kootenai County was based on the assumption 
that everyone assessed a fee used the county's disposal facilities, its holding was inapplicable in 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14 
governmental entities/pleadinglsummary judgment (dej) Jespol1se 17/· 
instances where fee payers do not utilize the county's services. Since the statute authorizing 
collection of fees from users did not grant the county the power to impose a mandatory fee on 
nonusers and there was no other basis for justifying such a fee, the county's assessment of the fee 
against nonusers of its system was improper. Id. at 651-52, 67 P .3d at 1263-64. 
In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions limiting Kootenai County, it cannot be 
said that the Court has "repeatedly" upheld mandatory user fees. Kootenai County is best viewed 
as turning on the statutory authorization involved in that case and the unique factual 
circumstances. See Michael C. Moore, The Idaho Constitution and Local Governments -
Selected Topics, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 417, 440 (1995) (noting that the decision in Kootenai County 
hinged on the fact that the legislature had mandated that citizens accept the county's services and 
pay a fee for those services). As such, the decision did not modify the analysis employed by 
Idaho courts in determining whether a fee is really a disguised tax. Under Kootenai County, V-J 
Oil, and Waters Garbage, the voluntary nature of the fee remains a factor to be considered when 
there is not specific legislative authorization for imposition of a mandatory service fee. As 
explained below, there is no independent legislative authorization for the City's stormwater 
utility fee. Consequently, the voluntary nature of the fee remains relevant in determining 
whether the fee is a valid exercise of the City's police power Of, rather, is an unlawful disguised 
tax. Because property owners and occupants within the City have no choice but to pay the 
stormwater utility fee, the fee is a forced contribution - another factor supporting the conclusion 
that the fee is really a disguised tax. 14 
14 The City argues that "[tJhe Waters Garbage opt-out requirement is satisfied by the City's Ordinance" because the 
administrative appeal process allows "landowners [toJ demonstrate that the utility fee is 'unwarranted' as to them." 
(Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 20.) As explained above, however, the grounds for appeal contained in 
the Ordinance are very narrow and are not equivalent to an "opt-out" provision. The appellate procedure does not 
render payment of the fee voluntary. 
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3. The Stormwater Fee is a Revenue Raising Measure. 
The City's stormwater utility fee is designed to raise revenue rather than to fund any 
regulatory program or the provision of any particular service. As more fully explained in the 
Entities' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, several factors support this 
conclusion. First, the stormwater fee was imposed to supplement the City's general revenue. 
The "stormwater" activities currently funded by the fee were previously funded out of the City 
streets department budget. Numerous statements by City employees contained in the record 
demonstrate the fee was intended to provide additional revenue for City streets. Because the fee 
is used to fund what were previously considered street maintenance activities, no increased 
services or benefits are being conferred on fee payers, and there has been no corresponding 
decrease in taxes, the fee is nothing more than a revenue raising measure used to supplement the 
City's annual budget. 
Second, revenues from the fee are not "segregated in a fund used solely for providing the 
storm water service" as the City suggests. (Mem. in SUpp. ofDef's Mot. for Summ. J. 12.) The 
City acknowledges that pursuant to the Ordinance "all fees collected" are to be deposited in a 
stormwater enterprise fund where they "will be segregated from other revenues of the City and 
will be available only for payment of costs of maintenance, operation, repairs, upkeep, and 
capital improvements to the City's storm water system"; however, no such separate stormwater 
enterprise fund exists. IS Stormwater utility fee revenues are deposited into the City's general 
fund. Once deposited into the City's primary account, the funds are commingled with the City's 
general operating funds and revenue. (Marsh Dep. 36:8-24; 37:4-16, 49:10-20, Feb. 16, 2010.) 
No cash basis accounting is conducted and expenditures are not allocated to stormwater until the 
15 Although the City may separately track stormwater revenues and expenses on an accrual basis and call it an 
"enterprise fund," there is no segregated bank account into which revenue from the stormwater fee is deposited or 
the expenses paid. 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 16 173 · governmental entities/pleading/summary judgment (dej) _response 
end of the fiscal year. Id. at 54:17-21; (Bingman Dep. 112:7-19, Feb. 23, 2010.) The City's 
decision to comingle stormwater fee funds with its general revenue is further evidence the fee 
was intended as a revenue raising measure. 
Third, nothing in the Ordinance limits the purposes for which stormwater fee revenues 
may be expended. For a fee to be valid, limitations must be set on the uses to which funds 
generated by the fee may be spent. See Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 
126 Idaho 740, 743, 890 P.2d 326, 329 (1995) (holding an ordinance that did not "in any way 
limit[] the use of the revenue created" by the fee was "antithetical to [the] Court's definition of a 
fee"); 54 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 7 (1993) (concluding that where an ordinance "fails to delineate a 
method for segregating and accounting for the revenues collected" it was unlikely that the 
enacting entity "could establish that expenditures of [the] fees are reasonably related to the cost 
of providing services"). Although the City recently tried to retroactively cure the deficiency in 
the Ordinance by enacting Resolution 2009-68, that enactment does not resolve the uncertainty 
surrounding allocation of revenues from the fee. 
Resolution 2009-68 merely provides: "[a]ll Storm Water Utility Fees collected shall only 
be expended to maintain, operate or enhance the Storm Water Utility system of the City of 
Lewiston." Res. 2009-68(3). Nothing in the resolution limits the location in which maintenance 
and enhancement operations take place. Nor does anything restrict the location of improvements 
funded by the fee to the basins in which the fees are collected. See Idaho Bldg. Contractors, 126 
Idaho at 743, 890 P.2d at 329 (concluding that an ordinance was a revenue generating measure 
because it allowed fee revenue "to be used for 'capital improvements' without limitation as to 
the location ofthose improvements or whether they will in fact be used solely by those" assessed 
the fee). Because there is no limitation on the manner and location in which the activities funded 
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by the stormwater fee will be performed, the fee is not tied to the provision of a service to 
individual fee payers. The fee was designed to supplement the budget for various activities 
conducted throughout the City. 
Fourth, there is no relationship between the revenue collected from the fee and the 
regulation of stormwater. Revenues from the fee are not used to fund any regulatory 
enforcement efforts. 16 The primary purpose of the fee is to "generate funds for the non-
regulatory function of repairing and maintaining" the City's "stormwater system," which 
essentially consists of City streets. See Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 504, 768 
P.2d 765, 767 (1988).17 In addition to funding street maintenance, the fee was designed to raise 
millions of dollars in revenue over the next twenty years to fund the City's capital improvement 
plan. 
Nonetheless, the City maintains that its "utility fee stands in sharp contrast to the 
disguised taxes struck down in Brewster and IBCA" because the fees in those cases were not 
related to the "regulatory function provided to the individual landowner and [were] simply an 
effort to raise revenues from landowners or developers to provide services to the community as a 
whole." (Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 16.) The City does not, however, explain 
how its fee is any different from the fees struck down in those cases. None of the revenue from 
the City's stormwater fee has been allocated towards enforcing stormwater regulations - most 
16 The City states that Ordinance 4512 "was adopted in response to new regulatory requirements mandated by the 
(EPA]." (Mem in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 2.) The City has not, however, provided infonnation 
regarding the draft permit requirements it purportedly must follow, indicated the steps - if any - it has taken to 
reduce stonnwater pollutant loading, or revealed how the stonnwater "fee" is used to achieve Clean Water Act 
compliance. Even if the City were able to present evidence of such facts, however, the fact that the EPA imposes 
regulatory requirements on the City does not automatically vest the City with authority to impose a fee. 
n The City has not provided any basis for its speculation that the Justices who decided Brewster "were motivated 
primarily be the fact that the city repeatedly had sought and failed to achieve voter approval for a levy override" and 
that "the Court saw this fee as an end-run around clearly expressed voter disapproval of a new tax." (Mem in Supp. 
of Def.'s Mot. for Sumrn. J. 22 n.12.) For purposes of these proceedings, any unstated motivation underlying the 
Court's decision is irrelevant. 
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likely because no such regulations exist. 18 Nothing in Ordinance 4512 purports to regulate 
storrnwater discharge or impose any other regulatory requirements. 19 See 81 Idaho Op. Att'y 
Gen. 5-6 (1979) (concluding that a proposed service fee for general fire protection services 
would be an invalid tax because it lacked provisions of regulation, did not impose any new 
requirements regarding fire safety or inspections, and was designed to raise revenue). Because 
there is no regulatory function being served by the fee, the fee is no different than those held 
invalid in Brewster and Idaho Building Contractors Association (IBCA)?O Idaho Bldg. 
Contractors, 126 Idaho at 743-44, 890 P.2d at 329-30; Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, 768 P.2d at 
767; see also State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358, 361 (1923), overruled on other grounds 
by Greater Boise Auditorium Dist. v. Royal Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho 884, 888, 684 P.2d 286, 
290 (1984); 81 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 5 (1979) ("Nearly every appellate court which has 
considered the question has likewise emphasized that a fee or charge, to be justified as a police 
power measure, must regulate - i.e., it must impose some restriction or obligation in furtherance 
of the public health, safety, morals, or welfare."). Like the fees in those cases, the storrnwater 
utility fee is an attempt by the City to raise revenue to fund services provided to the community 
as a whole. Revenue from the fee is used primarily to fund street sweeping and road 
maintenance, and roughly half of the fee will eventually be used to fund stormwater capital 
improvements. These are not regulatory enforcement activities; rather, they are activities that the 
City admits are intended to benefit the general public. Accordingly, there is no "sharp contrast" 
18 The City's memorandum acknowledges that ordinances lacking provisions of regulation may not be justified as 
exercises of the police power. (Mem. in Supp. ofDef. 's Mot. for Sumrn. J. 13.) 
19 In its memorandum the City maintains "the Utility was given regulatory authority for planning, design, 
construction, maintenance, administration, and operation of all City storm water conveyances." (Mem. in SUpp. of 
Def. 's Mot. for Summ. J. 2.) However, the City fails to address the issues raised in the Entities' memorandum 
regarding the lack of a utility structure, stormwater regulations, or any regulatory enforcement activities. 
20 Without explicitly so stating, the City appears to be arguing that the stormwater fee is justifiable because Idaho 
law does not require precision between the amount of the fee imposed and the cost of enforcing the regulation. 
Although the City's characterization of the law is correct, the stormwater utility fee still fails because no regulations 
exist to which the fee could bear a reasonable relation. 
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between the City's stormwater utility fee and the unlawful fees struck down in Brewster and 
IBCA. 
The City's stormwater fee is nothing more than a revenue raising measure. The fee is 
designed to supplement the City's annual budget, revenue from the fee is commingled with the 
City's general operating funds, there are inadequate limitations on expenditures of revenue raised 
from the fee, and the fee bears no relationship to the regulation of stormwater. For these reasons, 
the third factor used to determine whether a fee is really a disguised tax also supports a finding 
that the fee is invalid. 
4. Summary of the Factors Justifying the Conclusion that the City's Fee is Not a 
Valid Exercise of the Police Power. 
In sum, the stormwater utility fee is an unlawful tax. All three factors set forth by the 
City in its own memorandum support the conclusion that the stormwater utility fee is a disguised 
tax and invalid under Idaho law. The fee is not related to the provision of any service, is a forced 
contribution, and is used to raise general revenue for the City. As such, the fee cannot be a valid 
regulatory or service fee. Because the City has pointed to no other legitimate basis to justify its 
imposition ofthe fee, its motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
C. THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT STATUTORY BASIS AUTHORIZING 
IMPOSITION OF THE CITY'S STORMW ATER UTILITY FEE. 
In its memorandum, the City argues that various statutory provisions, including numerous 
provisions the City Council did not cite as authority for enacting the Ordinance, authorize 
imposition of the stormwater fee. Those statutes are Idaho Code sections: 63-1311,50-301,50-
304, 50-315, 50-323, 50-331, 50-332, 50-334, and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. For the 
following reasons, none of those provisions grant the City authority to impose its stormwater 
utility fee. 
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1. Idaho Code section 63-1311 does not grant the City authority to assess the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Idaho Code section 63-1311 provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the governing board of any taxing 
district may impose and cause to be collected fees for those services provided by 
that district which would otherwise be funded by property tax revenues. The fees 
collected pursuant to this section shall be reasonably related to, but shall not 
exceed, the actual cost of the service being rendered. 
I.e. § 63-1311 (emphasis added). 
Section 63-1311 does not authorize imposition of the stormwater utility fee. The 
provision only permits the collection of fees for services. As explained above, and more fully 
outlined in the Entities' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, the City is not 
providing individual fee payers with stormwater services. Many fee payers are required to pay 
the fee even though they do not receive any particular service or directly benefit from the City's 
stormwater system. Even if the stormwater maintenance activities being performed by the City 
could be construed as services, the fee is not reasonably related to "the actual cost of the services 
being rendered." The fee was designed to raise revenue to fund the City's twenty year capital 
improvement plan and supplement the budget for City streets. Because the stormwater utility fee 
is not related to any stormwater service provided to individual fee payers, section 63-1311 does 
not authorize imposition of the fee. 
2. Idaho Code section 50-301 does not vest the City with authority to assess the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Idaho Code section 50-301 states: 
Cities governed by this act . . . may ... exercise all powers and perform all 
functions of local self-government in city affairs as are not specifically prohibited 
by or in conflict with the general laws or the constitution of the state of Idaho. 
I.e. § 50-301 (emphasis added). 
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Nothing in section 50-301 authorizes imposition of the City's stormwater utility fee. 
Instead, the provision reaffirms the City's ability to impose fees in accordance with Idaho law. 
As explained above, the City's stormwater utility fee is not authorized under Idaho law. In fact, 
the fee violates at least two provisions of the Idaho Constitution. Because the stormwater fee 
conflicts with both the Idaho Constitution and the general laws ofthe state, the City may not rely 
upon section 50-301 to justify imposition ofthe fee. 
3. Idaho Code section 50-304 does not grant the City authority to impose the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Section 50-304 provides: 
Cities may ... pass all ordinances and make all regulations necessary to preserve 
the public health. 
I.e. § 50-304. 
Section 50-304 does not provide authority for imposing the stormwater utility fee. The 
provision does nothing more than reaffirm municipalities' police power, which is already 
recognized by article 7, section 2 ofthe Idaho Constitution. As explained above, the stormwater 
utility fee cannot be justified as an exercise of the City's police power. Even if it could, there are 
no provisions in Ordinance 4512 that establish regulations preserving the public health. The 
Ordinance merely authorizes the formation of a "utility" to collect "fees." For these reasons, 
section 50-304 does not vest the City with authority to assess the stormwater utility fee. 
4. Idaho Code section 50-315 does not vest the City with authority to impose the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Idaho Code section 50-315 states: 
Cities may provide for the repairing, rebuilding and relaying of pavement, curb, 
gutter, sewer or other improvements, the procedure and manner of payment to be 
the same as provided by law for making such improvements in the first instance. 
I.C. § 50-315 (emphasis added). 
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Section 50-315 contains no independent grant of authority for assessing a stormwater fee; 
rather, the statute requires the manner of payment for improvements be as "provided by law." 
Service and regulatory fees may not be used to fund infrastructure improvements and repairs 
throughout the City. Under Idaho law, city-wide infrastructure improvements to curb, gutter, 
and sewage systems must typically be funded through taxation, special assessments, local 
improvement districts, or municipal bonding. Because the stormwater utility fee cannot be used 
for "making such improvements in the first instance," the City may not rely on section 50-315 as 
authority for imposing a fee to fund stormwater infrastructure. 
5. Idaho Code section 50-323 does not provide authority for assessmg the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Section 50-323 provides: 
Cities are . . . empowered to establish, create, develop, maintain and operate 
domestic water systems; provide for domestic water from wells, streams, water 
sheds or any other source; provide for storage, treatment and transmission of the 
same to the inhabitants of the city; and to do all things necessary to protect the 
source of water from contamination. The term "domestic water systems" and 
"domestic water" includes by way of example but not by way of limitation, a 
public water system providing water at any temperature for space heating or 
cooling, culinary, sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses. 
I.e. § 50-323 (emphasis added). 
The City's reliance on section 50-323 to justify imposition ofthe stormwater utility fee is 
misplaced. The statute grants cities the authority to manage, operate, and protect domestic water 
systems. Examples of domestic water provided in the statute are all associated with household 
and recreational uses. Accordingly, stormwater does not fall within the meaning of the term 
"domestic water" as it is used in the statute. Although the City is correct that the statute's list of 
examples of domestic water is not exclusive, the City does not indicate how stormwater could 
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possibly be classified as domestic water. Because section 50-323 does not relate to stormwater 
systems, it may not serve as the basis for imposition of the City's stormwater utility fee. 21 
6. Idaho Code section 50-331 does not grant the City the authority to assess the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Section 50-331 provides: 
Cities may establish, alter and change the channels of watercourses and wall or 
cover the same within the boundaries of the city and outside the corporate limits 
to the extent necessary to preserve the watercourse. 
LC. § 50-331. 
The City'S stormwater fee is not authorized under section 50-331. That provision relates 
to the establishment and maintenance of watercourses. The Idaho Supreme Court has defined a 
watercourse as: 
a stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and sides or banks, 
and discharging itself into some other stream or body of water. The flow of water 
need not be constant, but must be more than mere surface drainage occasioned by 
extraordinary causes; there must be substantial indications of the existence of a 
stream, which is ordinarily a moving body of water. 
Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 104,524 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1974) (quoting Hutchinson v. 
Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484,488, 101 P. 1059 (1909)) (emphasis added). Under this 
definition, a stormwater conveyance system would not qualify as a channel or water course. Any 
stormwater drainage systems within the City are not comprised of definite, flowing channels or 
moving bodies of water. Stormwater is "mere surface drainage" resulting from periodic rain 
storms. Section 50-331 also does not authorize imposition of an unlawful fee or tax to fund 
watercourse operations undertaken pursuant to the statute. In any event, the City has not alleged 
that it has taken action to alter or change channels or watercourses, let alone indicated that it has 
funded such actions with the stormwater utility fee. As with the other statutes relied upon by the 
21 Even if stormwater could be classified as domestic water, the statute does not authorize imposition of an unlawful 
fee to fund the functions contained in the statute. 
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City as authority for imposing the stormwater fee, the City has simply quoted the statute without 
providing any explanation as to how the provision may justify the fee. Based on these 
considerations, the City's stormwater feeis not authorized under section ?0-331. 
7. Idaho Code section 50-332 does not serve as authority for assessmg the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Section 50-332 states: 
Cities are authorized to clear, cleanse, alter, straighten, widen, pipe, wall, fill or 
close any waterway, drain or sewer or any watercourse in such city when not 
declared, by law, to be navigable and, as provided in section 50-1008, assess the 
expense thereof in whole or in part to the property specially benefited thereby. 
I.C. § 50-332 (emphasis added). 
Section 50-332 does not authorize imposition of the City's stormwater utility fee. The 
statute only permits fees to be imposed on property that is specially benefited by certain 
improvements. The City's stormwater utility fee, however, is assessed against virtually every 
owner or occupant of property within the City of Lewiston. Assessment of the fee is not based 
upon any special benefit a particular piece of property receives from the City's "stormwater 
services." Nor is the assessment calculated to reflect the expense of providing any service. 
Because the fee is not calculated based upon the expense of clearing, cleansing, draining or 
altering storm drains for the benefit of particular properties, the fee is not authorized under 
section 50-332. 
8. Idaho Code section 50-334 does not grant the City the authority to assess the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Section 50-334 provides: 
Cities are empowered to declare what shall be deemed nuisances, to prevent, 
remove and abate nuisances at the expense of the parties creating, causing, 
committing or maintaining the same, to levy a special assessment as provided in 
section 50-1012 [50-1008, Idaho Code], on the land or premises whereon the 
nuisance is situated to defray the cost or to reimburse the city for the cost of 
abating the same, and this power shall extend three (3) miles beyond the city 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 25 
governmental entities/pleading/summOly judgment (def) Jesponse 
limits, provided however, that the expense of declaring, preventing, removing and 
abating nuisances outside the city limits shall rest with the city when the nuisance 
comes within the three (3) mile area by reason of expansion of city boundaries. 
LC. § 50-334. 
As with the other sections cited by the City, section 50-334 does not serve as authority 
for imposition of the stormwater utility fee. The provision allows a city to levy a special 
assessment on land that has been declared to contain a nuisance in order to reimburse the city for 
the cost of abating the nuisance. Nothing in the statute authorizes imposition of a stormwater 
fee. Although the provision permits cities to levy special assessments, the circumstances under 
which such assessments may be made are not present in this case. The City has not declared that 
every property assessed a stormwater fee contains a nuisance, has not taken action to abate such 
nuisances, and has not levied any special assessments. Accordingly, the City's fee does not fall 
within the scope of section 50-334 and exceeds any authority granted by that statute. 
9. Idaho Code section 50-1703 does not provide authority for imposing the 
stormwater utility fee. 
Section 50-1703 provides in relevant part: 
(a) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to make or cause to 
be made anyone (1) or more or combination of the following improvements: 
(1) To establish grades and layout, establish, open, extend and widen any local, 
collector, arterial or other street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility; 
(2) To purchase, acquire, construct, improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, 
surface, resurface, curb, gutter, sewer, drain, landscape and beautify any street, 
sidewalk or alley; 
(3) To purchase, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, 
sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, CUlverts, sanitary sewers, storm sewers, 
ditches, drains, conduits, flood barriers and channels for sanitary and drainage 
purposes, or either or both thereof, with inlets or outlets, manholes, catch basins, 
flush tanks, treatment systems and all other sewer and drainage appurtenances 
necessary for the comfort, convenience, health and well-being of the inhabitants 
of the municipality; provided, that any improvements for sanitary sewer facilities 
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shall be constructed so as to confonn with the general rules of the Idaho 
department of environmental quality; 
(10) To construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair optional improvements; 
(12) To make any other improvements now or hereafter authorized by any other 
law, the cost of which in whole or in part can properly be detennined to be of 
particular benefit to a particular area within the municipality; 
(13) To construct and install all such structures, equipment and other items and to 
do all such other work and to incur any such costs and expenses as may be 
necessary or appropriate to complete any of such improvements in a proper 
manner; 
I.e. § 50-1703(a). To pay for all or part of the expense associated with such improvements, 
section 50-1703 authorizes cities to "create local improvement districts within the municipality, 
levy assessments on the property within such a district which is benefited by the making of the 
improvements and issue interim or registered warrants and local improvement bonds as provided 
in this chapter." I.C. § 50-1703(b). 
Section 50-1703 does not serve as a valid basis for imposing the stonnwater utility fee. 
Although section 50-1703 authorizes improvements to the stonnwater system, it only pennits 
funding of such improvements to be accomplished through local improvement districts, 
assessments on benefited property, and local improvement bonds. The City's stonnwater fee 
does not fall within any of the funding mechanisms authorized by section 50-703. Because the 
City has not established a local improvement district, has not levied assessments on benefitted 
property, and has not registered local improvement bonds to fund stonnwater system 
maintenance and improvements, its stonnwater utility fee falls outside the scope of section 
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50-1703. Accordingly, that provision does not provide authority for imposition of the City's 
stormwater utility fee. 
10. The Idaho Revenue Bond Act does not authorize imposition of the stormwater 
utility fee. 
Finally, the City relies on the Idaho Revenue Bond Act for authority to impose the 
stormwater utility fee. The City argues the fee is permissible because "[tJhe act encompasses 
drainage systems, which includes storm water." (Mem. in SUpp. of Def.' s Mot. for Summ. J. 
23.) For the reasons stated in the Entities' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which need not be repeated here, Idaho's Revenue Bond Act does not authorize 
imposition of the fee. 
11. Summary of the Reasons Justifying the Conclusion that the City does not have 
Independent Statutory Authority to Impose the Stormwater Utility Fee. 
In summary, the City has failed to establish the stormwater fee has been imposed 
pursuant to any specific legislative authorization. Although some of the statutes cited by the City 
grant it various powers with respect to stormwater, they do not authorize imposition of the 
stormwater utility fee. See City of Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535, 538, 777 P.2d 1208, 
1211 (1989) ("If there is a fair, reasonable, substantial doubt as to the existence of a power, the 
doubt must be resolved against the city."); see also Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 140 Idaho 1,4-
5, 89 P.3d 841, 844-45 (2003). The statutes do not authorize unlawful fees or the imposition of 
fees on nonusers of the "stormwater system." Instead, the statutes merely reaffirm the City's 
general police power to regulate the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. In exercising 
those powers the City may admittedly impose valid regulatory or service fees. It may not, 
however, levy an unlawful tax. Because there is no specific legislative authorization for the 
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stonnwater utility fee, any doubt regarding the City's power to impose the fee must be construed 
against the City. Consequently, the City's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The City's motion for summary judgment should be denied. The City's stonnwater 
utility fee is a disguised tax as it is not related to the provision of any individual service, is a 
forced contribution, and was designed as a revenue raising measure. Furthennore, there is no 
statutory grant of authority authorizing the fee. Because the City is constitutionally prohibited 
from assessing the fee against property owned by the Governmental Entities, it is not entitled to 
summary judgment. 
DATED this2L(~ay of May, 2010. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
t&f~t~ O~¥~~ 
Theodore O. Creason 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Case No. CV 09-02057 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF IJLAI.NTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the plaintiffs (hereinatler "Govcmmental Enlities" or "Entities"), by and 
through their attollley of record, Theodore O. Creason of Creason, Moore, Dokken & 
p.3 
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Geidl, PLLC, and hereby submit their Reply tn Supporl of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgmcnl. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The factual background of this case is set forth in the Eritities' Memorandum in SUppolt 
orMotion for SUlllmary Judgment, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
ll. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The standard governing summary judgment proceedings when cross-motions f()r 
summary judgment have been filed is set forth in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion 
for Summmy Juti.srnlent, which is incorporated herein by ref'crence. 
Ill. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. Under Idaho Cuse Law, the City's Stormwater Utility Fee is a DisguisNI Tay 
that Violates the Idaho Constitution. 
In ils response to the Entities' MallOn for Summary Judgment, the City anempts to 
dislingui>:h the cases Slipporling the r~.ntilies' argument that the· City's stonnwaler utility fce is 
really a disguised tax. In particular, the Clty argues its st0D11water fcc is distinguishable from the 
disguised taxes struck down in Brewster v. CiTy of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 
(1988), ~lnd Boll v. City ofLansilIg, 587 N. W .2d 264 (1998). According to the City. its fee is in 
accuHI with the fees upheld in Koo{enai Counzy Prop. Association v. Kootenai Counly, 
115 Idaho 676, 678~79, 769 P.2d 553, 555-56 (1989), Alpert v. Boise WaleI' Corp., 118 Idaho 
136, 138, 795 P.2d 298, 300 (1990). Loomis v. Cily of liailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 
1272,1275 (1991), and Ports Construction Co. v. North Kootenai Water [)istriCl, 141 Idaho 678, 
682, 116 P.3d ~, 12 (20U5). For the following reasons, the City's stormwater utility /l:(; dUCl; Hut 
fa 11 within any of lhe categories of fees reeo gnized .. is val id under idaho law. The City's attempt 
to analogize its fee to those upheJd in prior Idaho cases is unavailing. 
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The City initially argues that its rec is valid under Brewster \I. City of Pocatello, 
115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2J 7()5 (1988). As the City puts it, Bre'rvsrer stand!) [or tho proposition that 
"a proper Icc is one lh,at is based on lhe user's consumption of a city service." (DeC's Resp. 2.) 
The City Inaintains its stormwater uti lity fee is law Cui under that standard because the fee is 
"hased on a user's consumption or the municipal stonn water system." !d. By the City's 
estimation, it is providing a service to fee payers because "[s]torm water flows off a pared'::; 
imperviou~ surfaces. , . ;1nd into some type ofa storm waleI' collectioll." Id. (emphasis added). 
Contrary lO lhe City's asserlion, its fee is not based upon fee payers' consumption of:1 
service. The City is correct that stonnwater generally tlows into "some type or a stormwaler 
collection system," however, in many instances those collection systems are not owned or 
IIla.iutained by the City_ Numerous parcels assessed u fee do not contribute stormwaler to the 
City's so-called st01l11watcr system. Instead, they retain and treat lheir own stormwatcr. The 
City's stormwater program coordinator, Tom Decherl, admitted that. nLlrncrous parcels in the City 
assessed a fee do not contribute runotT into the "City's stonnwaler systcm." Mr. Deehclt also 
admitted that the City's system consisted in large pan of privately owned inI[-(il:>trul,;tul\:;. 
(Deched Ocp, 49: 11-22, dated Nov. 14 & 16, 2009.) Owners of these properties that do not 
generate stonnwaler runoff into the City's system are not receiving any service provided by the 
City. 
At the same time. owners of property that do contribulestorrnwater runoff to the City's 
system arc not paying for uny particular ticrvico. Such property owners are assessed ::1 f~~(=: 
regardless of the extent to which Lhey usc the system. Propelty owners are not given credit for 
their own storrnwatcr l1Hll1agement or treatment efforts; but instead, are charged the same fee as 
those who cngage in 110 stormwater management activities. Any benefits funded by the fcc are 
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bestowed equally upon everyone in the City. Accordingly, like the fee struck down in JJrewster, 
the City's stonmvater fee i::; ilullJing more than a fcc for tho privilege of Jiving in the City of 
Lewiston. The fce is a disguised tax that the Idaho Constitution prohibits the City from asses:;ing 
against property owned by the Govemmcntal Entities. 
The City contends that its failure to provide exemptions and reductions for the 
stormwater fee assessment does not render the fee invalid. ACGun.liu):; to the City, the 
"construction of private storm w<\!'er facilities" is iITclcvanl because those facilities do "not l11ak.e 
the st0l111 water go away." T11C City's argument misconstrues the significance of private 
st0l111wuter treatment and retcntion facilities. The Entities have never asserted that the existence 
of private facilities somehow makes slormwater disappear. The facilities do, however, 
signit1canlly n.:dut.:t: and, in :;omc instancos, completely eliminate slormwater rlInoff into the 
City's system. In fact, in its response, the City admits that LeSC's stormwaler retention ponds 
reduce the amounl of stonnwater discharged into the City's system. Although some of LeSC's 
storrnwater may eventually wind up in the City's system, the amount is significantly less than if 
LCSC had not taken any actIOns to manage stormWl:HCr. LCSC is nevertheless cbarged the same 
fee as it would be il",,11 of its st()rmwater flowed into the Cilysystem and none of the st0l111water 
was retaincd on-site. A stonnwater fee imposed on property such as that owned by LCSe 
regardless of the rnnoff generated by the property cannot be construed as a fcc for services. The 
City's argument that plivate retention facilities arc of no consequence because they do not make 
::;luuuwater "go away" misses the point. When the City i;i not provirlinr, any particular 
slorrnwater services, it may not impose a service ree - regardless of whethcr the stormwater goes 
away or not. 
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The City's attempt to distinguish its fee from the fee struck down in Bolt is also 
unconvincing, The City argut:s that Bolr. is distinguishable because the Court in (hat case "ruled 
'voluntariness' was a requirement ofa ree compared to a tax," (Der's Rcsp, 3.) The City argues 
that because there is no voluntariness requirement under Idaho law, Bolt is inapplicable. The 
City's argument regarding voJulllariness is flawed in at least two significant respects. First, the 
Court in Bolt did not hold that '''voluntaliness' was a requirement or a fee compared lu it (,1,\ 
undcr Michigan law." (Der.'s R(-~::;p. :i.) Instead. the court held that "[tJhere is no bright~line test 
for distinguishing between a valid user ree and a tax." Bolt v, CiZva/Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 
268 (Mich. 1998). It then considered several f~\etors in reaching its conclusion that Lansing's 
stormwater fee was really a disguised tax. !d. at 269 ("Determining whether the storm water 
service d)arge is properly charactclizcd as a fee Qr a tax involves consideration of several 
factors."). Although the three primary characteristics or a valid fee noted by the Court were thaI 
the rce "serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose," "be propoltionale to 
the necessary costs of the service," and be voluntary, voluntariness was only one of the factors 
considered - it was not a "requirement" of a valid fee as the City suggests. lei. TIll:: COUli's 
analysis orthc vnlllnt.ary nature of the fee is set torth below: 
One of the distinguishing factors or a tax is lh(1t il is compulsory by law, "whereas 
payments oruser fees are unly CUllIpU]SOIY for those who usc the servicc, hove the 
ability to choose how much o(thc service to usc, and whelhcr to lise it at all." ... 
The charge in the present case is effectively cO)l1pnlsory. The property owner has 
no choice whether to use the service rlI1d is unable to control the extent to which 
the service is used. The dissent suggests that propelty owners can control the 
amount of the feo thoy pay by building less on their property, l-l"owever, we do not 
find that this is a legitimate method for controlling the amount of the fee because 
it is tanlarnount to requiring property owners to relinquish their rights of 
ownership to their property by declining to build on the propelty. 
Td. at 272. 
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Second, the BolL court's analysis of the voluntary nature of the fee is in accordance with 
Idaho law. In Idaho, a tilX is a "ji:Jrced contribution by tho pUblic nt large to meet pUblic needs." 
Brewster, 115 Tdaho at 505, 768 P.2d al 768 (emphasis added). To be forced, payment of a 
contribution must necessarily be involuntary. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining "force" as ''[t]o compel by physical means or by legal requirement" or "to produce 
only with unnatural or ullwilling eCfolt"). Accorciingly, lhe City's argument that voluntarincss is 
an irrelevant consideration under Idaho law is inconect.! 
The City also argues Bolt is distinguishable because "a I11ajor portion of the fee contested 
ill Bolt was for capital expenditures." (DeL's Resp. 3.) Because the City's stormwater fee is not 
cum::ntly being allocated to fund capital expenditures, the City argues Boll is inapplicable. /d. 
In IJoh, thc City of Lansing intended to lIse half of its stomlwutcr fce to fund a combined sewer 
overflow system over a period of thirty years_ Roughly 63'% of those funds would be llsed to 
fund capital expenditures. In light of the intended use of the funds, the court concluded revenues 
(rom the fee were intended as "an investment in infrastructure as opposed to a fee designed 
simply to defray the cosls of a regulatory activity." Boll, 587 N.W.2d at 270. Consequently, the 
COlilt concluded the fee was a revenue raising measure and not related to the provision or any 
service. h'-
The ract that the City's stonnwater uti lity fcc is not currently being used to fund capital 
improvements is not determinative of its validity. The City's fee was designed to fund such 
improvements und intended as a revenue raising measure. RevenLle fi-om the fcc is not used to 
de[Tay the costs of regulation or to fund the provision of any service. The fee is invalid under 
Idaho law even ifit is not evenlually llsed to fund capit.al improvements. None of t.he cases 
I Further discussion of the errors in the City'S vo\uIltariness argument is set forth in the Emities' Response to the 
City's Motion for SltrllJllary Judgll1em (lnd need nOl be repealed IIcIe. 
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relied upon by the City in its attempt to justify the stormwater utility fee alter this conclusion.2 
The lI.x;::; upheld in those CMCS were all authorized by specific legislative enactment. See 
Kootenai Coun(v Prop. Ass'n v. Koolenai COUllly, 1 IS Idaho 676, 679-80, 769 P.2d 553,556-57 
(1989) (upholding county's solid waste disposal fee where "the legislature specifically 
authorized counties to collect either fees or taxes both for CUITent operations and future 
(Icquisition of landtIlI sites"); Alpert v. BOise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136, 138, 795 P.2d 298, 
300 (1990) (upho ldi ne three percent franchise ('ee imposed pursuant to a franchise agreement 
authorized by the Constitution and legislative: enactment);?> foomis v. Ci()i 0/ Hailey, 119 Idaho 
434, 435-36, 807 P.2d 1272, 1273-74 (1991) (upholding user fees where city voters had 
approved revenue bond to fund il11provements to the sewer syslem pursuant to the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act); II POllS COllst. Co. v. N. Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 681-82, 116 
P.3d 8, 11-12 (2005) (upholding ICc imposed by water district where statute granted "municipal 
water service boards the authority to increase or decrease rates and fees as needed," revenues 
from the fec were "delegated for repairs, replacemenl and maintenance of system components 
proportionally llsed by those within the water district's system," and the reI:; only applied "to 
Ihnse who [paid] into the systeln")_ Because the Idaho Legislature has not granted the City 
authority to impose the stonnwater utility fee without adopling corresponding regUlations or 
providing a service to fee payers? the City's fee is an unlawful tax. 
2 The City argues its fees are analogous to the fees upheld in the cit~~d Cllf;eS, but does not provide any analySIS to 
S\lpport its bart as:lenioll . 
. 1 Moreover, the fee in Alperr was "based on consumpti()l1 and USe (of water and gas servicesl by the resident" and 
"not imposed on the residents directly by the cities, but lwasJ paid by the Ullhtles to the cities and as a COSt of 
business [andJ then passed on to the consumers by the utilities." Alperr, 118 Idaho at 133,795 1'.2d at 300. 
<I In addition, the Ices assessed in Loomis were calculated hased on remaining bond princip<ll, revenue li'orn fees 
were plaCed in a "special account and \lsed only for replacement oj' ex.isting system Cacilitic::; ami cy\liplllt;l1l," "[n]o 
funds collected ... [wcre) placed into or used by the general operating fund of the city," ''In)one of the connection 
fee generated funds [wen.:J used for expansion or irnpl'ovement of the cxistillg systems," ami "only users of ... 
servicc~ [were] charged'" UJOlI1is, 119 Id<lllo :J.r 4.3 5·] 6, 807 P .20 al 1273·74. 
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B. The City's Stormwater Utility Fee is Not Authorized Under the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act. 
Next, the City argues that its stonnwatcr utility fee is valid under the Idaho Revenue 
Bond Act ("!RBA" or "Act"). The City admits thal it has not been authorize(l to, nor has ir 
incurred, indebtedness to fund sl(>nl1water operations, lll()intcnance, Or improvelnents pursuant to 
the lRBA. Instead, il simply maintains that it reserves the right to pursue that option in the 
future. 
The possibility that the City may, at some undetem)ined point, issue revenue bonds does 
not grant it the authority to impose a slUllllwa(er utility fcc pursuant to lhe IRBA. Fee~, may only 
be imposed under the IRBA when revenue bonds have been issued. Because the City has not 
issued any bonds, the stormwater utility fee cannot be upheld as an exercise of authority pursl\ant 
to the lRBA. The City has cited no authority purporting to authorize the imposition of a fcc 
under such circumstances. 
In any event, the City's lee is inv~41id IIrlrier the IRBA because revenue from the fee is not 
dispersed in accordance with the IRBA's requirements. See Lo"omis, 119 Idaho (it 438-40, 807 
P.2d at 1276-78 (concluding that fees imposed pursuant to the TRBA are only valid if lhey 
"conform to the statutory scheme set forth in [that Act)"). Revenues from the stonnwater fee are 
not segrega.ted inlo a separall;: (lI.;count as required by thc Act. (Marsh Dep. 28:929:3; 36:8-24, 
Feb. 16, 2010.) Moreover, expenditures are not allocated to st0l111waier based upon any 
established guidelines or fomiula; but. instead, allocations arc based upon discretionary ad hoc 
determinations made by the City streets manager. (Bingman Dep. 37: 19~38:22, 44: 16-24\ 122:8-
18, Feb. 23, 2010.) When asked to explain certain allocations he made to stollllwah::r, the 
manager admitted he was simply trying to match expenditures to the budget. !d. at 112:7-19. 
Because the City's management of revenue Crom the stormwater utility fcc violales the 
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procedures established in the lRBA, the fee is not authori?cd by the Act. Instead) the stormwater 
tee i~ a disguised tax that violates lhe luahv Constitution. See Loomis, 119 Idaho at 439, g07 
P.2d at 1277 ("[1]f fees are collected under the disguise of the [Revenue )3ol1dJ Act and allocated 
and spent otherwise, then the fees arc primarily revenue raising and will be construed as taxes."). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The City's st0l111watcr utility rce is a disguised tax that violates me ldaho Constitution. 
"Under the theory advanced by the City, virtually all of what now are considered 'taxes' could 
be transmuted inlo 'user fees' by the simple expedient of dividing what are generally accepted as 
taxes into constituent parts, e.g., a 'police fcc. ", United States v. Ci()! of Huntington, 999 f.2d 
71, 73-74 (4th Cir. 1993). In their summary judgment filings, the Entities have presented 
overwhelming legal and lltelual authority demonstrating that the City'S foe is unconstitutional. 
There is no way to interpret Ordinance 4512 in a manner that upholds its constilutionality and the 
City has not set forth a basis for so doing. Instead, the City has merely responded to the Entities' 
argurnents with bare asseliions and conclusory allegations. None of' the legal authorities cited by 
the City serve to validate the st01l11water utility fee. Because 1he City's stOnl1water utility fcc i::; 
3. disguised tax, it may not be asses$t':d against the Govell1ll1cntal Entitie~ and the Entities are 
entitled to summary judgment on that basis. 
DATED lhi~ 3rcl day of June, 2010. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEJDL, PLLC 
----------------.-.--~ ~ /7 / . ~----- ~~-;-
To~dl 
Attorneys for Plaintitfs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on lhis 3rt! day or June, 2010, a copy of the foregoing REPLY 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTll:;'FS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Don L. Roberts, Attorney 
City of Lewiston 
1134 F Street, 21\d Floor 
P. O. Box 617 
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CV -2009-0002057 
Lewiston Independent School District # 1, etal. vs. City Of Lewiston 
Hearing type: Plfs' & Def's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 6/11/2010 
Time: 11 :02 am 
Judge: John Bradbury 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: PAM 
Tape Number: Crtrm #1 
Plaintiffs: Theodore Creason & Cynthia Mosher 
Defendant: Don Roberts 
COURT MINUTES 
11:02:25 Counsel are present in the courtroom. 
11:02:30 Court reviews Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. Court has reviewed all briefing submitted. Court has 
read Deckert, Stubbers and Bingman. Court's law clerk has read Marsh and Davies and 
has informed Court about them. Court has also read the Michigan case. Court has also 
read the ordinances in detail. Court has looked at almost everything submitted. Court is 
ready to proceed with argument. 
11:04:53 Mr. Creason presents Plaintiffs' argument on Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs are challenging city ordinance 4512. He argues that the 
power to tax is the power to destroy. He presents argument re: Article 7 of Idaho's 
Constitution. He argues that there is no regulatory provision in ordinance 4512. 
11:10:59 Court responds to Mr. Creason's argument and questions Mr. Creason. 
Court Minutes June 11,2010 
/11· 
11:11:55 Mr. Creason to Court's questioning and with 
argument. The storm water collection fee is not voluntary. 
11:13:04 Court questions Mr. Creason re: exception in appeal process. 
11:13:10 Mr. Creason responds to Court's questioning and continues with 
Plaintiffs' argument. 
11:14:47 Court responds. 
11:15:04 Mr. Creason responds. 
11:16:19 Court responds. 
11:16:22 Mr. Creason responds and continues with Plaintiffs' argument. 
11:16:51 Court responds. 
11:16:59 Mr. Creason responds and continues with Plaintiffs' argument. The fee is 
a tax. There is no exemption for non-users. 
11:18:01 Court responds. There is no exemption from fee when people don't put 
out garbage for collection. 
11:18:15 Mr. Creason responds and presents further argument on Plaintiffs' 
response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. This tax is a violation of Article 
7 Section 2. 
11:20:27 Court responds. Need to find out what a fee is and what a tax is. 
11:21:09 Mr. Creason responds and continues with argument re: difference 
bern'-e€:l1 a tax ruLd a fee. 
11:22:30 Court responds and questions Mr. Creason. 
11:23:50 Mr. Creason responds to Court's questioning and continues with 
Plaintiffs' argument. 
11:24:29 Court responds. 
11:25:59 Mr. Creason responds. 
11:26:33 Court responds. 
11:28:45 Mr. Creason responds. 
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11:29:23 Court respOl 
11:29:41 Mr. Creason continues with Plaintiffs' argument. 
11:30:58 Court responds. 
11:31:07 Mr. Creason responds. 
11:35:16 Court questions Mr. Creason. 
11:36:24 Mr. Creason responds. 
11:40:58 Court responds. 
11:42:57 Mr. Creason responds and presents Plaintiffs' additional argument. His 
clients do not agree to pay a fee that is a tax and legally do not have to pay if it is a tax. 
11:45:36 Court responds. Court will make the decision if it is a tax or a fee. There 
will be no gray area. 
11:45:50 Mr. Creason responds and continues with Plaintiffs' argument. The city 
has gone about it the wrong way in collecting money for the storm water problem. 
11:47:51 Mr. Roberts presents Defendants' argument and responds to Plaintiffs' 
argument. The main issue for the Court to decide is whether it is a fee or a tax. 
Defendants' position is that it is a fee and not a tax. 
11:54:42 Court questions Mr. Roberts. 
11:54:56 Mr. Roberts responds. 
11:56:05 Court questions Mr. Roberts. 
11:57:37 Mr. Roberts responds. 
12:01:57 Mr. Creason responds to Defendant's argument. 
12:04:05 Court questions Mr. Creason. 
12:04:22 Mr. Creason responds and presents argument. 
12:07:59 Court questions Ms. Mosher if there is anything she would like to add. 
12:08:02 Ms. Mosher responds no. 
12:08:08 Mr. Roberts responds and presents further argument. 
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12:09:45 Court responds and questions Mr. Roberts. 
12:10:05 Mr. Roberts responds. 
12:10:36 Court responds. Court wants to review everything again. Court takes 
motions for summary judgment under advisement. 
12:11:58 Court in recess at 12:11pm. 
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This case comes before me on cross-motions for summary judgment. There are no 
factual disputes. The legal dispute is whether or not the City of Lewiston's (City) storm water 
charge is a tax or a fee, and, if it is a tax, whether it is statutorily authorized, and, if so, whether 
it can be imposed on public and governing bodies (Public Entities). 
FACTS 
On August 11, 2008, the Lewiston City Council (Council) enacted Ordinance No. 
4512 (Ordinance) which created a City-controlled Storm Water Utility (Utility) and authorized 
imposition of a storm water utility charge to fund the Utility's functions. 1 
The Ordinance was adopted in response to new regulatory mandates by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1342. Section 402 requires municipalities discharging storm water to "waters of 
the United States" to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit. Section 402 states that its purpose is to "effectively prohibit non-storm water 
1 The Ordinance is codified at sections 36-151 to 36-162 of the Lewiston City Code and became effective on 
October 1, 2008. 
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discharge into the storm sewers" and "to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum 
extent practicable ... ". 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p),(B),3, (ii), (iii). 
Even though it is in draft form, the City's NPDES pe rrTl it requi~es the City to 
undertake comprehensive management of its storm water system to reduce pollutant loads 
from entering the receiving waters, which are primarily the Clearwater and Snake Rivers 
and Tammany and Lindsay Creeks. The Ordinance recites the Council's findings that 
"storm water run off causes property damage and erosion; carries concentrations of various 
pollutants into receiving waters; degrades the integrity of the City street and the 
transportation system; reduces citizen access to emergency services; and poses hazards to 
both lives and property" ... and "that storm water runoff must be managed in a manner that 
protects the public health, safety and welfare .... ". 
The Council also found that "establishing a Storm Water Utility provides the funding 
necessary to enable on-going maintenance operation, regulation, water quality 
management and improvement of the system ... and that all utility users having impervious 
surface areas make use of or benefit from city's ... storm water system; and that all utility 
users should participate in funding ... the storm water system." 
The Ordinance states that storm water occurs as a result of and in proportion to the 
extent of impervious surfaces (primarily roofs and pavement), and that all persons having 
impervious surfaces on their property generate storm water and thereby contribute to the 
need for storm water management. It also provides that all landowners benefited by a 
peripheral contribution the storm water system should pay for it by a charge that is 
proportional to the amount of water they contribute to the system. The Ordinance makes 
the "responsible person" liable for the charge. A responsible person is defined as the owner 
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or a person having possession of the property. 
The rate structure classifies property into residential and non-residential categories. 
The charge for each residential property is the same regardless of size or location. The 
charge is defined as one "equivalent residential unit" ("ERU") based on the assumption that 
the extent of impervious surfaces on residential lots is roughly equal. The charge for non-
residential properties is a sliding scale in which the number of ERUs is calculated based on 
a site-specific quantification of impervious surfaces. 
The Ordinance contemplated a Council resolution that would create the 
organizational structure of the Utility and the charge for each ERU. The Ordinance created 
an appeal process by which a landowner may challenge the charge as being unwarranted 
or based on an incorrect calculation of impervious surface or other aspect of the rate 
structure. 
The Ordinance created a storm water enterprise fund into which all charges collected 
would be deposited. The funds are to be segregated from other revenues of the City and 
are supposed to be available only for payment of costs of maintenance, operation, repairs, 
upkeep, and capital improvements to the storm water system, including bond payments. 
Finally, the Ordinance recited its reliance on the City's police power to provide for the 
health, welfare and safety of its residents. 
The Council then adopted Resolution No. 2008-55 on October 27,2008. The 
resolution exempted parcels of less than 2,000 square feet, excluding condominiums, 
undeveloped properties and owners qualifying for "circuit breaker" status. The resolution 
set the "base rate charge" per ERU at $6.00 per month. It assigned all residential parcels a 
value of one ERU to be paid at 100 percent of the base rate. There are no exemptions for 
property owners who contain storm water on their property or who otherwise do not 
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discharge storm water into infrastructures owned or operated by the City. 
The resolution phased in the charge over a three-year period. The City would assess 
50 percent the first year (October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009), 75 percent the 
second year (October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010), and 100 percent of the fee after 
October 1,2010. Council Resolution 2009-68 extended the 50 percent phase-in rate for an 
additional year - from October 1, 2009 through September 30, 2009. Resolution 2009-68 
also limited the purpose for which storm water fees may be expended. Section 3 of the 
resolution provides that "[a]II Storm Water Utility Fee collected ... only be expended to 
maintain, operate, or enhance the Storm Water Utility system of the City of Lewiston." The 
City currently uses Utility revenues for sweeping all the city streets, curb and gutter 
patching, trash and debris clean up, road shoulder grading and ditching, weed control clean 
up, and other interdepartmental charges assessed by the streets division and other City 
departments and divisions. Before the advent of Ordinance 4512, these activities were paid 
for out of the City's general revenue fund. 
The City divides its storm water drain system into three areas: North Lewiston, 
Normal Hill and the Downtown area, and the Orchards. In North Lewiston on the west side 
of the Clearwater River bridge is the Port of Lewiston, which has a comprehensive drain 
system. On the east side of the bridge there are a few minor drains but no comprehensive 
or coordinated drainage system. East of 31 st Street N. the drainage is through culverts 
under Highways 12/95. In the Orchards many neighborhoods are served by natural 
drainage ways and roadside ditches. Only the areas of Thain Road from Stewart Avenue to 
Linden Avenue and 8th Street from Preston to Linden Avenue, and 18th Street from Grelle 
Avenue to Alder Avenue have a storm water drain system. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: NPDES Permit # IDS 028061, http://gosemite.epa.gov.lr10, 
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water.nsf/NPDES & permits/Draft Permits 10/$ FILE/IDS 028061-FS.pdf6 (2007). There are, 
therefore, numerous properties with impervious services whose owners are charged by the 
.. UtilitybuLwhose water runoff, if any, does not enter a storm water dr.?in atall. _____ . 
On October 1, 2008, the City began billing the Public Entities for storm water 
charges. Their complaint followed. 
CONTENTIONS 
The Public Entities assert the City has created a tax that is disguised as a fee, that it 
is not statutorily authorized as a tax, and, if it is, it cannot be imposed on them because they 
are public entities. 
The City contends that the fee is proportional to the benefits the property owners 
realize from the storm drain system based on the water load their properties contribute to 
the system, and that the funds collected are allocated solely to administering the system. 
That, it asserts, qualifies the imposed charges as fees. If the charges are in fact a tax, the 
City contends it is statutorily authorized to impose it. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Constitutional Framework 
Whether or not the Utility charge for operating the storm water system is a tax or a 
fee is a matter of constitutional moment. See State v Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998). 
The legislature's power over municipalities is plenary. It has the "power to amend the 
charters of municipal corporations, may enlarge or diminish their powers, change their 
boundaries, or create or abolish them." Hays v. Steunenberg, 5 Idaho 1, 2 (1896). Once 
municipalities are created, however, the Idaho Constitution vests them with the power to 
protect the public's safety. 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all 
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such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter 
or with the general laws. 
IDAHOCONST., art. XII, §2. The police power encompasses providing for "the public health, 
morals, safety and general welfare" of the community being governed. Winther v. Vii/age of 
Weippe, 91 Idaho 798, 801-802 (1967). The authority has been described as "the least 
limitable of the powers of government." Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343, 349 (1950) 
quoting District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 US 138, 149. The police power is so broad that 
state legislation regarding it is a limitation on that power rather than a grant of authority. 
Rowe, 70 Idaho at 348. In the realm of police power, municipalities' power has been 
described as "coequal with the authority of the legislature ... ". Clyde Hess District Co. v. 
Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 512 (1949); see, generally, Michael C Moore, The Idaho 
Constitution and Local Governments - Selected Topics, 31 IDAHO L. REv.,4 17, 419-425. The 
only restrictions on a city's police power is that its reach must not exceed the city limits, it 
must be consistent with state law and it must not be arbitrary. Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 
205,207 (1983). 
The City also has the inherent power to impose fees to fund those services and 
regulations. Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,211 (1941). 
Effective exercise of the police power necessarily involves expenditures in many 
ways. The means and instrumentalities, by and through which the supervising 
powers of the policing authority are brought to bear on the subject to be regulated, 
involve costs and expenses. It is only reasonable and fair to require the business, 
traffic, act or thing that necessitates policing to pay this expense. 
Id. The fees that are imposed must be specific to the service or regulation and the funds 
must be allocated to those activities. State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713 (1923), overruled on 
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other grounds by Greater Boise Auditorium District v. Royal Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho 844 
(1984). There is no prohibition against charging public entities fees for the services they 
receive. 
The City, however, does not have inherent power to levy taxes. The Idaho 
Constitution authorizes the state legislature to vest municipalities with the power to assess 
and collect taxes. 
The legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town or 
other municipal corporation, but may by law invest in the corporate authorities 
thereof, respectively, the power to asses and collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation. 
IDAHO CONST., art. VII, §6. So while the legislature cannot raise taxes for municipalities, it can 
authorize them to do it for themselves. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 503 
(1988); see also Hamilton v. McCafl, 90 Idaho 253, 259 (1965). Municipalities are, however, 
constitutionally proscribed from taxing public entities. "The property of ... the state, counties, 
towns, cities, villages, school districts, and other municipal corporations and public libraries 
shall be exempt from taxation; ... " IDAHO CaNST., art. VII, § 4. 
As a result, if the Utility charges are fees, the Public Entities must pay them; if they 
are a tax, it can't be levied on them. The Public Entities enter this fray with the burden to 
overcome the Ordinance's "strong presumption of validity." See State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 
195,197 (1998). 
B. The Characteristics of a Tax and a Fee 
The difference between a fee and a tax is fairly simply stated. A police power "fee is 
a charge for a direct public service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a 
forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs." Brewster, 115 Idaho at 
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505. Deciding where a charge falls, however, is not always as simple. 
Charges for supplying water and collecting garbage fit easily into the fee category . 
. Only those who are eligible or actually receive tangible services pay the cost of those 
services. The fees are based on the projected cost of the particular service. See, e.g., 
Schmidt v. Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48 (1953) (sewer hookup); Kootenai County Property Owners 
Assn. v. Kootenai County, 115 Idaho 676 (1989) (solid waste disposal). 
These types of discrete services to specific consumers are distinguishable from 
police, fire protection, libraries, streets and schools, where the public at large is the 
beneficiary and for which taxes are levied. As earlier stated, however, unlike police power 
services or regulations, taxes must be permitted by legislation. IDAHO CONST., art. VII., § 6; 
Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424 (1985). The question I must decide is 
whether the effects from the storm water drain system provide a discrete benefit for the 
individual property owners, or whether the property owners have the same benefit as the 
public at large. 
C. The Storm Water Charge 
This is a case of first impression in Idaho. There is a divergence of authority in those 
states that have addressed the issue. As did the City of Lewiston, Lansing, Michigan, 
created a storm water system to comply with the Clean Water Act. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 
587 N.W. 2d 264, 269 (Mich. 1999). It also based its charge to property owners on the 
area of impervious surface on the individual parcels. The Michigan Supreme Court applied 
three criteria necessary for the charge to be a fee: does it serve a "regulation purpose rather 
than a revenue-raising purpose," are the charges proportionate to the costs of the project, 
and is the use of the service voluntary. Id. at 270-271. The court held that the charge was a 
tax because no one could opt out of the system, that some property owners were already 
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served by a drain system, and the charges would continue after the capital cost had been 
amortized. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the fourth Circuit held thata perJon charge on solid 
waste that is hauled to landfills to fund compliance with EPA rules regulating pollutants 
entering the surface waters of West Virginia was a tax. Valero Terrestial Corp. v. Caffrey, 
205 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 2000). There the court defined a "classic tax" as a charge that is 
imposed by an administrative agency on "a large segment of society" to "benefit the 
community at large" and a "classic fee" as a charge on only those being regulated for 
regulatory purposes or to defray the costs of the regulation. Id. at 134. The court held that 
because the charges were passed on to the people whose waste was hauled, it was 
imposed on a significant portion of the population and because the beneficiaries of the 
charge were the surface waters of West Virginia, it was a tax. Id. at 134-135. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court, however, applying state law, found the benefits to 
the property owners sufficient to validate the fees, holding that "it is not requisite to the 
validity of an assessment. ... that the benefits be immediate or direct or that protection from 
floods are absolute." City of Huntington v. Bacon, 473 S.E. 2d 743, 756 (1996), quoting 
Duling Bros. Co. v. City of Huntington, 196 S.E. 552 (1938). Other courts have also found 
that an indirect benefit to property owners from whose property the water flows into the 
storm water system is enough nexus to be considered a benefit to the property owners. 
See, e.g., Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1996); 
Densmore v. Jefferson County, 813 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 2001); Board of Education of Jordan 
School District, 94 P.3d. 234 (Utah 2004); Storedahl Properties v. Clark County, 178 P.3d 
377 (Wash. App. 2008). 
The Florida Supreme Court analogized the benefit to the developed property owners 
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as "similar to the special benefit received from the collection and disposal of solid waste." 
Sarasota County, 667 So. 2d at 186. 
The(JtahSupreme; Qo_Urt heldthe owners of the property with impervious surfaces 
received a benefit from the storm water system because the "removal of something one 
does not wish to retain can be as valuable as the delivery of something one wishes to 
receive." The court held "that a storm sewer drainage fee may be labeled a service fee and 
is akin to the water, lighting and sewer charges .... " Board of Education, 94 P.3d at 240. 
The Washington Court of Appeals held the storm water charge was a fee "because 
Clark County reasonably based its rates on the amount of the property owners' 
contributions to the problem." Storedahl Properties, 178 P.3d at 386. The court held that 
was a "direct" benefit to the property owners. Id. 
It is in the context of this precedent that I must decide whether the City's storm water 
charges are a fee or a tax. In doing so I am cognizant of the presumption that the 
Ordinance is valid. 
The recent trend clearly favors the City's position. It argues its ordinance meets the 
indirect benefits criterion the Florida, Alabama, West Virginia, Utah and Washington courts 
established for the storm water charge to qualify as a fee. The Alabama court described the 
benefits to the land owners who must pay the charges as indirect. It said that "for a fee to 
be sustained as valid, the benefit conferred on the property owners need not relate directly 
to the exact amount paid" but "that a 'substantial indirect benefit' to a property owner would 
suffice to uphold the validity of a fee." Densmore, 813 So. 2d at 845, (citation omitted). It 
did not identify what the benefit was. 
That authority runs contrary to the Idaho precedent that has found fees to be 
permissible when "a direct public service is rendered to the particular consumer ... " in cases 
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not involving storm water drains. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 505. The question is the extent to 
which a direct benefit to a specific property or owner can be attenuated before the charges 
no longer qualify as a fee. That question can only be answered after the effects of the 
storm water drain system on property owners are examined. 
The City Council made findings in the Ordinance that storm water causes property 
damage and erosion, transports pollutants, degrades streets and transportation and 
reduces access to emergency services. Those, of course, are the effects on the public and 
there is no indication that any of them are attributable to anyone property owner or to them 
as a category. The purpose of the drain system is to alleviate the storm water's effects. To 
the extent it succeeds the public at large, in a random sense, benefits. Fewer weeds, 
cleaner streets, better curbs, unobstructed ditches directly benefit only those people whose 
lives encounter those changes. 
The intended and measurable benefits of less pollution are to the surface waters 
into which the storm water flows, especially the Snake and Clearwater Rivers and Tammany 
and Lindsay Creeks. And the City Council acknowledged that when it enacted the 
Ordinance. Its stated purpose was to reduce the pollutants entering the rivers in order to 
comply with the draft NPDES permit. The primary means of accomplishing that is by 
cleaning and repairing the Citys' street system. The City Storm Water Activity List includes: 
• removal and replacement of pavement to provide a safe and smooth 
traveling surface 
• installing berms and humps to regulate traffic speed and to prevent 
road shoulder washing and rutting 
• asphalt patches between curb and gutter to provide smooth traveling 
surface and guide storm water in the gutter 
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water if and when it leaves the properties whose owners are being charged. It is difficult to 
see how an owner's property or life is in any way directly enhanced, degraded or otherwise 
changed with the adventQltbeJ.)tility ___ Unlikese\Nageorgarbage which is owner generated 
waste that is actually removed by the City's garbage collection and sewer system, the City 
plays no part in the water flowing from property within the City. 
Reduced to its bare, unadorned essentials, the charge is directly related to the 
estimated amount of water that could flow from parcels of land rather than to any consumed 
product, rendered service or conduct regulation that is specific to the parcel owners. The 
rationale is that, as the Washington Court of Appeals held, the fee is based on the "amount 
of the property owners' contribution to the problem." Storedahl Properties, 178 P.3d at 386. 
That approach is remarkably similar to the City of Pocatello ordinance that imposed a street 
restoration and maintenance fee on property owners based on the estimated traffic 
generated by a given piece of property. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 502. There, as here, there 
was no regulation of the traffic that could enter the streets, nothing to consume no service to 
property owners that was not available to all who used the city streets. There the court said 
in the absence of a regulation, service or consumable product, it was "a forced contribution 
by the public at large to meet public needs." Id. at 505. 
Here the only nexus between the property owners and reduced pollution limits is that 
some of the water that may flow from some of the properties onto the City streets that in 
turn may eventually enter the storm drain system at some unspecified point. If this tenuous 
link between the property owner and the drain system is enough to transform a charge a 
into fee, the distinction between a fee and a tax is illusory. The beneficiaries of clean streets 
and fewer weeds are all the residents of Lewiston. The beneficiaries of cleaner surface 
waters are the users of those waters. If one assumes the Idaho Supreme Court meant what 
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it said in the Brewster - that a "fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to the 
particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public 
needs" - the Utility charge is a tax.2 
The City argues that, that even if the charge is a tax, it can be imposed as a fee by 
virtue of Idaho Code §63-1311 which permits a city to impose fees that would otherwise be 
funded by property taxes so long as the fees are reasonably related to the actual cost of the 
service being rendered. The statute explicitly assumes services are being rendered to 
properties being charged. There are, however, as discussed, no services being provided. 
I reach this conclusion fully cognizant of the evolving authority that contributing 
storm water to a drain system is enough of an indirect benefit to warrant the charge being 
characterized as a fee. The problem is that the indirect benefits are not indentified or 
described and none is apparent. More than mere conclusions are required. Even if there 
were an indirect benefit, there is not a scintilla of evidence that it would accrue to the 
property owners in any way differently that it does to the public at large. 
The distinction between a tax and a fee is of constitutional dimension. It should not 
be blurred by courts' unsupported conclusions of benefits for the reason that they find the 
projects worthy. There is no dispute that reducing pollutants in our rivers is a worthwhile 
endeavor. Its worth, however, does not trump the constitutional imperative of how it must be 
accomplished. 
D. Is the City Authorized to Impose the Tax? 
In considering the City's authority to tax I am guided by Di"on's Rule, which states 
that "any fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the 
[municipal) corporation against the existence of power." Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 
2 Brewster, 115 Idaho at 503 (emphasis added). 
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Iowa 163, 170 (1868) (Dillon, C, J.), adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Caesar v 
State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 (1980). Once the power is given, however, "it carries with it by 
. implicationthe dQing ofJhosE;; things necessary to make such [sewer] systems effective and 
complete, and also the manner in which the power is to be carried out, if not specifically 
provided." Veatch v Gibson, 29 Idaho 609,617 (1916) citing 1 Dillon on Municipal Corp., 5th 
ed., sc 242. 
Sections 315, 317 and 323 of Title 50 of the Idaho Code grant cities the authority to 
repair streets, remove weeds and provide domestic water. There is nothing in those 
sections that authorizes the construction of a storm water drain system or taxes to pay for 
the maintenance of one. To the contrary, section 317 provides that only the property owner 
on whose property the weeds are found can be charged for their removal. 
Sections 331,332 and 334 authorize cities to change water courses, to alter drains 
or sewers or water courses by a special levy for that purpose and to abate nuisances. Again 
there is nothing that authorizes a tax for a storm water drain system, especially one that 
includes a city's entire street maintenance system. 
The City also relies on Idaho Code §50-1702 which authorizes local improvement 
districts to be formed with the power to assess the property owners who are benefitted. 
There is no LID involved here. 
Finally, the City invokes the Idaho Revenue Bonding Act, Idaho Code § §1027 to 1042, 
that encompasses storm water drainage systems. No bonds are involved. But the Act 
demonstrates that if the legislature had intended to include storm water drains in a tax 
authorization statute it knew how to do it. Instead it chose bonds as the means to finance a 
storm water drain system. 
The problem is the lack of legislative authority to levy taxes to pay for the system 
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that article VII, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution requires. I must construe the statutes on which 
the City relies against the City if there is doubt about its power to tax for the Utility. City of 
Grangeville v Haskin, 116 Idaho 533, 538 (1989) ("If there is a fair, reasonable substantial 
doubt as to the existence of a power, the doubt must be resolved against the city"); 
Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 140 Idaho 1, 4-5 (2003). None of the statutes specifically 
authorizes taxes for storm water drain systems and there is nothing that compels that 
conclusion by implication. See Haskin, 116 Idaho at 538. 
I sympathize with the City's plight. The answer is to be found at the legislature, 
which, under Idaho's constitution, is solely empowered to authorize the City to raise the 
taxes necessary to accomplish what the NPDES draft permit requires. 
Since I have concluded that the charges are a tax and that the City does not have 
authority to levy it, I do not reach the question of whether the Public Entities qualify for 
immunity under article VII, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The Public Entities' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; the Citys' motion 
for summary judgment is DENIED. Cost are awarded to the Public Entities. The parties shall 
bear their own lawyer's fees. 
It is so ordered this 16th day of July, 2010. 
John Bradbury, District Judge 
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CLERK OF THE DIST. COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL ) Case No. CV 09-02057 
DISTRICT #1, an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; LEWIS-CLARK STATE ) 
COLLEGE, an Idaho body politic and ) 
corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, a legal ) 
subdivision ofthe state ofIdaho; PORT OF ) 
ORDER FOR ENTRY OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
--- ----~-~LEWISTON,-a-public1ycreated Port District ___ ) _____ ~ _____________________________ _ 
within Nez Perce County, Idaho; and ) 
LEWISTON ORCHARDS IRRIGATION ) 
DISTRICT, a duly organized Irrigation ) 
District within Nez Perce County, Idaho, ) 
PlaLl1tiffs, 
v. 













ORDER FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - 1 
lac/go vtentitieslpleadingljudgment ~ order 
The Court, having reviewed the Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment entered 
into by the parties in the above-entitled matter, hereby orders as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment be 
entered in favor of the plaintiffs pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
entered on July 16,2010. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that any 
claims raised in the plaintiffs' Complaint that were not disposed of by the July 16,2010 
Order are hereby dismissed, including the plaintiffs' request for issuance of writs of 
prohibition and mandate. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs be awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of$1,708.55. 
DATED tlus Ji day of August, 2010. 
O~uu/~ 
~tns~6tJUdge tI 
ORDER FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - 2 
toclgovtentitieslpleadingljudgment_ order 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ 2, day of August, 2010, a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER FOR ENTRY OF FINAtfunGMENT was served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Theodore o. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P. O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Don L. Roberts, Attorney 
City of Lewiston 
1422 Main Street 
P. O. Box 617 










ORDER FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - 3 
locigo)llentitieslpleading(judgmellt_order 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4day of August, 2010, a copy of the 
foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was served by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Don L. Roberts, Attorney 
City of Lewiston 
1422 Main Street 
P. O. Box 617 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dok1cen & Geidl, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
P. O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
~ HAND DELNERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
FINAL JUDGMENT - 3 
tocigovtentities/pleadin/jillaI.Judgment 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By ~~ty 
DON L. ROBERTS 
City Attorney 
JAMIE C. SHROPSHIRE 
Assistant City Attorney 
1422 Main Street, P.O. Box 617 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: 208.746.7948 
Fax: 208.746.7952 
ISB # ftlf'f 
ISB # 3804 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT #1, ) 
an Idaho body politic and corporate; LEWIS- ) 
CLARK STATE COLLEGE, an Idaho body ) CASE NO. CV09-02057 
politic and corporate; NEZ PERCE COUNTY, ) 
a legal subdivision of the State of Idaho; ) 
PORT OF LEWISTON, a publicly created Port ) 
District within Nez Perce County, Idaho; and, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
LEWISTON ORCHARD IRRIGATION DISTRICT, ) 
a duly organized Irrigation District within ) 
Nez Perce County, Idaho, ) 
) 




CITY OF LEWISTON, a Municipal Corporation, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant! Appellant. ) 
) 
------------------------------) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #1, LEWIS-CLARK STATE COLLEGE, NEZ PERCE COUNTY, PORT OF 
LEWISTON, AND, LEWISTON ORCHARDS IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
1. The above named appellant, CITY OF LEWISTON, appeals against the 
above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Final Judgment 
entered in the above entitled action on the 23rd day of August 2010, Honorable 
John Bradbury, Presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment described in paragraph 1, above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. The issues on appeal, as currently identified are: 
a. The district court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that the City of Lewiston Storm Water Utility fee which the 
City is authorized to establish property pursuant to the City's police powers 
contained in the Idaho Code, Title 50, Chapter3, Title 50, Chapter 10, Title 50, 
Chapter 20, and Title 50, Chapter 31, Section 50-1027, et seq., Section 50-
1703, Ordinance No. 4512, codified as Article V, Section 36-151, et seq., of the 
Lewiston Municipal Code, Resolution No. 2008-55, Resolution 2009-68 and 
pursuant to the statutory authority granted in Idaho Code Section 63-1311. 
b. The district court erred in granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the City of Lewiston Storm Water Utility fee is a tax not a fee 
and, was therefore improperly enacted and imposed. 
4. There is no order sealing any of the record of this proceeding. 
S. A reporter's transcript of the hearing on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment has been prepared. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
6. The appellant requests that the following documents be included in the 
clerk's record: 
a. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
b. Plaintiffs' Memoranda in support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
c. The Affidavit of Theodore O. Creason with the transcripts of the 
following depositions which were presented in hard copy and CD and attached 
to the Affidavit of Theodore O. Creason in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
(1) Thomas Deche rt taken November 14 and 16, 2009; 
(2) Thomas Dechert taken January 27, 2010; 
(3) Daniel Marsh taken February 16, 2010; 
(4) Chris Davies taken February 16, 2010; 
(5) Keith Bingman taken February 23, 2010; and, 
(6) Shawn Stubbers taken February 23, 2010. 
d. The Affidavit of Chet Herbst attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
e. All exhibits attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
or presented by Plaintiffs at the hearing on the parties motions for summary 
judgment held June 11, 2010. 
f. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
g. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
h. Ordinance No. 4512 and Article V. of the Lewiston Municipal Code 
attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment as 
Exhibit A. 
1. Resolution 2008-55 of the City of Lewiston attached to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment as Exhibit B. 
j. Resolution 2009-68 of the City of Lewiston attached to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment as Exhibit C. 
k. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
l. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
m. The Memorandum Decision and Order issued by Judge Bradbury on 
July 16, 2010. 
7. Appellant requests that the following documents admitted as 
exhibits be sent to the Supreme Court: all exhibits attached to the Motions and 
Memoranda in Support of the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment and 
Replies or Responses to the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment and any 
additional exhibits admitted at the hearing on the motions for summary 
judgment held on June 11,2010. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter 
of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 4 
Linda L. Carlton, C.S.R. #336 
425 Warner Avenue 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501. 
(b) The reporter has been paid the fee for the preparation of the 
reporter's transcript. 
(c) The appellant is exempt from paying for the preparation of the 
clerk's record because the appellant is a municipal corporation of the State of 
Idaho. 
(d) The appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
the appellate is a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho. 
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this ?:£)fL. day of ~pte~ 2010. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September 2010, I delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the parties in the 
manner specified below. 
Mr. Theodore O. Creason 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 





BY~~ amie C. Shropshire 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 6 ~J/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #1 et aI, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 38116 
vs. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
CITY OF LEWISTON, A Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, 
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-
Appeal, and additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That no exhibits were marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
2. That the following will be submitted as exhibits to 
this record on appeal to the Supreme Court only: 
Transcript of the depositions of the following: 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Thomas Dechert taken November 14 and 16, 2009; 
Thomas Dechert taken January 27, 2010; 
Daniel Marsh taken February 16, 2010; 
Chris Davies taken February 16, 2010; 
Keith Bingman taken February 23, 2010 and 
Shawn Stubbers taken February 23, 2010 
CD 
Exhibits #1 - #19 pertaining to the deposition of Thomas 
Dechert. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said court this ~ day of November 2010. 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #1 et aI, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
CITY OF LEWISTON, A Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 38116 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript were hand delivered to 
Don L. Roberts and Theodore O. Creason this day of November 
2010. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this ~q day of November 2010 
PATTY O. WEEKS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By __________________________ ___ 
Deputy Clerk 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
